The thing is, Bin Laden is now in Pakistan. Does this mean that the Pakistani's are 'protecting' or 'harbouring' him? Should America be carpet bombing Pakistan now?
you are talking about tribal areas. otherwise known as pakistan by borders only. pakistan has no control of this area. should we carpet bomb this area? no but laser guided bombs would be nice
I think that the correct course of action would have been to have courted the Talebans favour in 2002 and perhaps sent in some special forces to assist them.
courted the taliban? are you insane? what makes you think they would want us to court them? good thing you werent president when we were attacked. "court the taliban" wow.
The Taleban know that land better than Bin Laden and the other Saudi's who were living up in those mountains. They could have flushed him out quicker than anyone.
again, are you insane? somehow you think the taliban would help the US catch bin laden?
No evidence of your favorite excuse, just prove it to me and i'll follow you all the way.
Keep on rockin in the free world!!!!
The economy has polarized to the point where the wealthiest 10% now own 85% of the nation’s wealth. Never before have the bottom 90% been so highly indebted, so dependent on the wealthy.
you are talking about tribal areas. otherwise known as pakistan by borders only. pakistan has no control of this area. should we carpet bomb this area? no but laser guided bombs would be nice
courted the taliban? are you insane? what makes you think they would want us to court them? good thing you werent president when we were attacked. "court the taliban" wow.
again, are you insane? somehow you think the taliban would help the US catch bin laden?
always comes down to oil doesnt it? im not even going to try with this one
The Taleban would have grabbed at the chance to have gotten the worlds only superpower on their side. However, the U.S offered them nothing, but just set demands on them.
Again, it seems to me like the U.S had an ulterior motive from the word go.
Because it isn't 'percieved by most in the world to be one of his biggest blunders and biggest areas of incompetence'. Nothing of the sort. And catching and executing Sadaam took the limelight. Because the media have given up on Bin Laden, nobody gives a fuck about him anymore - except perhaps those people who lost family members in the twin towers.
And i'll repeat what i said earlier. American's need an enemy. Bin Laden will always be there in the background, ready to serve that need, and ready to serve the needs of the war mongers and spin doctors.
Well there you go. You just contradicted the hell out of yourself. Nobody gives a fuck about Osama Bin Laden anymore???
Well why the hell does Bush need him then? If nobody cares, Bush's supposed "ploy" of decpeption and fear mongering wouldn't work now would it?
Harboured him? What does that mean? It means nothing. The Pakistani's could be accused of harbouring him now. So what? Jlew spoke of him living in tribal areas - as if this is no mans land. Well, he was living in tribal areas in Afghanistan. What difference does it make?
If America had put something on the table for the Taleban to grab at then they would have flushed Bin Laden out in a matter of days.
US policy on Taliban influenced by oil - authors
By Julio Godoy
PARIS - Under the influence of United States oil companies, the government of President George W Bush initially blocked intelligence agencies' investigations on terrorism while it bargained with the Taliban on the delivery of Osama bin Laden in exchange for political recognition and economic aid, two French intelligence analysts claim.
In the book Bin Laden, la verite interdite (Bin Laden, the forbidden truth), that was released recently, the authors, Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie, reveal that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) deputy director John O'Neill resigned in July in protest over the obstruction.
The authors claim that O'Neill told them that "the main obstacles to investigate Islamic terrorism were US oil corporate interests and the role played by Saudi Arabia in it". The two claim that the US government's main objective in Afghanistan was to consolidate the position of the Taliban regime to obtain access to the oil and gas reserves in Central Asia.
They affirm that until August, the US government saw the Taliban regime "as a source of stability in Central Asia that would enable the construction of an oil pipeline across Central Asia" from the rich oilfields in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, through Afghanistan and Pakistan, to the Indian Ocean. Until now, says the book, "the oil and gas reserves of Central Asia have been controlled by Russia. The Bush government wanted to change all that."
But, confronted with Taliban's refusal to accept US conditions, "this rationale of energy security changed into a military one", the authors claim.
"At one moment during the negotiations, the US representatives told the Taliban, 'either you accept our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a carpet of bombs,'" Brisard said in an interview in Paris.
According to the book, the Bush administratino began to negotiate with the Taliban immediately after coming into power in February. US and Taliban diplomatic representatives met several times in Washington, Berlin and Islamabad.
To polish their image in the United States, the Taliban even employed a US expert on public relations, Laila Helms. The authors claim that Helms is also an expert in the works of US intelligence organizations, for her uncle, Richard Helms, is a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The last meeting between US and Taliban representatives took place in August, five weeks before the attacks on New York and Washington, the analysts maintain. On that occasion, Christina Rocca, in charge of Central Asian affairs for the US government, met the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan in Islamabad.
Brisard and Dasquie have long experience in intelligence analysis. Brisard was until the late 1990s director of economic analysis and strategy for Vivendi, a French company. He also worked for French secret services, and wrote for them in 1997 a report on the now famous Al-Qaeda network, headed by bin Laden.
Dasquie is an investigative journalist and publisher of Intelligence Online, a respected newsletter on diplomacy, economic analysis and strategy, available through the Internet.
Brisard and Dasquie draw a portrait of the closest aides to Bush, linking them to the oil business. Bush's family has a strong oil background, as do some of his top aides. From Vice President Dick Cheney, through the director of the National Security Council Condoleezza Rice, to the ministers of commerce and energy, Donald Evans and Stanley Abraham, all have for long worked for US oil companies.
Cheney was until the end of last year president of Halliburton, a company that provides services for oil industry; Rice was between 1991 and 2000 manager for Chevron; Evans and Abraham worked for Tom Brown, another oil giant.
Besides the secret negotiations held between Washington and Kabul and the importance of the oil industry, the book takes issue with the role played by Saudi Arabia in fostering Islamic fundamentalism, in the personality of bin Laden, and with the networks that the Saudi dissident built to finance his activities.
Brisard and Dasquie contend that the US government's claim that it had been prosecuting bin Laden since 1998. "Actually," Dasquie says, "the first state to officially prosecute bin Laden was Libya, on the charges of terrorism."
"Bin Laden wanted to settle in Libya in the early 1990s, but was hindered by the government of Muammar Gaddafi," Dasquie claims. "Enraged by Libya's refusal, bin Laden organized attacks inside Libya, including assassination attempts against Gaddafi."
Dasquie singles out one group, the Islamic Fighting Group (IFG), reputedly the most powerful Libyan dissident organization, based in London, and directly linked with bin Laden. "Gaddafi even demanded Western police institutions, such as Interpol, to pursue the IFG and bin Laden, but never obtained cooperation," Dasquie says. "Until today, members of IFG openly live in London."
The book confirms earlier reports that the US government worked closely with the United Nations during the negotiations with the Taliban. "Several meetings took place this year, under the arbitration of Francesc Vendrell, personal representative of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to discuss the situation in Afghanistan," says the book. "Representatives of the US government and Russia, and the six countries that border with Afghanistan were present at these meetings," it says. "Sometimes, representatives of the Taliban also sat around the table."
These meetings, also called Six plus 2, because of the number of states (six neighbors plus the US and Russia) involved, have been confirmed by Naif Naik, former Pakistani minister for foreign affairs.
In a French television news program two weeks ago, Naik said that during a Six plus 2 meeting in Berlin in July, the discussions turned around "the formation of a government of national unity. If the Taliban had accepted this coalition, they would have immediately received international economic aid. And the pipelines from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan would have come," he added.
Naik also claimed that Tom Simons, the US representative at these meetings, openly threatened the Taliban and Pakistan. "Simons said, 'either the Taliban behave as they ought to, or Pakistan convinces them to do so, or we will use another option'. The words Simons used were 'a military operation'," Naik claimed.
since you need it explained to you I will. it means they allowed him to set up training camps. and allowed him to freely operate el queda. what dont u understand about that?
Well, he was living in tribal areas in Afghanistan. What difference does it make?
big difference. bin laden wasnt confied to one small lawless area of afgahistan. he freely moved around the whole country. do you see osama renting an apartment in Islamabad next to the american embassy?
In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, two reports appeared in the British media indicating that the US government had threatened military action against Afghanistan several months before September 11.
The BBC’s George Arney reported September 18 that American officials had told former Pakistani Foreign Secretary Niaz Naik in mid-July of plans for military action against the Taliban regime:
“Mr. Naik said US officials told him of the plan at a UN-sponsored international contact group on Afghanistan which took place in Berlin.
“Mr. Naik told the BBC that at the meeting the US representatives told him that unless Bin Laden was handed over swiftly America would take military action to kill or capture both Bin Laden and the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar.
“The wider objective, according to Mr. Naik, would be to topple the Taliban regime and install a transitional government of moderate Afghans in its place—possibly under the leadership of the former Afghan King Zahir Shah.
“Mr. Naik was told that Washington would launch its operation from bases in Tajikistan, where American advisers were already in place.
“He was told that Uzbekistan would also participate in the operation and that 17,000 Russian troops were on standby.
“Mr. Naik was told that if the military action went ahead it would take place before the snows started falling in Afghanistan, by the middle of October at the latest.”
Four days later, on September 22, the Guardian newspaper confirmed this account. The warnings to Afghanistan came out of a four-day meeting of senior US, Russian, Iranian and Pakistani officials at a hotel in Berlin in mid-July, the third in a series of back-channel conferences dubbed “brainstorming on Afghanistan.”
The participants included Naik, together with three Pakistani generals; former Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations Saeed Rajai Khorassani; Abdullah Abdullah, foreign minister of the Northern Alliance; Nikolai Kozyrev, former Russian special envoy to Afghanistan, and several other Russian officials; and three Americans: Tom Simons, a former US ambassador to Pakistan; Karl Inderfurth, a former assistant secretary of state for south Asian affairs; and Lee Coldren, who headed the office of Pakistan, Afghan and Bangladesh affairs in the State Department until 1997.
The meeting was convened by Francesc Vendrell, then and now the deputy chief UN representative for Afghanistan. While the nominal purpose of the conference was to discuss the possible outline of a political settlement in Afghanistan, the Taliban refused to attend. The Americans discussed the shift in policy toward Afghanistan from Clinton to Bush, and strongly suggested that military action was an option.
While all three American former officials denied making any specific threats, Coldren told the Guardian, “there was some discussion of the fact that the United States was so disgusted with the Taliban that they might be considering some military action.” Naik, however, cited one American declaring that action against bin Laden was imminent: “This time they were very sure. They had all the intelligence and would not miss him this time. It would be aerial action, maybe helicopter gunships, and not only overt, but from very close proximity to Afghanistan.”
The Guardian summarized: “The threats of war unless the Taliban surrendered Osama bin Laden were passed to the regime in Afghanistan by the Pakistani government, senior diplomatic sources revealed yesterday. The Taliban refused to comply but the serious nature of what they were told raises the possibility that Bin Laden, far from launching the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon out of the blue 10 days ago, was launching a pre-emptive strike in response to what he saw as US threats.”
Bush, oil and Taliban
Further light on secret contacts between the Bush administration and the Taliban regime is shed by a book released November 15 in France, entitled Bin Laden, the Forbidden Truth, written by Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie. Brisard is a former French secret service agent, author of a previous report on bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network, and former director of strategy for the French corporation Vivendi, while Dasquie is an investigative journalist.
The two French authors write that the Bush administration was willing to accept the Taliban regime, despite the charges of sponsoring terrorism, if it cooperated with plans for the development of the oil resources of Central Asia.
Until August, they claim, the US government saw the Taliban “as a source of stability in Central Asia that would enable the construction of an oil pipeline across Central Asia.” It was only when the Taliban refused to accept US conditions that “this rationale of energy security changed into a military one.”
In the weeks prior to the military action in Afghanistan, U.S. President George W. Bush delivered an ultimatum [5] to the Taliban, to:
* deliver Al-Qaeda leaders located in Afghanistan to the United States
* release all imprisoned foreign nationals, including American citizens [6]
* protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in Afghanistan
* close terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and "hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities"
* give the United States full access to terrorist training camps to verify their closure
President Bush further stated the demands were not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban refused to directly speak to Bush, stating that talking with a non-Muslim political leader would be an insult to Islam.
* The only known direct conversation between Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar and any U.S. official, on August 22, 1998, just two days after the U.S. sent cruise missiles into bin Laden training camps in Afghanistan in retaliation for the attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. [2]
* An August 23, 1998 cable from the U.S. Department of State following the conversation with Mullah Omar that provided evidence linking bin Laden with the U.S. Embassy attacks in Africa and several other terrorist plots, including a plan to blow up U.S. airliners in the Pacific. [3]
* Frequent contradictions in Taliban statements to U.S. diplomats. The Taliban claimed that 80% of their officials and a majority of Afghans oppose Osama bin Laden's presence, yet also claimed that the Taliban would be overthrown were they to extradite bin Laden, due to his popularity in Afghanistan and around the Muslim world. Mullah Omar called bin Laden "an enemy," according to a Pakistani informant, while other Taliban officials tell the U.S. that Mullah Omar is the primary reason why bin Laden continued to be afforded sanctuary in Afghanistan, despite the fact that 80% of Taliban officials opposed his presence [6][9][7][24].
* An October 1998 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad documenting statements made by the Taliban Foreign Minister, Maulawi Wakil Ahmed, that the Taliban "do not support terrorism," and that bin Laden was moved to Kandahar "to keep a better watch on him." In a November 1998 cable from the State Department, a low-level Taliban official assures the American ambassador that bin Laden is "now under full Taliban control and in no position to commit terrorist acts." Taliban reassurances on terrorism also include claims that they "have always and will condemn terrorism, including hijacking," according to a February 2000 State Department cable. [10][14] [21]
* A December 1998 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad demonstrating that bin Laden promoted further acts of terrorism against the U.S. In his first interview after the August 20, 1998 missile strikes, bin Laden reiterated his fatwa (religious ruling) urging Muslims to kill U.S., U.K., and Israeli citizens and "reserving the right to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD)." [19]
* Despite several promises to the U.S. that they would keep bin Laden away from the media, the Taliban allowed him to be interviewed "so that he could renounce terrorism," according to Taliban representative Syedur Rahman Haqqani. Instead, bin Laden strongly reiterated his commitment to terrorism against American citizens and once again claimed the right to use weapons of mass destruction against Western targets. Despite the fact that bin Laden "did not do what he promised," the Taliban did not agree to expel him. [20]
Document 1 - Islama 01750
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Raising Bin Ladin With the Taliban" Mar 4, 1997, Confidential, 5 pp.
Mullah Ehsanullah Ehsan, an influential member of the Taliban Inner Shura, communicates his belief to U.S. embassy officials that the expulsion of Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan is not a solution to the bin Laden "problem." "To where and how should he be expelled? ... Bin Laden was expelled from Saudi Arabia to Sudan and from Sudan to Afghanistan." The Taliban official also suggests that bin Laden did not have the communications equipment to lead his followers in Saudi Arabia and that the Taliban did not know where bin Laden was. If he is "located in areas under our control, we will definitely impose a ban on his activities."
According to Mullah Ehsan, the real problem is not bin Laden, but the failure of the U.S. government to recognize the legitimacy of the Taliban government, which he advised America to do, "If the U.S. did not want every Afghan to become a bin Laden." The Taliban representatives furthermore erroneously claim that bin Laden was invited to Afghanistan by the "enemies of the Taliban," and was not giving any financial assistance to the Taliban.
According to The 9/11 Commission Report (p65) and Ahmed Rashid's Taliban, (p133), bin Laden's 1996 return to Afghanistan was supported by the Nangarhar Shura in Jalalabad, a local council of Islamic leaders that was not aligned with either the Rabbani government in Kabul or the Taliban in Kandahar. When Jalalabad fell to the Taliban in September 1996 bin Laden solidified his ties to the Taliban and the relationship grew.
Document 2 - State 154712
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Afghanistan: Taliban's Mullah Omar's 8/22 Contact with State Department," August 23, 1998, Confidential, NODIS, 4 pp. [Excised]
Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar initiates a phone conversation to the U.S. Department of State, two days after the August 20, 1998 U.S. missile strike on Afghanistan and Sudan in retaliation for the terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Mullah Omar speaks with U.S. director for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs (SA/PAB Director) Michael E. Malinowski. This phone call appears to be the only time Mullah Omar has spoken directly with a U.S. government official. Omar suggests President Clinton resign in order to restore U.S. popularity in the Islamic world and asserts the U.S. missile attack will spread bin Laden's anti-American message by uniting the fundamentalist Islamic world and will cause further terrorist attacks. He requests proof that bin Laden was involved in the Africa bombings, claiming he saw no evidence implicating bin Laden in terrorist activities since he has been afforded sanctuary in Afghanistan. Omar's rhetoric mirrors bin Laden's as he criticizes the U.S. for maintaining a military presence in Saudi Arabia, but Malinowski remarks that Omar "was in no way threatening." The document concludes that this unusual communication from the head of the Taliban "is indicative of the seriousness of how the Tall Ban [sic] views the U.S. strikes and our anger over bin Laden."
Document 3 - State 154713
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Message to the Taliban on Bin Laden," August 23, 1998, Secret, NODIS, 6 pp.
This cable, apparently a response to Mullah Omar's request for evidence against bin Laden, outlines the justification for the U.S. military action, the American case against bin Laden, and grounds for bin Laden's expulsion from Afghanistan by the Taliban. The document claims the United States has "reliable intelligence that the bin Laden network has been actively seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction - including chemical weapons - for use against U.S. interests." The document also notes that bin Laden's network has tried in the past to blow up U.S. airliners in the Pacific.
Document 4 - Islama 06433
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "SITREP 6: Pakistan/Afghanistan Reaction to U.S. Strikes," August 25, 1998, Confidential, 7 pp. [Excised]
This SITREP cable, part of a State Department reporting series established to gauge foreign reactions to the strikes, documents the impact of the August 20 action in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph W. Ralston, was present in Islamabad during strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan. The Pakistani press reported that Ralston was in Islamabad to assure the government of Pakistan that it was not being attacked by India if the Pakistani Air Defense detected the missiles. Though they did not notice the attack, officials in the Pakistani government were outraged at the U.S. violation of Pakistani airspace and call for an investigation.
The Taliban reportedly believed the U.S. strikes on Khost were appalling, since the Taliban had repeatedly promised to take action against bin Laden if evidence was presented linking him to terrorism. In the wake of this U.S. missile strike, the Taliban hardened its stance on extraditing bin Laden. Taliban religious leaders Mullah Zakiri and Mullah Shinwari issued a fatwa, an Islamic legal ruling, requiring Muslims to protect bin Laden.
Document 5 - Islama 06448
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "SITREP 7: Pakistan/Afghanistan Reaction to U.S. Strikes," August 26, 1998, Confidential, 8 pp. [Excised]
The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan reports that the Pakistani Military Press Office has issued a statement to clarify General Ralston's presence in Islamabad on the evening of the U.S. missile strikes. Ralston requested permission to visit Islamabad to explain the presence of U.S. ships in international waters off the coast of Pakistan. Ralston assured the Pakistanis the ships were there for possible action against terrorists in Afghanistan. The report concludes that if the attack were detected by Pakistani Air Defense, Ralston would be in a position to clarify the action immediately.
The cable goes on to report that the Taliban have received a letter from the U.S. providing evidence that bin Laden has engaged in terrorist activities, but that the Taliban see the letter as "too general" to warrant bin Laden's extradition. In any case, the Taliban are "not in favor" of talks with the U.S. because of the missile strikes.
Document 6 - Islama 06863
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Demarche to Taliban on New Bin Laden Threat," September 14, 1998, Secret, 5 pp.
Meeting in Islamabad with a U.S. official, Abdul Hakim Mujahid, Taliban envoy to the United Nations, said that Mullah Omar is the primary reason why Osama bin Laden continues to be afforded sanctuary in Afghanistan, as 80% of Taliban officials oppose this policy, including Taliban Deputy Council leader Mullah Mohammad Rabbani. Mujahid added that "very few Afghans are in favor of bin Laden's presence in Afghanistan." Mujahid also tried to bolster relations with the U.S. by appealing to commonalities between the United States and Afghanistan, including their shared "dislike of Iran."
Upon hearing of the Taliban capture of the central Afghan town of Bamiyan, the U.S. official asked the Taliban leadership to defend the Shiite Muslims in the region and the Bamiyan Buddha statues. Mujahid assured the U.S. that Mullah Omar already ordered the protection of the statues and that many of the Shiites in Bamiyan opposed the Taliban, and therefore had to be defeated.
(In November 2001 the retreating Taliban completely destroyed the city of Bamiyan in the Hindu Kush. There was also evidence of a systematic slaughter of hundreds of Hazara Shi'a men at the hands of the Taliban. The Bamiyan Buddhas were demolished in March 2001 by the Taliban, who declared them offensive to Islam.)
Document 7 - State 181837
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Message to Mullah Omar," October 1, 1998, Secret, NODIS 7 pp.
This cable consists of a letter from Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Omar faxed to U.S. officials on September 24, 1998 and a subsequent response from the U.S. State Department. Omar's letter advised the U.S. to alter its policies or risk alienating the Muslim world and claimed that bin Laden was "just an excuse made by the U.S. and this is hurting the U.S." The State Department reaction contains "with us or against us" language reminiscent of many U.S. officials' speeches in the days and weeks following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. According to the 1998 cable, this is a "clash between the forces of the past and the forces of the future, between those who tear down and those who build up, between hope and fear, chaos and community. Those who continue to harbor and welcome terrorists must accept responsibility for the actions of the terrorists." "The only dividing line is between those who practice, support or tolerate terror, and those who understand that it is murder, plain and simple."
Document 8 - Islama 07510
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Pakistan: Ambassador Raises bin Laden with Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed" October 6, 1998, Secret, 2 pp. [Excised]
U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan William B. Milam discusses Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden with Pakistan Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed. The Ambassador states that although there are a number of "sticking points in our relationship [with the Taliban] which we are willing to discuss, preeminently the status of women and girls, there was one issue on which we had no flexibility. This was the presence of Osama bin Laden and his organization in Afghanistan."
Ambassador Milam asks for Pakistan's help on the bin Laden issue and stresses "that U.S. patience was growing thin" and bin Laden's extradition was something the U.S. needed to have "settled 'in a matter of days' rather than weeks or months."
Document 9 - Islama 07553
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama Bin Ladin: GOP Official - Claiming Taliban Want to Get Rid of Bin Ladin - Reviews Three Options for Dealing With Him," October 7, 1998, Secret, NODIS, 6 pp. [Excised]
A Pakistani official has told U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan William B. Milam that the Taliban "want to rid themselves of terrorist Usama bin Ladin," and listed 3 possible ways of doing so. The unnamed official emphasized option two, in which the U.S. would purchase bin Laden from the Taliban for a large sum. The cable also refers to recent meetings in which the Taliban claimed that if they expelled bin Laden, they would be overthrown because the Pashtun tribal system dictates that they must provide refuge to those that seek it.
Document 10 - Islama 07665
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama Bin Laden: High-Level Taliban Official Gives the Standard Line on Bin Laden With a Couple of Nuances, In October 11 Meeting With Ambassador," October 12, 1998, Secret, NODIS, 10pp. [Excised]
U.S. Ambassador Milam met with the Taliban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maulawi Wakil Ahmed, on October 11 in the first U.S. meeting with a major Taliban official since the August 20, 1998 U.S. missile strike. The Taliban called bin Laden "a serious problem." As the U.S. stressed the urgency in getting bin Laden out of Afghanistan, Wakil continued to give the now repetitive Taliban explanation that the Afghan people would overthrow the Taliban if they handed bin Laden over. This contradicts other messages, such as those from Abdul Hakim Mujahid on September 14, 1998 in which the Taliban stated that few Afghans were in favor of bin Laden's presence in Afghanistan. Wakil did, however, ask questions regarding bin Laden's possible treatment in Saudi Arabia if bin Laden were turned over to Saudi authorities.
Wakil also exaggerated in statements that bin Laden was invited to Afghanistan by the previous regime and that the Saudis told the Taliban to keep bin Laden in Afghanistan after they captured Jalalabad.
Document 11 - Islama 07841
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama bin Ladin: Coordinating our Efforts and Sharpening our Message on bin Ladin," October 19, 1998, Secret, 7 pp. [Excised]
Coordinating with United Nations efforts in Afghanistan and discussing ways to compel Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Taliban to cooperate on the extradition of Osama bin Laden, the State Department reiterates "that the U.S. reserves the right to take military action concerning bin Ladin and will hold the Taliban directly responsible for any terrorist activities bin Ladin engages in."
The cable recognizes the need for increased pressure on the Taliban for bin Laden, "before the U.S. strikes on Khost - a wasting asset - become old news to the Taliban leadership," and also observes that Saudi Arabia needs to be "the cornerstone of U.S. efforts to bring bin Ladin to justice."
Document 12 - Islama 08369
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama bin Ladin: Taliban Announce Cut-Off Date for Receipt of Evidence; GOP Official Says Taliban Growing More Intransigent," November 10, 1998 Secret, 5 pp. [Excised]
According to two state department sources, including one Pakistan government official, the Taliban continue to grow hardened and more inflexible on the issue of extraditing Osama bin Laden. Sources attribute the uncompromising Taliban position "to press reports that the Saudi Interior Minister has exonerated bin Ladin for involvement in the Khobar Towers and Riyadh bombings, as well as Taliban frustrations that the U.S. had not provided them any evidence" proving bin Laden's involvement in terrorist activities. The Taliban also announced a cut-off date of November 20, 1998 for the submission of evidence against Osama bin Laden to the Taliban's Supreme Court.
Document 13 - State 210367
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Afghanistan: Message to Taliban on Usama Bin Laden," Nov 11 1998, Secret, NODIS 2 pp. [Excised]
In this cable, Ambassador Milam is asked to pass the message along to the Taliban that the U.S. has now provided greater evidence of bin Laden's terrorist activities and that the Taliban will be held responsible for any terrorist action that bin Laden undertakes.
Document 14 - State 210511
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Usama Bin Ladin: Message Delivered to Taliban Representative," Nov 11 1998, Secret, NODIS 4 pp. [Excised]
A low-level Taliban official, Syedur Rahman Haqqani, said that bin Laden "is totally under control," and that bin Laden should not be held responsible for the terrorist activities of those he had trained or has had contact with. Over 20,000 people were trained for the jihad and bin Laden "cannot be held accountable for all of their actions." Haqqani "smugly" asserted that the Saudi attitude regarding bin Laden remained unclear. Furthermore, the Taliban welcomed proof linking bin Laden to terrorist activities.
Document 15 - State 220495
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Osama bin Laden: Taliban Spokesman Seeks New Proposal for Resolving bin Laden Problem," November 28, 1998, Secret, 10 pp. [Excised]
The Taliban Supreme Court announces there is insufficient evidence to implicate Osama bin Laden in terrorist activities, but Wakil Ahmed, a close aide to Taliban Supreme leader Mullah Omar, contacts State Department officials, expressing that "Kandahar did not believe that the bin Laden matter had been resolved by the recent Taliban court ruling." Wakil mentions that video evidence against bin Laden given to the Taliban by the U.S. contained "nothing new" and was therefore not submitted to the court.
In an extensive discussion with Alan W. Eastham Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission to the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, Wakil observes that "Saudi Arabia held the key to any resolution" to the bin Laden issue, but the Taliban felt the Saudis were unwilling to discuss bin Laden. He claims this is "unfortunate because the Taliban had given the Saudis an authentic proposal for resolving the bin Laden issue. . . . It was only Saudi pride that stood in the way."
Wakil, claiming that "bin Laden had once been a trained guerilla supported by the United States," is corrected by Eastham, who clarifies that "while [bin Laden] may have fought with a resistance group which had received U.S. support, we had never heard his name during that period and did not support him at that time."
While further questioning the culpability of bin Laden in the August bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Wakil "observed that Saddam Hussein was the root cause of all these problems."
Document 16 - Islama 09222
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama bin Ladin: Charge Reiterates U.S. Concern to Key Taliban Official, Who Sticks to Well-Known Taliban Positions," December 19, 1998, Secret, 5 pp.
Wakil Ahmed, a close aide to Taliban Supreme leader Mullah Omar communicates to Alan W. Eastham Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan that he has "personally discussed U.S. concerns with 'Amir-Al-Mumineen' (Commander of the Faithful) Mullah Omar," and the Taliban still consider Osama bin Laden "innocent," adding, "It is unbelievable that this small man did this to you."
Wakil further claims that the Taliban remain "deeply upset" over the U.S. bombings of training camps in Khost and compares the U.S. cruise missile attacks to a terrorist bombing. "The U.S. said bin Ladin had killed innocent people, but had not the U.S. killed innocent Afghans in Khost too? Was this not a crime?" The cable quotes the Taliban official, "I (Wakil said) consider you (the U.S.) as murderers of Afghans."
Document 17 - Islama 09420
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama Bin Ladin: Bin Ladin Uses Recent Interviews to Assert Right to WMD, and to Threaten U.S. and U.K Over Iraq," Dec 28, 1998, Secret, NODIS, 5pp.
Despite the Taliban's claim that bin Laden was denied all access to the media, this cable reports that he has given two interviews since the August 20, 1998 U.S. strike on terrorist camps in Afghanistan and Sudan. Bin Laden asserted his right to use weapons of mass destruction, and called for Muslims to kill U.S., British, and Israeli civilians, referring to the recent military strikes in Iraq as justification. He denied any connection to the August 7, 1998 bombings in Africa and alleged the existence of a Saudi hit squad out to get him. According to bin Laden, there was mutual respect between himself and the Taliban, as they considered each other to be "good Muslims."
Document 19 - Islama 09424
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Taliban "Threat Warning"," Dec 29, 1998, Secret, NODIS, 2pp.
The Taliban has sent the U.S. an unspecific message that terrorists backed by Ahmed Shah Masoud and the intelligence services in Iran are conspiring against the U.S. The State Department believes that the Taliban's motives for sending the message are probably politically motivated, as Masoud and Iran remain some of the Taliban's most powerful enemies.
Document 20 - Islama 09488
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama Bin Ladin: Charge Underscores U.S. Concerns on Interviews; Taliban Envoy Says Bin Ladin Hoodwinked Them and it Will Not Happen Again," Dec 30, 1998, Secret, NODIS, 4pp.
In a meeting with a U.S. official, Taliban representative Syedur Rahman Haqqani asserted that the Taliban recently allowed Osama bin Laden to be interviewed in order to give him a chance to renounce terrorism. Instead, bin Laden strongly reiterated his commitment to terrorism against American citizens and once again claimed the right to use weapons of mass destruction against Western targets. Haqqani again promised that bin Laden would not be permitted to engage in any further press appearances or terrorist activities. "The U.S. should believe the Taliban that he [bin Laden] will not be permitted any more interviews and not allowed to engage in terrorist activities." The fact that bin Laden had "tricked" the Taliban did not hurt his status as a "guest" of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Document 21 - Islama 00567
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "A/S Inderfurth and S/CT Sheehan Meet Taliban Representatives," February 1, 2000, Confidential, 13pp. [Excised]
High-ranking U.S. and Taliban officials made no progress in discussing the fate of bin Laden, but the Taliban unequivocally agreed that "hijacking is a terrorist act; The Taliban always have and always will condemn terrorism, including hijackings." In attendance at the two-hour meeting were U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Karl F. Inderfurth, U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism Michael Sheehan, Taliban Director for Administration Amir Khan Muttaqi, and Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan Syed Mohammad Haqqani.
Document 23 - Islama 05749
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Searching for the Taliban's Hidden Message," September 19, 2000, Secret, 12 pp. [Excised]
A Taliban official whose name is excised from the cable surprises U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan William B. Milam by breaking from the usual Taliban responses - even refraining from questioning the validity of U.S. evidence linking Osama bin Laden to terrorism. The Ambassador observes that the "tone and statements" of the official remained "far less obstreperous than normal Taliban rhetoric."
Ambassador Milam clarifies for the Taliban official that "the U.S. was not against the Taliban, per se, was not out to destroy the Taliban," however that the "UBL issue is supremely important and must be resolved so the other issues can be discussed in a more amenable atmosphere. The one issue that cannot be subordinated or diminished is bin Ladin. If the U.S. and the Taliban could get past bin Ladin, 'we would have a different kind of relationship.'"
The unnamed Taliban official in this document is probably Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Abdul Jalil. Another declassified State Department cable, Islamabad 05779, also dated September 19, 2000, reiterates that a Taliban official who met with Ambassador Milam on September 19, 2000 requests "a follow-up meeting with U.S. officials on or about September 30, probably in Frankfurt." A cable dated November 9, 2000, State 215948, discusses meetings about bin Laden held in Frankfurt, Germany on November 2-3 between senior U.S. officials Alan Eastham and Edmund Hill and Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Abdul Jalil.
Document 24 - State 028054
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Taliban Deliver Letter from Muttawakil; Say They Will Comply With Office Closing in New York," February 15, 2001, Confidential, 5 pp.
The State Department informs several key diplomatic posts that the Taliban have delivered a letter from Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil Muttawakil to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell asking the Secretary to reconsider the policies of the previous administration. The message reiterated the claim that bin Laden has been contained from engaging in any "military" activities, and there was no evidence linking him to any terrorist plots. The Taliban intimated that they would consider trading bin Laden for U.S. recognition. The Taliban furthermore claimed that bin Laden is disliked by "80 to 90 percent" of Afghans. Noorullah Zandran, a Taliban representative, told the Americans, we "wished your missiles had hit him."
Al-Qaida monitored U.S. negotiations with Taliban over oil pipeline
A memo by military chief Mohammed Atef raises new questions about whether failed U.S. efforts to reform Afghanistan's radical regime -- and build the pipeline -- set the stage for Sept. 11.
By Jean-Charles Brisard
Pages 1 2
NothingJune 5, 2002 | A 1998 memo written by al-Qaida military chief Mohammed Atef reveals that Osama bin Laden's group had detailed knowledge of negotiations that were taking place between Afghanistan's ruling Taliban and American government and business leaders over plans for a U.S. oil and gas pipeline across that Central Asian country.
The e-mail memo was found in 1998 on a computer seized by the FBI during its investigation into the 1998 African embassy bombings, which were sponsored by al-Qaida. Atef's memo was discovered by FBI counter-terrorism expert John O'Neill, who left the bureau in 2001, complaining that U.S. oil interests were hindering his investigation into al-Qaida. O'Neill, who became security chief at the World Trade Center, died in the Sept. 11 attack.
Atef's memo shines new light on what al-Qaida knew about U.S. efforts to normalize relations with the Taliban in exchange for the fundamentalist government's supporting the construction of an oil and gas pipeline across Afghanistan. As documented in the book I coauthored with Guillaume Dasquie, "Bin Laden: The Forbidden Truth," the Clinton and Bush administrations negotiated with the Taliban, both to get the repressive regime to widen its government as well as look favorably on U.S. companies' attempts to construct an oil pipeline. The Bush White House stepped up negotiations with the Taliban in 2001. When those talks stalled in July, a Bush administration representative threatened the Taliban with military reprisals if the government did not go along with American demands.
The seven-page memo was signed "Abu Hafs," which is the military name of Atef, who was the military chief of al-Qaida and is believed to have been killed in November 2001 during U.S. operations in Afghanistan. It shows al-Qaida's keen interest in the U.S.-Taliban negotiations and raises new questions as to whether the U.S. military threat to the Taliban in July 2001 could have prompted al-Qaida's Sept. 11 attack.
Atef's memo is not about the pipeline alone, though it mentions the project several times. It is an analysis of the political situation facing the Taliban. It documents the movement's rise, its leadership, the geopolitical importance of Afghanistan, the Taliban's relationship with Pakistan, as well as the movement's relationship with the Arab mujahedin. The document's intended readership is unclear. But it reveals that the pipeline was seen as a strategic offering toward the West, in order to make the Taliban government acceptable to the United States and Pakistan, as well as to reduce military and investigative pressure on the country to rein in or even extradite bin Laden.
Atef explains that the United States wants "to take control of any region which has huge quantities of oil reserves," and "the American government is keen on laying the oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan." Atef concludes that al-Qaida's "duty toward the movement [Taliban] is to stand behind it, support it materially and morally, especially because its regional and international enemies are working night and day to put an end to it and make it fail."
It seems clear the military chief didn't expect the pipeline negotiations to bear fruit. Referring to Pakistanis as "nonbelievers," and noting that the pipeline "will be under American control ... and it also goes through the territories of Pakistan which are allied to America," Atef implies that the Taliban has no intention of ultimately cooperating with the project, but is trying to string along the Americans and Pakistanis to win some breathing room for its unpopular government.
The Atef memo is the latest piece of evidence documenting a murky chapter in recent American history -- the overtures of the last two American administrations to the repressive Taliban regime. Several U.S. oil companies, most notably Unocal, had been advocates of diplomatic overtures to the Taliban, in order to facilitate the building of a pipeline from the Caspian Sea region to Pakistan and the Persian Gulf through Afghanistan. In 1996, Unocal vice president Chris Taggart described the fall of Kabul to the Taliban regime as a "very positive step" and urged the U.S. to extend recognition to the new rulers in Kabul and thus "lead the way to international lending agencies coming in."
Just 10 days after the Taliban seized power in Kabul, Zalmay Khalilzad, former National Security Council official and Unocal consultant who was appointed special envoy to Afghanistan by President George W. Bush at the end of 2001, argued in a Washington Post opinion article that the U.S. should try to work with the mullahs and form a broad-based government that included other factions. "The Taliban does not practice the anti-U.S. style of fundamentalism practiced by Iran -- it is closer to the Saudi model ..." Khalilzad contended, concluding that "we should use as a positive incentive the benefits that will accrue to Afghanistan from the construction of oil and gas pipelines across its territory ... These projects will only go forward if Afghanistan has a single authoritative government."
Soon after, the State Department spokesman Glyn Davies told the New York Times he had hope that "the new authorities in Kabul will move quickly to restore order and security and to form a representative interim government that can begin the process of reconciliation nationwide." Davies also said the United States "wanted to send diplomats to Afghanistan to meet with the Taliban and held out the possibility of re-establishing full diplomatic ties with the country," according to the Times.
In November 1997 Unocal invited a Taliban delegation to Texas and, in early December, the company opened a training center at the University of Nebraska, to instruct 137 Afghans in pipeline construction technology. The company also donated to the university's Center for Afghanistan Studies. Unocal CEO John Imle estimated that the company spent between $15 and $20 million on its Central Asia oil pipeline (CentGas) project -- on preliminary feasibility studies, humanitarian projects and other efforts to lobby the Taliban (Unocal equipped the regime with satellite phones, for instance.)
In February 1998, Unocal's vice president for international relations, John Maresca, told a House subcommittee hearing on U.S. interests in the Central Asian Republics that an oil pipeline "would benefit Afghanistan, which would receive revenues from transport tariffs, and would promote stability and encourage trade and economic development." Emphasizing that "the proposed Central Asia Oil Pipeline (CentGas) cannot begin construction until an internationally recognized Afghanistan government is in place," he urged the administration and the Congress "to give strong support to the United Nations-led peace process in Afghanistan."
your cut and pasting skills are awesome. as well as you use of bold.
how does any of this prove your point?
US tried to talk to the Taliban. the taliban gave some song and dance about evidence. nothing got accomplished.
yet if I post a links. its bullshit.
These articles provide evidence of repeated contacts between the Taliban and U.S officials. You said that the Taliban refused to deal with the U.S authorities. Therefore you were wrong.
In fact, not only were they in constant contact but Taliban representatives were invited to Washington and to Texas as guests of the Government and of big business.
'Atef's memo shines new light on what al-Qaida knew about U.S. efforts to normalize relations with the Taliban in exchange for the fundamentalist government's supporting the construction of an oil and gas pipeline across Afghanistan. As documented in the book I coauthored with Guillaume Dasquie, "Bin Laden: The Forbidden Truth," the Clinton and Bush administrations negotiated with the Taliban, both to get the repressive regime to widen its government as well as look favorably on U.S. companies' attempts to construct an oil pipeline. The Bush White House stepped up negotiations with the Taliban in 2001. When those talks stalled in July, a Bush administration representative threatened the Taliban with military reprisals if the government did not go along with American demands.
The seven-page memo was signed "Abu Hafs," which is the military name of Atef, who was the military chief of al-Qaida and is believed to have been killed in November 2001 during U.S. operations in Afghanistan. It shows al-Qaida's keen interest in the U.S.-Taliban negotiations and raises new questions as to whether the U.S. military threat to the Taliban in July 2001 could have prompted al-Qaida's Sept. 11 attack.'
These articles provide evidence of repeated contacts between the Taliban and U.S officials. You said that the Taliban refused to deal with the U.S authorities. Therefore you were wrong.
they refused contact after 9/11 but then again my source was bullshit. so how can we debate right?
I don't recall stating that your source was bullshit. What you pasted was this:
'The Taliban refused to directly speak to Bush, stating that talking with a non-Muslim political leader would be an insult to Islam.'
This doesn't state that the Taliban were unwilling to talk with U.S officials.
ok sorry. you said the information in the source was bullshit.
let me clear it up for you.
you seem to believe that we could have sat down with Omar and politely asked for bin laden. maybe given the taliban some gold or something and in a few days we would have had the Osama.
according to the wiki...
In the weeks prior to the military action in Afghanistan, U.S. President George W. Bush delivered an ultimatum [5] to the Taliban, to:
* deliver Al-Qaeda leaders located in Afghanistan to the United States
* release all imprisoned foreign nationals, including American citizens [6]
* protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in Afghanistan
* close terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and "hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities"
* give the United States full access to terrorist training camps to verify their closure
President Bush further stated the demands were not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban refused to directly speak to Bush, stating that talking with a non-Muslim political leader would be an insult to Islam. But they made statements through their embassy in Pakistan: the Taliban rejected the ultimatum on September 21, 2001, saying there was no evidence in their possession linking bin Laden to the September 11 attacks.
I'm not doubting the US and the taliban have talked in the past. my point is.......
the US tried to talk to the taliban as clearly stated in Bush ultimatum above. taliban refused. we attacked. and rightfully so. the fires were still burning in NYC.
ok sorry. you said the information in the source was bullshit.
let me clear it up for you.
you seem to believe that we could have sat down with Omar and politely asked for bin laden. maybe given the taliban some gold or something and in a few days we would have had the Osama.
according to the wiki...
In the weeks prior to the military action in Afghanistan, U.S. President George W. Bush delivered an ultimatum [5] to the Taliban, to:
* deliver Al-Qaeda leaders located in Afghanistan to the United States
* release all imprisoned foreign nationals, including American citizens [6]
* protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in Afghanistan
* close terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and "hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities"
* give the United States full access to terrorist training camps to verify their closure
President Bush further stated the demands were not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban refused to directly speak to Bush, stating that talking with a non-Muslim political leader would be an insult to Islam. But they made statements through their embassy in Pakistan: the Taliban rejected the ultimatum on September 21, 2001, saying there was no evidence in their possession linking bin Laden to the September 11 attacks.
I'm not doubting the US and the taliban have talked in the past. my point is.......
the US tried to talk to the taliban as clearly stated in Bush ultimatum above. taliban refused. we attacked. and rightfully so. the fires were still burning in NYC.
you know, you really shouldn't use wikipedia as verification for anything solid.
and you know there comes a time when if you've supported terrorism you will become a target of it. no matter how righteous you are or how indestructable you think you are.
hear my name
take a good look
this could be the day
hold my hand
lie beside me
i just need to say
you know, you really shouldn't use wikipedia as verification for anything solid.
well in this case I believe the reference to be true. prove me wrong. otherwise dont waste your time with useless comments. at least byzine was able to produce some evidence of his position
and you know there comes a time when if you've supported terrorism you will become a target of it. no matter how righteous you are or how indestructable you think you are.
Comments
courted the taliban? are you insane? what makes you think they would want us to court them? good thing you werent president when we were attacked. "court the taliban" wow.
again, are you insane?
always comes down to oil doesnt it? im not even going to try with this one
Afghanistan
and Iraq.
Iraq (this war) has nothing to do with taking out the taliban.
No evidence of your favorite excuse, just prove it to me and i'll follow you all the way.
The economy has polarized to the point where the wealthiest 10% now own 85% of the nation’s wealth. Never before have the bottom 90% been so highly indebted, so dependent on the wealthy.
The Taleban would have grabbed at the chance to have gotten the worlds only superpower on their side. However, the U.S offered them nothing, but just set demands on them.
Again, it seems to me like the U.S had an ulterior motive from the word go.
Well there you go. You just contradicted the hell out of yourself. Nobody gives a fuck about Osama Bin Laden anymore???
Well why the hell does Bush need him then? If nobody cares, Bush's supposed "ploy" of decpeption and fear mongering wouldn't work now would it?
Harboured him? What does that mean? It means nothing. The Pakistani's could be accused of harbouring him now. So what? Jlew spoke of him living in tribal areas - as if this is no mans land. Well, he was living in tribal areas in Afghanistan. What difference does it make?
If America had put something on the table for the Taleban to grab at then they would have flushed Bin Laden out in a matter of days.
This is just an assumption.
How about proving me wrong?
Remember when members of the Taleban visited Bush Snr and Donald Rumsfeld in Houston?
Central Asia/Russia
US policy on Taliban influenced by oil - authors
By Julio Godoy
PARIS - Under the influence of United States oil companies, the government of President George W Bush initially blocked intelligence agencies' investigations on terrorism while it bargained with the Taliban on the delivery of Osama bin Laden in exchange for political recognition and economic aid, two French intelligence analysts claim.
In the book Bin Laden, la verite interdite (Bin Laden, the forbidden truth), that was released recently, the authors, Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie, reveal that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) deputy director John O'Neill resigned in July in protest over the obstruction.
The authors claim that O'Neill told them that "the main obstacles to investigate Islamic terrorism were US oil corporate interests and the role played by Saudi Arabia in it". The two claim that the US government's main objective in Afghanistan was to consolidate the position of the Taliban regime to obtain access to the oil and gas reserves in Central Asia.
They affirm that until August, the US government saw the Taliban regime "as a source of stability in Central Asia that would enable the construction of an oil pipeline across Central Asia" from the rich oilfields in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, through Afghanistan and Pakistan, to the Indian Ocean. Until now, says the book, "the oil and gas reserves of Central Asia have been controlled by Russia. The Bush government wanted to change all that."
But, confronted with Taliban's refusal to accept US conditions, "this rationale of energy security changed into a military one", the authors claim.
"At one moment during the negotiations, the US representatives told the Taliban, 'either you accept our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a carpet of bombs,'" Brisard said in an interview in Paris.
According to the book, the Bush administratino began to negotiate with the Taliban immediately after coming into power in February. US and Taliban diplomatic representatives met several times in Washington, Berlin and Islamabad.
To polish their image in the United States, the Taliban even employed a US expert on public relations, Laila Helms. The authors claim that Helms is also an expert in the works of US intelligence organizations, for her uncle, Richard Helms, is a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The last meeting between US and Taliban representatives took place in August, five weeks before the attacks on New York and Washington, the analysts maintain. On that occasion, Christina Rocca, in charge of Central Asian affairs for the US government, met the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan in Islamabad.
Brisard and Dasquie have long experience in intelligence analysis. Brisard was until the late 1990s director of economic analysis and strategy for Vivendi, a French company. He also worked for French secret services, and wrote for them in 1997 a report on the now famous Al-Qaeda network, headed by bin Laden.
Dasquie is an investigative journalist and publisher of Intelligence Online, a respected newsletter on diplomacy, economic analysis and strategy, available through the Internet.
Brisard and Dasquie draw a portrait of the closest aides to Bush, linking them to the oil business. Bush's family has a strong oil background, as do some of his top aides. From Vice President Dick Cheney, through the director of the National Security Council Condoleezza Rice, to the ministers of commerce and energy, Donald Evans and Stanley Abraham, all have for long worked for US oil companies.
Cheney was until the end of last year president of Halliburton, a company that provides services for oil industry; Rice was between 1991 and 2000 manager for Chevron; Evans and Abraham worked for Tom Brown, another oil giant.
Besides the secret negotiations held between Washington and Kabul and the importance of the oil industry, the book takes issue with the role played by Saudi Arabia in fostering Islamic fundamentalism, in the personality of bin Laden, and with the networks that the Saudi dissident built to finance his activities.
Brisard and Dasquie contend that the US government's claim that it had been prosecuting bin Laden since 1998. "Actually," Dasquie says, "the first state to officially prosecute bin Laden was Libya, on the charges of terrorism."
"Bin Laden wanted to settle in Libya in the early 1990s, but was hindered by the government of Muammar Gaddafi," Dasquie claims. "Enraged by Libya's refusal, bin Laden organized attacks inside Libya, including assassination attempts against Gaddafi."
Dasquie singles out one group, the Islamic Fighting Group (IFG), reputedly the most powerful Libyan dissident organization, based in London, and directly linked with bin Laden. "Gaddafi even demanded Western police institutions, such as Interpol, to pursue the IFG and bin Laden, but never obtained cooperation," Dasquie says. "Until today, members of IFG openly live in London."
The book confirms earlier reports that the US government worked closely with the United Nations during the negotiations with the Taliban. "Several meetings took place this year, under the arbitration of Francesc Vendrell, personal representative of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to discuss the situation in Afghanistan," says the book. "Representatives of the US government and Russia, and the six countries that border with Afghanistan were present at these meetings," it says. "Sometimes, representatives of the Taliban also sat around the table."
These meetings, also called Six plus 2, because of the number of states (six neighbors plus the US and Russia) involved, have been confirmed by Naif Naik, former Pakistani minister for foreign affairs.
In a French television news program two weeks ago, Naik said that during a Six plus 2 meeting in Berlin in July, the discussions turned around "the formation of a government of national unity. If the Taliban had accepted this coalition, they would have immediately received international economic aid. And the pipelines from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan would have come," he added.
Naik also claimed that Tom Simons, the US representative at these meetings, openly threatened the Taliban and Pakistan. "Simons said, 'either the Taliban behave as they ought to, or Pakistan convinces them to do so, or we will use another option'. The words Simons used were 'a military operation'," Naik claimed.
guess what, it is no mans land. pakistan has no control of this area.
big difference. bin laden wasnt confied to one small lawless area of afgahistan. he freely moved around the whole country. do you see osama renting an apartment in Islamabad next to the american embassy?
again with this. taliban would never have helped america.
I have to say, I'm shocked you think this way. it shows alot
The US threatens war—before September 11
In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, two reports appeared in the British media indicating that the US government had threatened military action against Afghanistan several months before September 11.
The BBC’s George Arney reported September 18 that American officials had told former Pakistani Foreign Secretary Niaz Naik in mid-July of plans for military action against the Taliban regime:
“Mr. Naik said US officials told him of the plan at a UN-sponsored international contact group on Afghanistan which took place in Berlin.
“Mr. Naik told the BBC that at the meeting the US representatives told him that unless Bin Laden was handed over swiftly America would take military action to kill or capture both Bin Laden and the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar.
“The wider objective, according to Mr. Naik, would be to topple the Taliban regime and install a transitional government of moderate Afghans in its place—possibly under the leadership of the former Afghan King Zahir Shah.
“Mr. Naik was told that Washington would launch its operation from bases in Tajikistan, where American advisers were already in place.
“He was told that Uzbekistan would also participate in the operation and that 17,000 Russian troops were on standby.
“Mr. Naik was told that if the military action went ahead it would take place before the snows started falling in Afghanistan, by the middle of October at the latest.”
Four days later, on September 22, the Guardian newspaper confirmed this account. The warnings to Afghanistan came out of a four-day meeting of senior US, Russian, Iranian and Pakistani officials at a hotel in Berlin in mid-July, the third in a series of back-channel conferences dubbed “brainstorming on Afghanistan.”
The participants included Naik, together with three Pakistani generals; former Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations Saeed Rajai Khorassani; Abdullah Abdullah, foreign minister of the Northern Alliance; Nikolai Kozyrev, former Russian special envoy to Afghanistan, and several other Russian officials; and three Americans: Tom Simons, a former US ambassador to Pakistan; Karl Inderfurth, a former assistant secretary of state for south Asian affairs; and Lee Coldren, who headed the office of Pakistan, Afghan and Bangladesh affairs in the State Department until 1997.
The meeting was convened by Francesc Vendrell, then and now the deputy chief UN representative for Afghanistan. While the nominal purpose of the conference was to discuss the possible outline of a political settlement in Afghanistan, the Taliban refused to attend. The Americans discussed the shift in policy toward Afghanistan from Clinton to Bush, and strongly suggested that military action was an option.
While all three American former officials denied making any specific threats, Coldren told the Guardian, “there was some discussion of the fact that the United States was so disgusted with the Taliban that they might be considering some military action.” Naik, however, cited one American declaring that action against bin Laden was imminent: “This time they were very sure. They had all the intelligence and would not miss him this time. It would be aerial action, maybe helicopter gunships, and not only overt, but from very close proximity to Afghanistan.”
The Guardian summarized: “The threats of war unless the Taliban surrendered Osama bin Laden were passed to the regime in Afghanistan by the Pakistani government, senior diplomatic sources revealed yesterday. The Taliban refused to comply but the serious nature of what they were told raises the possibility that Bin Laden, far from launching the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon out of the blue 10 days ago, was launching a pre-emptive strike in response to what he saw as US threats.”
Bush, oil and Taliban
Further light on secret contacts between the Bush administration and the Taliban regime is shed by a book released November 15 in France, entitled Bin Laden, the Forbidden Truth, written by Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie. Brisard is a former French secret service agent, author of a previous report on bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network, and former director of strategy for the French corporation Vivendi, while Dasquie is an investigative journalist.
The two French authors write that the Bush administration was willing to accept the Taliban regime, despite the charges of sponsoring terrorism, if it cooperated with plans for the development of the oil resources of Central Asia.
Until August, they claim, the US government saw the Taliban “as a source of stability in Central Asia that would enable the construction of an oil pipeline across Central Asia.” It was only when the Taliban refused to accept US conditions that “this rationale of energy security changed into a military one.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._invasion_of_Afghanistan
In the weeks prior to the military action in Afghanistan, U.S. President George W. Bush delivered an ultimatum [5] to the Taliban, to:
* deliver Al-Qaeda leaders located in Afghanistan to the United States
* release all imprisoned foreign nationals, including American citizens [6]
* protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in Afghanistan
* close terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and "hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities"
* give the United States full access to terrorist training camps to verify their closure
President Bush further stated the demands were not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban refused to directly speak to Bush, stating that talking with a non-Muslim political leader would be an insult to Islam.
or his weather pre-dicting scientists!!
01/06/00 dublin
23/08/06 dublin
11/09/06 paris
18/06/07 london
17/08/09 manchester
18/08/09 london
This is bullshit, as proven by the fact that the U.S government had met with Taliban leaders on numerous occasions prior to 9/11.
Mullah Omar Called Washington in 1998, New Documents Show
Taliban Leader Initiated Call 2 Days After Cruise Missile Attack On Terrorist Camps
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB134/index.htm
* The only known direct conversation between Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar and any U.S. official, on August 22, 1998, just two days after the U.S. sent cruise missiles into bin Laden training camps in Afghanistan in retaliation for the attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. [2]
* An August 23, 1998 cable from the U.S. Department of State following the conversation with Mullah Omar that provided evidence linking bin Laden with the U.S. Embassy attacks in Africa and several other terrorist plots, including a plan to blow up U.S. airliners in the Pacific. [3]
* Frequent contradictions in Taliban statements to U.S. diplomats. The Taliban claimed that 80% of their officials and a majority of Afghans oppose Osama bin Laden's presence, yet also claimed that the Taliban would be overthrown were they to extradite bin Laden, due to his popularity in Afghanistan and around the Muslim world. Mullah Omar called bin Laden "an enemy," according to a Pakistani informant, while other Taliban officials tell the U.S. that Mullah Omar is the primary reason why bin Laden continued to be afforded sanctuary in Afghanistan, despite the fact that 80% of Taliban officials opposed his presence [6][9][7][24].
* An October 1998 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad documenting statements made by the Taliban Foreign Minister, Maulawi Wakil Ahmed, that the Taliban "do not support terrorism," and that bin Laden was moved to Kandahar "to keep a better watch on him." In a November 1998 cable from the State Department, a low-level Taliban official assures the American ambassador that bin Laden is "now under full Taliban control and in no position to commit terrorist acts." Taliban reassurances on terrorism also include claims that they "have always and will condemn terrorism, including hijacking," according to a February 2000 State Department cable. [10][14] [21]
* A December 1998 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad demonstrating that bin Laden promoted further acts of terrorism against the U.S. In his first interview after the August 20, 1998 missile strikes, bin Laden reiterated his fatwa (religious ruling) urging Muslims to kill U.S., U.K., and Israeli citizens and "reserving the right to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD)." [19]
* Despite several promises to the U.S. that they would keep bin Laden away from the media, the Taliban allowed him to be interviewed "so that he could renounce terrorism," according to Taliban representative Syedur Rahman Haqqani. Instead, bin Laden strongly reiterated his commitment to terrorism against American citizens and once again claimed the right to use weapons of mass destruction against Western targets. Despite the fact that bin Laden "did not do what he promised," the Taliban did not agree to expel him. [20]
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Raising Bin Ladin With the Taliban" Mar 4, 1997, Confidential, 5 pp.
Mullah Ehsanullah Ehsan, an influential member of the Taliban Inner Shura, communicates his belief to U.S. embassy officials that the expulsion of Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan is not a solution to the bin Laden "problem." "To where and how should he be expelled? ... Bin Laden was expelled from Saudi Arabia to Sudan and from Sudan to Afghanistan." The Taliban official also suggests that bin Laden did not have the communications equipment to lead his followers in Saudi Arabia and that the Taliban did not know where bin Laden was. If he is "located in areas under our control, we will definitely impose a ban on his activities."
According to Mullah Ehsan, the real problem is not bin Laden, but the failure of the U.S. government to recognize the legitimacy of the Taliban government, which he advised America to do, "If the U.S. did not want every Afghan to become a bin Laden." The Taliban representatives furthermore erroneously claim that bin Laden was invited to Afghanistan by the "enemies of the Taliban," and was not giving any financial assistance to the Taliban.
According to The 9/11 Commission Report (p65) and Ahmed Rashid's Taliban, (p133), bin Laden's 1996 return to Afghanistan was supported by the Nangarhar Shura in Jalalabad, a local council of Islamic leaders that was not aligned with either the Rabbani government in Kabul or the Taliban in Kandahar. When Jalalabad fell to the Taliban in September 1996 bin Laden solidified his ties to the Taliban and the relationship grew.
Document 2 - State 154712
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Afghanistan: Taliban's Mullah Omar's 8/22 Contact with State Department," August 23, 1998, Confidential, NODIS, 4 pp. [Excised]
Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar initiates a phone conversation to the U.S. Department of State, two days after the August 20, 1998 U.S. missile strike on Afghanistan and Sudan in retaliation for the terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Mullah Omar speaks with U.S. director for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs (SA/PAB Director) Michael E. Malinowski. This phone call appears to be the only time Mullah Omar has spoken directly with a U.S. government official. Omar suggests President Clinton resign in order to restore U.S. popularity in the Islamic world and asserts the U.S. missile attack will spread bin Laden's anti-American message by uniting the fundamentalist Islamic world and will cause further terrorist attacks. He requests proof that bin Laden was involved in the Africa bombings, claiming he saw no evidence implicating bin Laden in terrorist activities since he has been afforded sanctuary in Afghanistan. Omar's rhetoric mirrors bin Laden's as he criticizes the U.S. for maintaining a military presence in Saudi Arabia, but Malinowski remarks that Omar "was in no way threatening." The document concludes that this unusual communication from the head of the Taliban "is indicative of the seriousness of how the Tall Ban [sic] views the U.S. strikes and our anger over bin Laden."
Document 3 - State 154713
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Message to the Taliban on Bin Laden," August 23, 1998, Secret, NODIS, 6 pp.
This cable, apparently a response to Mullah Omar's request for evidence against bin Laden, outlines the justification for the U.S. military action, the American case against bin Laden, and grounds for bin Laden's expulsion from Afghanistan by the Taliban. The document claims the United States has "reliable intelligence that the bin Laden network has been actively seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction - including chemical weapons - for use against U.S. interests." The document also notes that bin Laden's network has tried in the past to blow up U.S. airliners in the Pacific.
Document 4 - Islama 06433
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "SITREP 6: Pakistan/Afghanistan Reaction to U.S. Strikes," August 25, 1998, Confidential, 7 pp. [Excised]
This SITREP cable, part of a State Department reporting series established to gauge foreign reactions to the strikes, documents the impact of the August 20 action in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph W. Ralston, was present in Islamabad during strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan. The Pakistani press reported that Ralston was in Islamabad to assure the government of Pakistan that it was not being attacked by India if the Pakistani Air Defense detected the missiles. Though they did not notice the attack, officials in the Pakistani government were outraged at the U.S. violation of Pakistani airspace and call for an investigation.
The Taliban reportedly believed the U.S. strikes on Khost were appalling, since the Taliban had repeatedly promised to take action against bin Laden if evidence was presented linking him to terrorism. In the wake of this U.S. missile strike, the Taliban hardened its stance on extraditing bin Laden. Taliban religious leaders Mullah Zakiri and Mullah Shinwari issued a fatwa, an Islamic legal ruling, requiring Muslims to protect bin Laden.
Document 5 - Islama 06448
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "SITREP 7: Pakistan/Afghanistan Reaction to U.S. Strikes," August 26, 1998, Confidential, 8 pp. [Excised]
The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan reports that the Pakistani Military Press Office has issued a statement to clarify General Ralston's presence in Islamabad on the evening of the U.S. missile strikes. Ralston requested permission to visit Islamabad to explain the presence of U.S. ships in international waters off the coast of Pakistan. Ralston assured the Pakistanis the ships were there for possible action against terrorists in Afghanistan. The report concludes that if the attack were detected by Pakistani Air Defense, Ralston would be in a position to clarify the action immediately.
The cable goes on to report that the Taliban have received a letter from the U.S. providing evidence that bin Laden has engaged in terrorist activities, but that the Taliban see the letter as "too general" to warrant bin Laden's extradition. In any case, the Taliban are "not in favor" of talks with the U.S. because of the missile strikes.
Document 6 - Islama 06863
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Demarche to Taliban on New Bin Laden Threat," September 14, 1998, Secret, 5 pp.
Meeting in Islamabad with a U.S. official, Abdul Hakim Mujahid, Taliban envoy to the United Nations, said that Mullah Omar is the primary reason why Osama bin Laden continues to be afforded sanctuary in Afghanistan, as 80% of Taliban officials oppose this policy, including Taliban Deputy Council leader Mullah Mohammad Rabbani. Mujahid added that "very few Afghans are in favor of bin Laden's presence in Afghanistan." Mujahid also tried to bolster relations with the U.S. by appealing to commonalities between the United States and Afghanistan, including their shared "dislike of Iran."
Upon hearing of the Taliban capture of the central Afghan town of Bamiyan, the U.S. official asked the Taliban leadership to defend the Shiite Muslims in the region and the Bamiyan Buddha statues. Mujahid assured the U.S. that Mullah Omar already ordered the protection of the statues and that many of the Shiites in Bamiyan opposed the Taliban, and therefore had to be defeated.
(In November 2001 the retreating Taliban completely destroyed the city of Bamiyan in the Hindu Kush. There was also evidence of a systematic slaughter of hundreds of Hazara Shi'a men at the hands of the Taliban. The Bamiyan Buddhas were demolished in March 2001 by the Taliban, who declared them offensive to Islam.)
Document 7 - State 181837
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Message to Mullah Omar," October 1, 1998, Secret, NODIS 7 pp.
This cable consists of a letter from Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Omar faxed to U.S. officials on September 24, 1998 and a subsequent response from the U.S. State Department. Omar's letter advised the U.S. to alter its policies or risk alienating the Muslim world and claimed that bin Laden was "just an excuse made by the U.S. and this is hurting the U.S." The State Department reaction contains "with us or against us" language reminiscent of many U.S. officials' speeches in the days and weeks following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. According to the 1998 cable, this is a "clash between the forces of the past and the forces of the future, between those who tear down and those who build up, between hope and fear, chaos and community. Those who continue to harbor and welcome terrorists must accept responsibility for the actions of the terrorists." "The only dividing line is between those who practice, support or tolerate terror, and those who understand that it is murder, plain and simple."
Document 8 - Islama 07510
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Pakistan: Ambassador Raises bin Laden with Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed" October 6, 1998, Secret, 2 pp. [Excised]
U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan William B. Milam discusses Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden with Pakistan Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed. The Ambassador states that although there are a number of "sticking points in our relationship [with the Taliban] which we are willing to discuss, preeminently the status of women and girls, there was one issue on which we had no flexibility. This was the presence of Osama bin Laden and his organization in Afghanistan."
Ambassador Milam asks for Pakistan's help on the bin Laden issue and stresses "that U.S. patience was growing thin" and bin Laden's extradition was something the U.S. needed to have "settled 'in a matter of days' rather than weeks or months."
Document 9 - Islama 07553
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama Bin Ladin: GOP Official - Claiming Taliban Want to Get Rid of Bin Ladin - Reviews Three Options for Dealing With Him," October 7, 1998, Secret, NODIS, 6 pp. [Excised]
A Pakistani official has told U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan William B. Milam that the Taliban "want to rid themselves of terrorist Usama bin Ladin," and listed 3 possible ways of doing so. The unnamed official emphasized option two, in which the U.S. would purchase bin Laden from the Taliban for a large sum. The cable also refers to recent meetings in which the Taliban claimed that if they expelled bin Laden, they would be overthrown because the Pashtun tribal system dictates that they must provide refuge to those that seek it.
Document 10 - Islama 07665
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama Bin Laden: High-Level Taliban Official Gives the Standard Line on Bin Laden With a Couple of Nuances, In October 11 Meeting With Ambassador," October 12, 1998, Secret, NODIS, 10pp. [Excised]
U.S. Ambassador Milam met with the Taliban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maulawi Wakil Ahmed, on October 11 in the first U.S. meeting with a major Taliban official since the August 20, 1998 U.S. missile strike. The Taliban called bin Laden "a serious problem." As the U.S. stressed the urgency in getting bin Laden out of Afghanistan, Wakil continued to give the now repetitive Taliban explanation that the Afghan people would overthrow the Taliban if they handed bin Laden over. This contradicts other messages, such as those from Abdul Hakim Mujahid on September 14, 1998 in which the Taliban stated that few Afghans were in favor of bin Laden's presence in Afghanistan. Wakil did, however, ask questions regarding bin Laden's possible treatment in Saudi Arabia if bin Laden were turned over to Saudi authorities.
Wakil also exaggerated in statements that bin Laden was invited to Afghanistan by the previous regime and that the Saudis told the Taliban to keep bin Laden in Afghanistan after they captured Jalalabad.
Document 11 - Islama 07841
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama bin Ladin: Coordinating our Efforts and Sharpening our Message on bin Ladin," October 19, 1998, Secret, 7 pp. [Excised]
Coordinating with United Nations efforts in Afghanistan and discussing ways to compel Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Taliban to cooperate on the extradition of Osama bin Laden, the State Department reiterates "that the U.S. reserves the right to take military action concerning bin Ladin and will hold the Taliban directly responsible for any terrorist activities bin Ladin engages in."
The cable recognizes the need for increased pressure on the Taliban for bin Laden, "before the U.S. strikes on Khost - a wasting asset - become old news to the Taliban leadership," and also observes that Saudi Arabia needs to be "the cornerstone of U.S. efforts to bring bin Ladin to justice."
Document 12 - Islama 08369
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama bin Ladin: Taliban Announce Cut-Off Date for Receipt of Evidence; GOP Official Says Taliban Growing More Intransigent," November 10, 1998 Secret, 5 pp. [Excised]
According to two state department sources, including one Pakistan government official, the Taliban continue to grow hardened and more inflexible on the issue of extraditing Osama bin Laden. Sources attribute the uncompromising Taliban position "to press reports that the Saudi Interior Minister has exonerated bin Ladin for involvement in the Khobar Towers and Riyadh bombings, as well as Taliban frustrations that the U.S. had not provided them any evidence" proving bin Laden's involvement in terrorist activities. The Taliban also announced a cut-off date of November 20, 1998 for the submission of evidence against Osama bin Laden to the Taliban's Supreme Court.
Document 13 - State 210367
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Afghanistan: Message to Taliban on Usama Bin Laden," Nov 11 1998, Secret, NODIS 2 pp. [Excised]
In this cable, Ambassador Milam is asked to pass the message along to the Taliban that the U.S. has now provided greater evidence of bin Laden's terrorist activities and that the Taliban will be held responsible for any terrorist action that bin Laden undertakes.
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Usama Bin Ladin: Message Delivered to Taliban Representative," Nov 11 1998, Secret, NODIS 4 pp. [Excised]
A low-level Taliban official, Syedur Rahman Haqqani, said that bin Laden "is totally under control," and that bin Laden should not be held responsible for the terrorist activities of those he had trained or has had contact with. Over 20,000 people were trained for the jihad and bin Laden "cannot be held accountable for all of their actions." Haqqani "smugly" asserted that the Saudi attitude regarding bin Laden remained unclear. Furthermore, the Taliban welcomed proof linking bin Laden to terrorist activities.
Document 15 - State 220495
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Osama bin Laden: Taliban Spokesman Seeks New Proposal for Resolving bin Laden Problem," November 28, 1998, Secret, 10 pp. [Excised]
The Taliban Supreme Court announces there is insufficient evidence to implicate Osama bin Laden in terrorist activities, but Wakil Ahmed, a close aide to Taliban Supreme leader Mullah Omar, contacts State Department officials, expressing that "Kandahar did not believe that the bin Laden matter had been resolved by the recent Taliban court ruling." Wakil mentions that video evidence against bin Laden given to the Taliban by the U.S. contained "nothing new" and was therefore not submitted to the court.
In an extensive discussion with Alan W. Eastham Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission to the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, Wakil observes that "Saudi Arabia held the key to any resolution" to the bin Laden issue, but the Taliban felt the Saudis were unwilling to discuss bin Laden. He claims this is "unfortunate because the Taliban had given the Saudis an authentic proposal for resolving the bin Laden issue. . . . It was only Saudi pride that stood in the way."
Wakil, claiming that "bin Laden had once been a trained guerilla supported by the United States," is corrected by Eastham, who clarifies that "while [bin Laden] may have fought with a resistance group which had received U.S. support, we had never heard his name during that period and did not support him at that time."
While further questioning the culpability of bin Laden in the August bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Wakil "observed that Saddam Hussein was the root cause of all these problems."
Document 16 - Islama 09222
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama bin Ladin: Charge Reiterates U.S. Concern to Key Taliban Official, Who Sticks to Well-Known Taliban Positions," December 19, 1998, Secret, 5 pp.
Wakil Ahmed, a close aide to Taliban Supreme leader Mullah Omar communicates to Alan W. Eastham Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan that he has "personally discussed U.S. concerns with 'Amir-Al-Mumineen' (Commander of the Faithful) Mullah Omar," and the Taliban still consider Osama bin Laden "innocent," adding, "It is unbelievable that this small man did this to you."
Wakil further claims that the Taliban remain "deeply upset" over the U.S. bombings of training camps in Khost and compares the U.S. cruise missile attacks to a terrorist bombing. "The U.S. said bin Ladin had killed innocent people, but had not the U.S. killed innocent Afghans in Khost too? Was this not a crime?" The cable quotes the Taliban official, "I (Wakil said) consider you (the U.S.) as murderers of Afghans."
Document 17 - Islama 09420
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama Bin Ladin: Bin Ladin Uses Recent Interviews to Assert Right to WMD, and to Threaten U.S. and U.K Over Iraq," Dec 28, 1998, Secret, NODIS, 5pp.
Despite the Taliban's claim that bin Laden was denied all access to the media, this cable reports that he has given two interviews since the August 20, 1998 U.S. strike on terrorist camps in Afghanistan and Sudan. Bin Laden asserted his right to use weapons of mass destruction, and called for Muslims to kill U.S., British, and Israeli civilians, referring to the recent military strikes in Iraq as justification. He denied any connection to the August 7, 1998 bombings in Africa and alleged the existence of a Saudi hit squad out to get him. According to bin Laden, there was mutual respect between himself and the Taliban, as they considered each other to be "good Muslims."
Document 19 - Islama 09424
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Afghanistan: Taliban "Threat Warning"," Dec 29, 1998, Secret, NODIS, 2pp.
The Taliban has sent the U.S. an unspecific message that terrorists backed by Ahmed Shah Masoud and the intelligence services in Iran are conspiring against the U.S. The State Department believes that the Taliban's motives for sending the message are probably politically motivated, as Masoud and Iran remain some of the Taliban's most powerful enemies.
Document 20 - Islama 09488
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Usama Bin Ladin: Charge Underscores U.S. Concerns on Interviews; Taliban Envoy Says Bin Ladin Hoodwinked Them and it Will Not Happen Again," Dec 30, 1998, Secret, NODIS, 4pp.
In a meeting with a U.S. official, Taliban representative Syedur Rahman Haqqani asserted that the Taliban recently allowed Osama bin Laden to be interviewed in order to give him a chance to renounce terrorism. Instead, bin Laden strongly reiterated his commitment to terrorism against American citizens and once again claimed the right to use weapons of mass destruction against Western targets. Haqqani again promised that bin Laden would not be permitted to engage in any further press appearances or terrorist activities. "The U.S. should believe the Taliban that he [bin Laden] will not be permitted any more interviews and not allowed to engage in terrorist activities." The fact that bin Laden had "tricked" the Taliban did not hurt his status as a "guest" of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Document 21 - Islama 00567
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "A/S Inderfurth and S/CT Sheehan Meet Taliban Representatives," February 1, 2000, Confidential, 13pp. [Excised]
High-ranking U.S. and Taliban officials made no progress in discussing the fate of bin Laden, but the Taliban unequivocally agreed that "hijacking is a terrorist act; The Taliban always have and always will condemn terrorism, including hijackings." In attendance at the two-hour meeting were U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Karl F. Inderfurth, U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism Michael Sheehan, Taliban Director for Administration Amir Khan Muttaqi, and Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan Syed Mohammad Haqqani.
Document 23 - Islama 05749
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "Searching for the Taliban's Hidden Message," September 19, 2000, Secret, 12 pp. [Excised]
A Taliban official whose name is excised from the cable surprises U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan William B. Milam by breaking from the usual Taliban responses - even refraining from questioning the validity of U.S. evidence linking Osama bin Laden to terrorism. The Ambassador observes that the "tone and statements" of the official remained "far less obstreperous than normal Taliban rhetoric."
Ambassador Milam clarifies for the Taliban official that "the U.S. was not against the Taliban, per se, was not out to destroy the Taliban," however that the "UBL issue is supremely important and must be resolved so the other issues can be discussed in a more amenable atmosphere. The one issue that cannot be subordinated or diminished is bin Ladin. If the U.S. and the Taliban could get past bin Ladin, 'we would have a different kind of relationship.'"
The unnamed Taliban official in this document is probably Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Abdul Jalil. Another declassified State Department cable, Islamabad 05779, also dated September 19, 2000, reiterates that a Taliban official who met with Ambassador Milam on September 19, 2000 requests "a follow-up meeting with U.S. officials on or about September 30, probably in Frankfurt." A cable dated November 9, 2000, State 215948, discusses meetings about bin Laden held in Frankfurt, Germany on November 2-3 between senior U.S. officials Alan Eastham and Edmund Hill and Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Abdul Jalil.
Document 24 - State 028054
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Taliban Deliver Letter from Muttawakil; Say They Will Comply With Office Closing in New York," February 15, 2001, Confidential, 5 pp.
The State Department informs several key diplomatic posts that the Taliban have delivered a letter from Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil Muttawakil to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell asking the Secretary to reconsider the policies of the previous administration. The message reiterated the claim that bin Laden has been contained from engaging in any "military" activities, and there was no evidence linking him to any terrorist plots. The Taliban intimated that they would consider trading bin Laden for U.S. recognition. The Taliban furthermore claimed that bin Laden is disliked by "80 to 90 percent" of Afghans. Noorullah Zandran, a Taliban representative, told the Americans, we "wished your missiles had hit him."
Al-Qaida monitored U.S. negotiations with Taliban over oil pipeline
A memo by military chief Mohammed Atef raises new questions about whether failed U.S. efforts to reform Afghanistan's radical regime -- and build the pipeline -- set the stage for Sept. 11.
By Jean-Charles Brisard
Pages 1 2
NothingJune 5, 2002 | A 1998 memo written by al-Qaida military chief Mohammed Atef reveals that Osama bin Laden's group had detailed knowledge of negotiations that were taking place between Afghanistan's ruling Taliban and American government and business leaders over plans for a U.S. oil and gas pipeline across that Central Asian country.
The e-mail memo was found in 1998 on a computer seized by the FBI during its investigation into the 1998 African embassy bombings, which were sponsored by al-Qaida. Atef's memo was discovered by FBI counter-terrorism expert John O'Neill, who left the bureau in 2001, complaining that U.S. oil interests were hindering his investigation into al-Qaida. O'Neill, who became security chief at the World Trade Center, died in the Sept. 11 attack.
Atef's memo shines new light on what al-Qaida knew about U.S. efforts to normalize relations with the Taliban in exchange for the fundamentalist government's supporting the construction of an oil and gas pipeline across Afghanistan. As documented in the book I coauthored with Guillaume Dasquie, "Bin Laden: The Forbidden Truth," the Clinton and Bush administrations negotiated with the Taliban, both to get the repressive regime to widen its government as well as look favorably on U.S. companies' attempts to construct an oil pipeline. The Bush White House stepped up negotiations with the Taliban in 2001. When those talks stalled in July, a Bush administration representative threatened the Taliban with military reprisals if the government did not go along with American demands.
The seven-page memo was signed "Abu Hafs," which is the military name of Atef, who was the military chief of al-Qaida and is believed to have been killed in November 2001 during U.S. operations in Afghanistan. It shows al-Qaida's keen interest in the U.S.-Taliban negotiations and raises new questions as to whether the U.S. military threat to the Taliban in July 2001 could have prompted al-Qaida's Sept. 11 attack.
Atef's memo is not about the pipeline alone, though it mentions the project several times. It is an analysis of the political situation facing the Taliban. It documents the movement's rise, its leadership, the geopolitical importance of Afghanistan, the Taliban's relationship with Pakistan, as well as the movement's relationship with the Arab mujahedin. The document's intended readership is unclear. But it reveals that the pipeline was seen as a strategic offering toward the West, in order to make the Taliban government acceptable to the United States and Pakistan, as well as to reduce military and investigative pressure on the country to rein in or even extradite bin Laden.
Atef explains that the United States wants "to take control of any region which has huge quantities of oil reserves," and "the American government is keen on laying the oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan." Atef concludes that al-Qaida's "duty toward the movement [Taliban] is to stand behind it, support it materially and morally, especially because its regional and international enemies are working night and day to put an end to it and make it fail."
It seems clear the military chief didn't expect the pipeline negotiations to bear fruit. Referring to Pakistanis as "nonbelievers," and noting that the pipeline "will be under American control ... and it also goes through the territories of Pakistan which are allied to America," Atef implies that the Taliban has no intention of ultimately cooperating with the project, but is trying to string along the Americans and Pakistanis to win some breathing room for its unpopular government.
The Atef memo is the latest piece of evidence documenting a murky chapter in recent American history -- the overtures of the last two American administrations to the repressive Taliban regime. Several U.S. oil companies, most notably Unocal, had been advocates of diplomatic overtures to the Taliban, in order to facilitate the building of a pipeline from the Caspian Sea region to Pakistan and the Persian Gulf through Afghanistan. In 1996, Unocal vice president Chris Taggart described the fall of Kabul to the Taliban regime as a "very positive step" and urged the U.S. to extend recognition to the new rulers in Kabul and thus "lead the way to international lending agencies coming in."
Just 10 days after the Taliban seized power in Kabul, Zalmay Khalilzad, former National Security Council official and Unocal consultant who was appointed special envoy to Afghanistan by President George W. Bush at the end of 2001, argued in a Washington Post opinion article that the U.S. should try to work with the mullahs and form a broad-based government that included other factions. "The Taliban does not practice the anti-U.S. style of fundamentalism practiced by Iran -- it is closer to the Saudi model ..." Khalilzad contended, concluding that "we should use as a positive incentive the benefits that will accrue to Afghanistan from the construction of oil and gas pipelines across its territory ... These projects will only go forward if Afghanistan has a single authoritative government."
Soon after, the State Department spokesman Glyn Davies told the New York Times he had hope that "the new authorities in Kabul will move quickly to restore order and security and to form a representative interim government that can begin the process of reconciliation nationwide." Davies also said the United States "wanted to send diplomats to Afghanistan to meet with the Taliban and held out the possibility of re-establishing full diplomatic ties with the country," according to the Times.
In November 1997 Unocal invited a Taliban delegation to Texas and, in early December, the company opened a training center at the University of Nebraska, to instruct 137 Afghans in pipeline construction technology. The company also donated to the university's Center for Afghanistan Studies. Unocal CEO John Imle estimated that the company spent between $15 and $20 million on its Central Asia oil pipeline (CentGas) project -- on preliminary feasibility studies, humanitarian projects and other efforts to lobby the Taliban (Unocal equipped the regime with satellite phones, for instance.)
In February 1998, Unocal's vice president for international relations, John Maresca, told a House subcommittee hearing on U.S. interests in the Central Asian Republics that an oil pipeline "would benefit Afghanistan, which would receive revenues from transport tariffs, and would promote stability and encourage trade and economic development." Emphasizing that "the proposed Central Asia Oil Pipeline (CentGas) cannot begin construction until an internationally recognized Afghanistan government is in place," he urged the administration and the Congress "to give strong support to the United Nations-led peace process in Afghanistan."
how does any of this prove your point?
US tried to talk to the Taliban. the taliban gave some song and dance about evidence. nothing got accomplished.
yet if I post a links. its bullshit.
Bush doesn't care about capturing him. However, Bin Laden still serves a purpose by remaining alive.
There's no contradiction there.
These articles provide evidence of repeated contacts between the Taliban and U.S officials. You said that the Taliban refused to deal with the U.S authorities. Therefore you were wrong.
In fact, not only were they in constant contact but Taliban representatives were invited to Washington and to Texas as guests of the Government and of big business.
'Atef's memo shines new light on what al-Qaida knew about U.S. efforts to normalize relations with the Taliban in exchange for the fundamentalist government's supporting the construction of an oil and gas pipeline across Afghanistan. As documented in the book I coauthored with Guillaume Dasquie, "Bin Laden: The Forbidden Truth," the Clinton and Bush administrations negotiated with the Taliban, both to get the repressive regime to widen its government as well as look favorably on U.S. companies' attempts to construct an oil pipeline. The Bush White House stepped up negotiations with the Taliban in 2001. When those talks stalled in July, a Bush administration representative threatened the Taliban with military reprisals if the government did not go along with American demands.
The seven-page memo was signed "Abu Hafs," which is the military name of Atef, who was the military chief of al-Qaida and is believed to have been killed in November 2001 during U.S. operations in Afghanistan. It shows al-Qaida's keen interest in the U.S.-Taliban negotiations and raises new questions as to whether the U.S. military threat to the Taliban in July 2001 could have prompted al-Qaida's Sept. 11 attack.'
that was a air war
kosovo was a nato operation
kosovo protected us from terrorism
iraq......not so much
Bring it on cause I'm no victim
b nice loves pearl jam like ed vedder loves america
I don't recall stating that your source was bullshit. What you pasted was this:
'The Taliban refused to directly speak to Bush, stating that talking with a non-Muslim political leader would be an insult to Islam.'
This doesn't state that the Taliban were unwilling to talk with U.S officials.
ok sorry. you said the information in the source was bullshit.
let me clear it up for you.
you seem to believe that we could have sat down with Omar and politely asked for bin laden. maybe given the taliban some gold or something and in a few days we would have had the Osama.
according to the wiki...
In the weeks prior to the military action in Afghanistan, U.S. President George W. Bush delivered an ultimatum [5] to the Taliban, to:
* deliver Al-Qaeda leaders located in Afghanistan to the United States
* release all imprisoned foreign nationals, including American citizens [6]
* protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in Afghanistan
* close terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and "hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities"
* give the United States full access to terrorist training camps to verify their closure
President Bush further stated the demands were not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban refused to directly speak to Bush, stating that talking with a non-Muslim political leader would be an insult to Islam. But they made statements through their embassy in Pakistan: the Taliban rejected the ultimatum on September 21, 2001, saying there was no evidence in their possession linking bin Laden to the September 11 attacks.
I'm not doubting the US and the taliban have talked in the past. my point is.......
the US tried to talk to the taliban as clearly stated in Bush ultimatum above. taliban refused. we attacked. and rightfully so. the fires were still burning in NYC.
you know, you really shouldn't use wikipedia as verification for anything solid.
and you know there comes a time when if you've supported terrorism you will become a target of it. no matter how righteous you are or how indestructable you think you are.
take a good look
this could be the day
hold my hand
lie beside me
i just need to say
so america got what it deserved huh?