I am Justified
Ahnimus
Posts: 10,560
Aren't we basically all justified in our actions?
Has anyone performed an action that they felt was unjust at the time of performing it?
Certainly upon reflection we can see the err of our ways. However, as I act I feel justified. Let me share a relevant story:
One summer afternoon when I was 13, my brother and I were having a dispute over the living room stereo. He liked Garth Brooks and I like White Zombie, both of us had a distaste for each other's music. The dispute began with one of us changing the CD in the player, then other changed it back. This escalated into shouting and eventually physical violence.
At that time, and for some time after, we both felt justified in our actions. Upon reflection I've learned a valuable lesson, escalation doesn't usually resolve conflicts. Most resolutions come about during a calm and collected conversation. However, there are times, a few times here recently, where this knowledge recedes and I escalate along with the discussion, all the while, feeling just in my actions.
I'm sure everyone can relate to the story above and examine a similar situation in their life. If they do, I'm sure they will find that they felt justified as well. If I can't remember a situation where I did not feel justified in my actions. And I desire to share another's perspective, then I should imagine they feel justified in their actions as well.
Has anyone performed an action that they felt was unjust at the time of performing it?
Certainly upon reflection we can see the err of our ways. However, as I act I feel justified. Let me share a relevant story:
One summer afternoon when I was 13, my brother and I were having a dispute over the living room stereo. He liked Garth Brooks and I like White Zombie, both of us had a distaste for each other's music. The dispute began with one of us changing the CD in the player, then other changed it back. This escalated into shouting and eventually physical violence.
At that time, and for some time after, we both felt justified in our actions. Upon reflection I've learned a valuable lesson, escalation doesn't usually resolve conflicts. Most resolutions come about during a calm and collected conversation. However, there are times, a few times here recently, where this knowledge recedes and I escalate along with the discussion, all the while, feeling just in my actions.
I'm sure everyone can relate to the story above and examine a similar situation in their life. If they do, I'm sure they will find that they felt justified as well. If I can't remember a situation where I did not feel justified in my actions. And I desire to share another's perspective, then I should imagine they feel justified in their actions as well.
I necessarily have the passion for writing this, and you have the passion for condemning me; both of us are equally fools, equally the toys of destiny. Your nature is to do harm, mine is to love truth, and to make it public in spite of you. - Voltaire
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You are asking for some huge flaming, my friend, if you make a statement such as
and reveling in it's loyalty. It's made by forming coalitions
over specific principles, goals, and policies.
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I think you missed the point. You don't feel that those things are justified, and hence you would not act them. However, one who does act them, may feel justified. My question is, is it possible to feel unjustified in performing an action? Wouldn't that be contrary to one's own moral values? I'm asking you to try to carry your inner perspective of your own actions into the agency of another individual to properly see and feel what they see and feel and not what is obvious from an external objective view.
Thomas Nagel writes in "Freedom and the View from Nowhere"
"From the inside, when we act, alternative possibilities seem to lie open before us: to turn right or left, to order this dish or that, to vote for one candidate or the other—and one of the possibilities is made actual by what we do. The same applies to our internal consideration of the actions of others. But from an external perspective, things look different. That perspective takes in not only the circumstances of action as they present themselves to the agent, but also the conditions and influences lying behind the action, including the complete nature of the agent himself. While we cannot fully occupy this perspective toward ourselves while acting, it seems possible that many of the alternatives that appear to lie open when viewed from an internal perspective would seem closed from this outer point of view, if we could take it up. And even if some of them are left open, given a complete specification of the condition of the agent and the circumstances of action, it is not clear how this would leave anything further for the agent to contribute to the outcome—anything that he could contribute as source, rather than merely as the scene of the outcome—the person whose act it is. If they are left open given everything about him, what does he have to do with the result?"
This lead me to hypothesize what it would be like to take a truly internal perspective of another's actions.
Nagel continues...
"The defendant is an agent, and in a judgment of responsibility the judge doesn’t just decide that what has been done is a good or a bad thing, but tries to enter into the defendant’s point of view as an agent. He is not, however, concerned merely pith how it felt: rather, he tries to assess the action in light of the alternatives presenting themselves to the defendant—among which he chose or failed to choose, and in light of the considerations and temptations bearing on the choice—which he considered or failed to consider. To praise or blame is not to judge merely that what has happened is a good or a bad thing, but to judge the person for having done it, in view of the circumstances under which it was done. The difficulty is to explain how this is possible—how we can do more than welcome or regret the event, or perhaps the psychology of the agent.
The main thing we do is to compare the act or motivation with alternatives, better or worse, which were deliberately or implicitly rejected though their acceptance In the circumstances would have been motivationally comprehensible. That is the setting into which one projects both an internal understanding of the action and a judgment of what should have been done. It is the sense of the act in contrast with alternatives not taken, together with a normative assessment of those alternatives— also projected into the point of view of the defendant—that yields an internal judgment of responsibility. What was done is seen as a selection by the defendant from the array of possibilities with which he was faced, and is defined by contrast with those possibilities.
When we hold the defendant responsible, the result is not merely a description of his character, but a vicarious occupation of his point of view and evaluation of his action from within it. While this process need not be accompanied by strong feelings, it often is, and their character will depend on the makeup of the judge. Condemnatory judgments, for example, may be accompanied by impulses of retribution and punishment. These are most likely to appear in their full ferocity when the psychic configuration of the judge subjects him to strong conflicts with respect to the defendant’s situation of choice. A judgment of responsibility involves a double projection: into the actual choice and into the possible alternatives, better or worse. If the judge identifies strongly with the bad act done or avoided, his contempt or admiration will be correspondingly strong. It is a familiar fact that we hate most the sins that tempt us most, and admire most the virtues we find most difficult.
The kinds of things we judge others for vary. We condemn a rattlesnake for nothing, and a cat for nothing or practically nothing. Our understanding of their actions and even of their point of view puts us too far outside them to permit any judgments about what they should have done. All we can do is to understand why they have done what they did, and to be happy or unhappy about it. With regard to small children the possibilities of moral judgment are somewhat greater, but we still cannot project ourselves fully into their point of view in order to think about what they should do, as opposed to what would be required of an adult in corresponding circumstances. Similar limits apply to judgments of other people’s intelligence or stupidity. Someone has not made a stupid mistake if he completely lacks the capacity of thought needed to draw the correct conclusion from the evidence available to him. The larger his intellectual capacities, the greater his opportunities for stupidity, as well as for intelligence. It is the same with good and evil. A five-year-old can be blamed for throwing the cat out the window, but not for a gross failure of tact.
Two kinds of thing may undermine a judgment of responsibility, and familiar excusing conditions fall into one or other of these classes. First, it may emerge that the character of the choice or the circumstances of action facing the defendant are different from what they at first appeared to be. He may not have full knowledge of the consequences of what he is doing; he may be acting under severe coercion or duress; certain alternatives which seemed available may not be, or he may be unaware of them. Such discoveries alter the character of the action to be assessed, but do not blpck a judgment of responsibility altogether.
Second, something may prevent the judge from projecting his standards into the point of view of the defendant—the initial move needed for any judgment of responsibility. Certain discoveries render the judge’s projection into the defendant’s perspective irrelevant to the assessment of what the defendant has done, because he is quite different from the defendant in crucial ways. For example, the defendant may have been acting under hypnotic suggestion, or under the influence of a powerful drug, or even, in the vein of science fiction, under the direct control of a mad scientist manipulating his brain. Or he may turn out not to be a rational being at all. In these cases the judge will not regard the vantage point of the defendant as the correct one to take up for purposes of assessment. He will not project himself into the defendant’s point of view, but will stay outside him—so that the contemplation of alternative possibilities will not support praise or blame but only relief or regret.
The philosophical disappearance of all responsibility is an extension of this second type of disengagement. The essence of a judgment of responsibility is an internal comparison with alternatives—choices the agent did not make which we contrast with what he did, for better or for worse. In ordinary judgments of responsibility an objective view of the agent may lead us to alter our assumption about which alternatives are eligible for such comparison. Even alternatives that seemed to the agent to be available at the time may seem to us out of the running, once our external view of him becomes more complete.
The radically external standpoint that produces the philosophical problem of responsibility seems to make every alternative ineligible. We see the agent as a phenomenon generated by the world of which he is a part. One aspect of the phenomenon is his sense of choosing among alternatives, for good or bad reasons. But this makes no difference. Whether we think of his practical reasoning and his choices as causally determined or not, we cannot project ourselves into his point of view for the purpose of comparing alternatives once we have ascended to that extreme objective standpoint which sees him merely as a bit of the world. The alternatives that he may think of as available to him are from this point of view just alternative courses that the world might have taken. The fact that what didn’t happen would have been better or worse than what did doesn’t support an internal judgment of responsibility about a human being any more than it does about a rattlesnake."
How can we rightfully judge another agent without supposing they share the same qualities with us. I have never met a person who did not feel justified in their actions, even when they are heinous. Dahmer for example, he knew what he was doing was wrong, but was justified in doing it because he felt it was a compulsory act. In this case, the agent does not feel that the act is justified, but rather feels that he himself (the agent) is justified. And that is precisely what I mean.
Thomas Nagel: Freedom and the View from Nowhere
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But to make it short, it is a value judgement (sic), based on morals, based on the individual and his/her preference and values.
Peace
Dan
"Every judgment teeters on the brink of error. To claim absolute knowledge is to become monstrous. Knowledge is an unending adventure at the edge of uncertainty." - Frank Herbert, Dune, 1965
This is what I mean. From an internal subjective vantage point (first person perspective) we are all justified. It's only from an external objective vantage point (third person) that we view ourselves or others as unjust. However, as Nagel explains, the further we expand our objective view, the more ineligible the subjective view appears.
"justification" is just a support mechanism for ego.
what is the purpose of arguing it?
confused.
i expect more of you, ahnimus.
If I opened it now would you not understand?
It's about how we perceive or judge another individual.
Yeah, we always understand our own foolish motivations and the reasons we necessarily have them and therefore excuse and justify them. And yet when viewing someone else's errors in judgment, we tend to hold them to the ideal, even when we can't hold ourselves to it.
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Which is contrary to the principle of universality as mentioned by Chomsky as an elementary moral principle, which says, we should hold ourselves to the same standards we hold others. To do so, would mean to objectify ourselves, to view ourselves from the third person and reject our subjective view. An impossibility, I argue. However, we can refine this to, hold others to the same standards we hold ourselves. In other words, to apply our subjective view of ourselves, along with, the objective view, to those whom we judge.
I'm thinking that from an actual universal view, it encompasses the universal which includes both subjective and objective at the same time. I realize that is hard to quantify. I don't see the "universal" as being objectifying others. I see humans judging one another without understanding, compassion or subjective intelligence involved as objectifying others.
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We might be using "objective" in a slightly different sense from each other. Perhaps if you reviewed Thomas Nagel's Freedom and the View from Nowhere in this paper, the "objective view" is the "view from nowhere", or from the vantage point of no agency.
when it hits you, you feel to pain.
So brutalize me with music.”
~ Bob Marley
No that is not the point. If we all feel justified in our agency, then it is no one's fault.
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Rhinocerous Surprise '08!!!
when it hits you, you feel to pain.
So brutalize me with music.”
~ Bob Marley
You lost me :(
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Rhinocerous Surprise '08!!!
http://www.myspace.com/illuminatta
Rhinocerous Surprise '08!!!
http://www.myspace.com/illuminatta
Rhinocerous Surprise '08!!!
I don't share your perspective on this.
When I complain to a restuarant manager for poor service, I feel justified in doing so. It's not an after-the-fact, matter of supporting my ego. It is a background emotive state that facilitates the role of my agency. For if I did not feel my actions were rational or justified, what other motivation would I have?
I was in a restuarant a few weeks ago and a patron was harassing the waitress. Clearly she expected the waitress to serve her personally and above all her other duties. The woman was very rude and demanding. I could not rationalize or justify the patron's perspective or her behavior. But it seemed obvious to me, that she felt justified and rational. How else could she behave in such a way?
I think you are referring to a breakdown of our language. We don't have proper terms to refer to matters on a continua. We either describe facts as true or false, events as good or bad. But we all intuitively know that some things which are bad, aren't really that bad, and may have a hint of good to them, while other things are horrible. But even these words "horrible", "terrible" and so on, don't reflect the actual position on the scope of what is good-bad. Rather, we have a subjective measure with a point of separation, where things exist on either side of that point. It's difficult to conceive of all things being equal on that point of separation and being neither good nor bad, especially since we have a natural propensity to do so. Then what is the sufficient condition for accepting that something should not be catagorical? Is this not just an ideological concept with no substantial logical proof? Surely you would not say that a 5 mile wide meteor crashing into the earth is neutral from our vantage point, nor would it be neutral from the vantage point of our ecosystem. It only becomes neutral from the vantage point of our solar system, and perhaps there has some effect that will detiorate the structure. At any rate, I'm having difficulty understanding your perspective.
People who integrate their intelligence adapt and learn to operate within the continua, rather than aligning with illusions like either/or, good/bad, right/wrong, etc. With a holistic perspective, to exclude equals denial, and lack of realism. That's why as people become more holistic, they become more realistic.
When one aspires to align with what is universal and truthful they will continue to resolve false dichotomies to greater and greater degree. The closer we come to being one with what is universal, the more accurate, realistic and understanding we are of what is.
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"continuing" with at all times, including it's eternal nature. It is the ego or our filters and our personality that aligns with words, stances, time, arguments, perspectives etc. thereby willfully separating ourselves from the whole. This is the gist of the God stuff. When we fall from the Grace of the whole, we live out this hellish reality. And when we align with the whole, we live in peace and the Garden of Eden all around us. We choose in each moment. Reality which is stunning, or the illusions wherein we suffer due to our out-of-synchness.
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I'm not sure we are totally seeing eye-to-eye. Which brings me to Peter Gray's Psychology. One of the most widely used psychology textbooks on the planet. In the very introduction he lays the ground for an objective study of subjective phenomena, largely through biology. Which was a discussion we had before. As I recall you left biology out of psychology. Furthermore Gray mentions the influence Locke, Hobbes, Descartes, Darwin and so on had on the foundation of psychology, which is a scientific study and therefor must be causally connected to all other fields of science.
What are your thoughts on that?
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I recall you saying that you focus on psychology and I focus on neuroscience. But I can see throughout this text that neuroscience is a major factor in psychology.
Within each context, all things are justifiable.
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What I said about your focus and my own served my purpose in the discussion at the time in order to get my point across. Now I'm a blank slate developing my perceptions for this subject.
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Ok, so you don't know anything about psychology?
I was under the impression that you were somewhat of an expert.