Yeah, as much as I'd like to believe the US was justified, I've never believed that nuking Japan was a justified decision.
There are many supposed reasons as to why Truman chose to incinerate so many Japan civilians.
The most significant underlying reason is that the alternative would've been a full-scale invasion of Japan, against which the Japanese were prepared to fight to the end with not only their military, but also their civilian population including the women and children.
I have no doubt that if the US had gone ahead with the invasion, the final count of Japanese civilian deaths would've dwarfed the number of dead from Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
So, in that sense, yes the A-Bombs were actually a better alternative for both the US and Japan.
However, my opinion is that an invasion of Japan might not have actually been necessary. The fact of the matter is that the war had reached that stage because the invasion was all that there was left to do.
Japan's air force and navy were all but annhilated. The imperialistic arm of Japan had been severed. The once mighty Japanese army that had conquered most of asia was no longer a threat.
In essence, the US could've just waited it out with the use of a naval blockade and continued bombings of actual military targets.
Lastly, I've always wondered if Japanese commanders really understood the power of the atomic bomb prior to its usage against them. Perhaps if the US had simply sent them footage of bomb testings or even set one off in an unhabitated area of Japan for demonstrative purposes, the Japanese leadership would've then realized that there was no other alternative but to surrender.
Instead Truman dropped two of them on major cities in a sneak attack fashion without first making it known to the Japanese leadership exactly what they were up against.
But, one important thing to remember here is that in the end, the total unconditional surrender of Japan to the US military was the best thing that has ever happened to that country.
Without that unconditional surrender, Japan would never have fully recovered and become the economic powerhouse that it later became. It is very likely that we would not be driving hondas and toyotas, and there would be no nintendos or playstations.
The factories that the US built for Japan were state-of-the-art for their time. They were more advanced than the factories in the US.
This is why Japan was able to produce cameras and cars and various other products that were superior to those of the rest of the entire world.
On top of that, the US outlawed and ultimately eliminated the "old way" of how Japan did business. Japan's "old way" of doing business was rife with corruption, and actually worked against progress. It was a system that was left over from the days of feudal Japan. The US forced Japan to adopt a free-market style of business.
Again, none of that would've been possible if Japan had not given their unconditional surrender.
Again, none of that would've been possible if Japan had not given their unconditional surrender.
But the only condition on which the Japanese took issue was their wanting to keep the Emperor in power. And in the end they got what they wanted. So it wasn't really an unconditional surrender was it?
It's taught in Business school. I'm sure if you looked hard enough, you'd find it. And considering that you were way, way off the mark on your statement below, I would deem it prudent to give me the benefit of the doubt in this case.
But the only condition on which the Japanese took issue was their wanting to keep the Emperor in power. And the end they got what they wanted. So it wasn't really an unconditional surrender was it?
The Potsdam declaration, which laid out the terms of unconditional surrender for Japan, was not agreed to by the Japanese on any level until both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were nuked.
Only then did they consider the declaration, but they STILL demanded that 4 of the terms not be complied with.
Eventually, it was widdled down to the issue of the emperor's control, but only after the nukes had been dropped.
After the declaration was signed, Japan still kept its emperor as you stated. However, actual control of the government was handed over to the Japanese parliament, known as the National Diet of Japan.
Therefore, the Emperor of Japan ceased to have any significant control as a result of Japan's unconditional surrender.
It's taught in Business school. I'm sure if you looked hard enough, you'd find it.
It's taught in American business schools that Japans technological excellence is a result of Americans benevolently building the Japanese superior factories to their own? Really? American officials must have felt that they owed the Japanese some kind of favour. Sounds a bit far-fetched to me. Perhaps you'd like to dig out one of your old Business school textbooks and put this issue to rest by providing us with some reliable sources?
The Potsdam declaration, which laid out the terms of unconditional surrender for Japan, was not agreed to by the Japanese on any level until both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were nuked.
Only then did they consider the declaration, but they STILL demanded that 4 of the terms not be complied with.
http://www.antiwar.com/henderson/?articleid=11405
'There is ample evidence that the Japanese government was willing to surrender months before Aug. 6 if only it could keep its emperor. Much of this evidence is given in Alperovitz's book and much in Dennis D. Wainstock, The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996). Wainstock (pp. 22-23) tells of many attempts by the Japanese to clarify the terms and to make clear their willingness to surrender if they could only keep their emperor untouched. For example, on April 7, 1945, acting Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru asked Swedish Ambassador Widon Bagge in Tokyo "to ascertain what peace terms the United States and Britain had in mind." Shigemitsu emphasized that "the Emperor must not be touched." Bagge passed the message on to the U.S. government, but Secretary of State Edward Stettinius told the U.S. ambassador in Sweden to "show no interest or take any initiative in pursuit of this matter."[10]
So the Japanese government tried another route. On May 7, 1945, Masutard Inoue, counselor of the Japanese legation in Portugal, approached an agent of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Inoue asked the agent to contact the U.S. embassy and "find out exactly what they plan to do in the Far East." He expressed his fear that Japan would be smashed, and he emphasized, "there can be no unconditional surrender." The agent passed the message on, but nothing came of it.
Three times is a charm, goes the saying. But not for the hapless Japanese. On May 10, 1945, Gen. Onodera, Japan's military representative in Sweden, tried to get a member of Sweden's royal family to approach the Allies for a settlement. He emphasized also that Japan's government would not accept unconditional surrender and must be allowed to "save face." The U.S. government urged Sweden's government to let the matter drop.
But if you can't at first surrender, try, try again. On July 12, with almost four weeks to go before the horrible blast, Kojiro Kitamura, a representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank in Switzerland, told Per Jacobson, a Swedish adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, that he wanted to contact U.S. representatives and that the only condition Japan insisted on was that it keep its emperor. "He was acting with the consent of Shunichi Kase, the Japanese minister to Switzerland, and General Kiyotomi Okamoto, chief of Japanese European intelligence, and they were in direct contact with Tokyo."[11] On July 14, Jacobson met in Wiesbaden, Germany with OSS representative Allen Dulles (later head of the CIA) and relayed the message that Japan's main demand was "retention of the Emperor." Dulles passed the information to Stimson, but Stimson refused to act on it.
Interestingly, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy drafted a proposed surrender demand for the Committee of Three (Grew, Stimson, and Navy Secretary James Forrestal.) Their draft was part of Article 12 of the Potsdam Declaration, in which the Allies specified the conditions for Japan's surrender. Under their wording, Japan's government would have been allowed to keep its emperor as part of a "constitutional monarchy." Truman, though, who was influenced by his newly appointed Secretary of State James Byrnes on the ship over to the Potsdam Conference, changed the language of the surrender demand to drop the reference to keeping the emperor.
The bitter irony, of course, is that Truman ultimately allowed Japan to keep its emperor. Had this condition been dropped earlier, there would have been no need for the atom bomb. Rather than let Japan's government "save face," Truman destroyed almost 200,000 faces.
Why did this happen? Why did Truman persist in refusing to clarify what unconditional surrender meant? Alperovitz speculates, with evidence that some will find convincing and others won't, that the reason was to send a signal to Joseph Stalin that the U.S. government was willing to use some pretty vicious methods to dominate in the postwar world. My own view is that Truman and Byrnes wanted vengeance, plain and simple, and cared little about the loss of innocent lives. Let's face it: dropping an atom bomb on two non-militarily strategic cities was not different in principle from fire-bombing Tokyo or Dresden.
The Potsdam declaration, which laid out the terms of unconditional surrender for Japan, was not agreed to by the Japanese on any level until both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were nuked.
Only then did they consider the declaration, but they STILL demanded that 4 of the terms not be complied with.
Eventually, it was widdled down to the issue of the emperor's control, but only after the nukes had been dropped.
After the declaration was signed, Japan still kept its emperor as you stated. However, actual control of the government was handed over to the Japanese parliament, known as the National Diet of Japan.
Therefore, the Emperor of Japan ceased to have any significant control as a result of Japan's unconditional surrender.
Interesting article...
http://www004.upp.so-net.ne.jp/teikoku-denmo/english/history/mujoken.html
"By the Emperor Showa's (昭和天皇) (the 124th Emperor; known as Emperor Hirohito) Gyokuon-hôsô [Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War] (玉音放送),[1] the Empire of Japan accepted the Allied Nations' Potsdam Declaration[2] demanding unconditional surrender" — this is what we have learnt. But there is a question whether Japan surely accepted "unconditional surrender." The description written on the school textbooks is actually a big misunderstanding.
It is a big mystery why the legend that "Japan accepted unconditional surrender" has been believed.
Potsdam Declaration
Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender:
Issued, at Potsdam, July 26, 1945
'We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.'
Potsdam Declaration
Birth of the Constitution of Japan, National Diet Library of Japan http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html
There is no description of demanding the "unconditional surrender of the country Japan" but "of all Japanese armed forces" (demilitarization). In fact, the Emperor Showa was not forced to abdicate and the government continued to function (the prime minister was selected by Japan's side as well) although Japan was under control of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) that stationed the Occupation Army (US Army). The status of Japan remained as "independent and sovereign." It was just demilitarized by the clause 13 or the Potsdam Declaration but has never accepted to abandon the country. Nevertheless, the Japanese people believed that they lost everything because there were many suffering demands by the SCAP's excessive administration such as Shintô Directive (神道指令),[*1] the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)[4] and the Constitution of Japan. The IMTFE is against the international law and the enactment of the Constitution of Japan infringes the Hague Conventions.[5]
Potsdam Declaration:
'We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.'
Clause 10 guarantees the status of the Japanese people, and states "freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights."
Potsdam Declaration:
'The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.'
Clause 12 states that the occupying forces will be withdrawn from Japan as soon as certain objectives have been accomplished. Let's review clause 13 once again:
'We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.'
Therefore, the Potsdam Declaration just presents the Allied Nations' conditions "to provide proper and adequate assurances" if Japan accepts "unconditional surrender of armed forces." That means it was "conditional surrender" rather than "unconditional surrender."
Maybe you should worry more about all the innocent people who died in the Belgian Congo?? :rolleyes:
Thread title: Question about Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
What the fuck does the Belgian Congo have to do with Hiroshima and Nagasaki? If you want to make a thread about acts of great atrocity that happened in the Belgian Congo, go ahead. I will post in it and express my feelings once again. And as a Belgian I will stress how important it is that we, especially the Belgians, remember the atrocities that happened there.
I sold my textbooks back to the bookstore at the end of the semester.
However, there are some common sense points about my statement that I think even you could find plausible.
The factories built after the end of the war were NEW factories. Therefore, it can be assumed that they were tooled with the LATEST technology. That is unless for some reason they were tooled with used goods, which is unlikely considering the scale of the undertaking.
In the US, the factories were OLD, as private companies did not have the government's support to build entirely NEW factories with NEW technology with the bill being picked up by Uncle Sam.
That being said, it is also taught in business school that Japan had an unequalled work ethic, a revolutionary strategy for innovative thinking and efficient systems, and that those factors also played a major role in Japan's eventual success in the industrial world. Those facts go without saying. Anybody who saw the movie Gung Ho in the 80's knows that the Japanese mean business when it comes to business.
There is ample evidence that the Japanese government was willing to surrender months before Aug. 6 if only it could keep its emperor.
Your article says the Japanese attempted negotiation by contacting the "Swedish Ambassador Widon Bagge in Tokyo". And that "Masutard Inoue, counselor of the Japanese legation in Portugal" contacted "an agent of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)"?!
Are you kidding me? Don't you think that if Japan was really serious about negotiating, they would've taken more logical steps than that? Their country was teetering on total destruction and they sought clarification from a Swedish Ambassador and an OSS agent? In other words, the Japanese were somewhat stupid?
If Japan had seriously considered negotiating prior to being nuked, don't you think they would've made that clear to the world by now? Why would they leave it up to a handful of journalists to uncover it decades later?
The bitter irony, of course, is that Truman ultimately allowed Japan to keep its emperor. Had this condition been dropped earlier, there would have been no need for the atom bomb. Rather than let Japan's government "save face," Truman destroyed almost 200,000 faces.
The Potsdam declaration did not call for the removal of the Emperor. Rather, it called for the following:
The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.
and the following:
There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest
In response, the Japanese leadership demanded that the declaration allow the following:
does not compromise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign ruler
And after the war, the balance of power in Japanese government was shifted so that the above demand from the Japanese was not met.
It is a big mystery why the legend that "Japan accepted unconditional surrender" has been believed.
Now you are arguing semantics. The fact of the matter is that Japan was forced to surrender to terms to which it did not agree prior to the surrender.
Thread title: Question about Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
What the fuck does the Belgian Congo have to do with Hiroshima and Nagasaki? If you want to make a thread about acts of great atrocity that happened in the Belgian Congo, go ahead. I will post in it and express my feelings once again. And as a Belgian I will stress how important it is that we, especially the Belgians, remember the atrocities that happened there.
But anyway, good argument :rolleyes:
You take a shot at my country, I show you that your country has no room to take the moral high ground.
All the world will be your enemy, Prince with a thousand enemies, and whenever they catch you, they will kill you. But first they must catch you, digger, listener, runner, prince with the swift warning. Be cunning and full of tricks and your people shall never be destroyed.
But the only condition on which the Japanese took issue was their wanting to keep the Emperor in power. And in the end they got what they wanted. So it wasn't really an unconditional surrender was it?
"Can you provide any evidence for this?" Damn, you really don't know your history, do you....look up occupied Japan, Douglas MacArthur (Post WWII), Marshall Plan, Joesph M. Juran for starters.
Do you really think that the Japanese or even the Germans re-built their industrial infrastructure on their own following the war???
The emperor got demoted to figurehead following the war...they kept him in name only... Almost like the Queen of England.
All the world will be your enemy, Prince with a thousand enemies, and whenever they catch you, they will kill you. But first they must catch you, digger, listener, runner, prince with the swift warning. Be cunning and full of tricks and your people shall never be destroyed.
"Can you provide any evidence for this?" Damn, you really don't know your history, do you....look up occupied Japan, Douglas MacArthur (Post WWII), Marshall Plan, Joesph M. Juran for starters.
How about providing some evidence as I requested above, for starters. Why is it so difficult for you to do so?
You have presented no concrete proof of that they were considering surrender other mentions in post-war interviews by minor governmental representatives.
SUZUKI [prime minister of Japan since April] informed the Survey that when he assumed office "it was the Emperor’s desire to make every effort to bring the war to a conclusion as quickly as possible, and that was my purpose". This created a position SUZUKI described as difficult. On the one hand he had instructions from the Emperor to arrange an end to the war; on the other hand any of those opposing this policy who learned of such peace moves would be apt to attack or even assassinate him. Thus with the general staffs, government in general and the people, he advocated increased war effort and determination to fight, whereas "through diplomacy and any other means available" he had to negotiate with other countries to stop the war.
Almost immediately, SUZUKI ordered his chief cabinet secretary, SAKOMIZU, to make a study of Japan’s fighting capabilities and whether they were sufficient to continue the war. SAKOMIZU concluded in May that Japan could not continue the war, basing his estimate on Japanese studies as to the inability to produce aircraft, losses and damage to shipping, the precarious food situation and the anti-war sentiments of the people. SUZUKI, who agreed with the estimate, presented it to the Emperor. Concurrently he asked ex-premier Koki HIROTA to sound out the Russian ambassador to Tokyo, MALIK, privately as to the Russian attitude toward interceding with America.
Early in May the Supreme War Direction Council began to discuss ways and means of ending the war. Concurrently other meetings of the Council were going on with the view of obtaining Russia’s services at an opportune time. Foreign Minister TOGO was leader of this. While HIROTA was talking with MALIK, Ambassador SATO had been instructed in Moscow to prepare the way for a Japanese emissary to discuss improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations and Russia’s intercession to end the war. Specific terms for ending the war apparently did not come up at this time, but the Council was prepared that whatever the result they "would be worse than pre-war conditions". The Potsdam declaration had not been issued, but it was felt that the Cairo declaration terms [the demand for unconditional surrender] would not actually be applied; it was looked upon as a declaration only, whose terms could be reduced by negotiating and by being in a position to exact "heavy sacrifices" if the war continued.
....Shortly after the end of the European war, 8 May, the war minister, General Korechika ANAMI, asked the cabinet for an Imperial conference to decide the "fundamental principle of the war", that is whether to continue it. This action, while not indicating that the army was ready to quit (on the contrary the war minister and army chief of staff urged continuance of hostilities), did confirm KIDO’s belief that the Army would permit open consideration of the question within the cabinet only after Germany’s collapse.... The Navy of course was divided, with [Navy minister] YONAI among the foremost advocates of peace and Admiral Soemu TOYODA, the navy chief of staff, siding with the Army....
....After ANAMI’s request for an Imperial conference SAKOMIZU prepared a statement for that occasion which opened by saying that the war should be "accomplished", and the Emperor’s reign and the homeland kept intact. This was followed by the details of SAKOMIZU’s estimate prepared shortly after SUZUKI assumed office. On 6 June the six regular members of the Council discussed what steps should be taken to prosecute the war.... The conclusion was that unless some radical measure could be adopted to arouse the people, the nation’s war power was bound to decline very rapidly. At this session, as TOYODA explained, "no one expressed the view that we should ask for peace--when a large number of people are present it is difficult for any one member to say that we should so entreat".
On 8 June the six regular members of the Council conferred with the Emperor. The statement was read by the Emperor who made no comment at this meeting. Each of the others expressed his own official opinion, but none as yet expressed his own official opinion, but none as yet expressed his real feelings. On 20 June the Emperor on his own initiative called the six council members to a conference and stated that it was necessary to have a plan to close the war at once, as well as a plan to defend the home islands. He asked what the council thought of that idea. The prime minister, the foreign minister and the Navy minister stated that they fully concurred with the Imperial view and that such steps were then being taken to that end. Then the Emperor in turn asked when the ministers expected they would be able to send a special ambassador to Moscow. The reply was that it was uncertain but they hoped he could be sent before the Potsdam conference. [A]fter this expression from the Emperor, SUZUKI decided he could stop the war; when he returned from the conference he told SAKOMIZU "Today the Emperor said what everyone has wanted to say but yet was afraid to say".
After that the government redoubled its talks with Russia and decided to send [former Japanese prime minister] Prince KONOYE to Moscow.... Russia asked for more details concerning the mission and SATO was directed to explain the mission as follows: (1) to make an improvement in relations between Russia and Japan (in view of Russia’s denunciation of the neutrality pact), and (2) to ask Russia to intercede with the United States in order to stop the war. The Soviets replied on 13 July that since Stalin and Molotov were just leaving for Potsdam no answer could be given until their return to Moscow. On 12 July meanwhile the Emperor had called in KONOYE and secretly instructed him to accept any terms he could get and to wire these terms direct to the Emperor. KONOYE also testified that when SATO was sounding out the Russians he reported the Russians would not consider a peace role unless the terms were unconditional surrender, and that this reply had a great influence on the Emperor.
In the days before the Potsdam Declaration, SUZUKI, TOGO AND YONAI became pessimistic about the Russian negotiations. They expected eventually that they would have some answer; but if it were unfavorable they concluded that their only recourse would be to broadcast directly to the United States.
On 26 July the Potsdam declaration was issued. In their deliberations on that statement, which began immediately, no member of the Inner Cabinet had any objections to ending the war. SUZUKI, TOGO and YONAI felt that the declaration must be accepted as the final terms of peace at once, whether they liked it or not. The War Minister and the two chiefs of staff on the other hand felt that the terms were "too dishonorable". Discussion centered around first the future position of the Emperor, second the disposition of war criminals, and third the future form of Japan’s "national polity".
On 6 August in the midst of these discussions an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Early reports to Tokyo described very great damage, but the military did not think it was an atomic bomb until President Truman’s announcement and a mission of Japanese scientists sent to Hiroshima confirmed it. On the morning of 7 August SUZUKI and TOGO conferred and then reported the news to the Emperor, stating that this was the time to accept the Potsdam Declaration. The military side however could not make up their minds to accept it.
These differences continued to be examined and hope of favorable word from Russia had been all but abandoned when very early in the morning of 9 August the news arrived that Russia had declared war. Although considerable pessimism had prevailed regarding the outcome of the negotiations, the government was not prepared for war with the Soviets, nor the military capable of any effective counter-plan. SUZUKI calculated that he had a choice of resigning, or taking immediate positive action which could be either declaring war on Russia or continuing until the whole nation was destroyed or accepting the Potsdam declaration. He conferred with the Emperor around 0700 and after a couple of hours decided to accept the Potsdam terms, with which decision the Emperor agreed. A meeting of the six regular members of the Supreme War Direction Council was called for 1000. After two gloomy hours it remained deadlocked as before on the two opposing opinions: (1) to accept the Potsdam declaration outright, with the understanding that it did not alter the Emperor’s legal position; 2( To accept the declaration with the following conditions: (a) that the Allied forces would not occupy the homeland; (b) that the Japanese military and naval forces abroad would be withdrawn, disarmed and demobilized by japan itself; (c) that all war crimes should be prosecuted by the Japanese government.
....After a session lasting until 2000 without achieving unity, the cabinet declared an intermission. In this impasse SUZUKI decided to request an Imperial conference for the Inner Cabinet at which the conflicting views could be presented and the Emperor’s own decision sought. At 2330 on the 9th the conference was held.... The Potsdam declaration was first read to the Emperor, then TOGO expressed his opinion, followed by all the others who stated their views. Around 0300 on the 10th SUZUKI announced, “We have discussed this question for a long time and everyone has expressed his own opinion sincerely without any conclusion being reached. The situation is urgent, so any delay in coming to a decision should not be tolerated. I am therefore proposing to ask the Emepror his own wish and to decide the conference’s conclusion on that basis. His wish should settle the issue, and the government should follow it.” The Emperor then stated his own view, “I agree with the first opinion as expressed by the foreign minister. I think I should tell you the reasons why I have decided so. Thinking about the world situation and the internal Japanese situation, to continue the war means nothing but the destruction of the whole nation. My ancestors and I have always wished to put forward the nation’s welfare and international world peace as our prime concern. To continue the war now means that cruelty and bloodshed will still continue in the world and that the Japanese nation will suffer severe damage. So, to stop the war on this occasion is the only way to ssave the nation from destruction and to restore peace in the world. Looking back at what our military headquarters have done, it is apparent that their performance has fallen far short of the plans expressed. I don’t think this discrepancy can be corrected in the future. But when I think about my obedient soldiers abroad and of those who died or were wounded in battle, about those who have lost their property or lives by bombing in the homeland, when I think of all those sacrifices, I cannot help but feel sad. I decided that this war should be stopped, however, in spite of this sentiment and for more important considerations.”
SUZUKI then said, “The Imperial decision has been expressed. This should be the conclusion of the conference.” Immediately thereafter the full cabinet resumed its meeting and ratified unanimously a decision to accept the Potsdam terms provided they did not alter the Emperor’s prerogatives. This was cabled to the United States through the Swiss around 0700 the 10th.
You take a shot at my country, I show you that your country has no room to take the moral high ground.
I took a shot at your country? This is a thread about Nagasaki and Hiroshima, I said I think the bombs were not necessary, certainly not two. I also said I feel sad for the victims and that we should remember them. How is that a shot at your country? I also said that "it's ok to admit them, no one can be perfect, every country makes mistakes. You can only learn from them." I even said I was glad the US won.
This isn't about one country taking moral high ground, I even admitted Belgium made its share of mistakes before you even mentioned the Belgian Congo. But again, this thread is about Nagasaki and Hiroshima, if you want to "take a shot" at my country for what happened there, go ahead, make a thread about it. Also, I won't consider it a shot at my country because you are right. The things that happened there were inexcusable. And I think it's very important that people remember and know what happened there.
If you have anything relevant to say, please do so, but don't resort to these ridiculous fallacious arguments.
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=8229
'Washington has believed ever since that the atomic bomb decisively forced Japan's surrender. But the Soviet factor carried greater weight in the eyes of the emperor and most military leaders. For surrender to the Soviet Union would surely have doomed the monarchy, whereas the Potsdam Declaration, which Truman had deliberately prevented Stalin from signing, held out the slim possibility of maintaining it.'
How about providing some evidence as I requested above, for starters. Why is it so difficult for you to do so?
I gave you the direction to look in...if you weren't so busy digging up all this hearsay and after-fact "Monday Morning" quarterbacking of the war, you could do it yourself.
I repeat NO official Japanese documents exist that say Japan was going to surrender prior to the bombs. There was a faction in the upper circles that was considering it, but they did not have the power to make it happen.
All the world will be your enemy, Prince with a thousand enemies, and whenever they catch you, they will kill you. But first they must catch you, digger, listener, runner, prince with the swift warning. Be cunning and full of tricks and your people shall never be destroyed.
But we did allow Japan to keep the Emperor. Explain that!
Yep, I'm always losing arguments here on the M.T. I must be some sort of masochist!
A) Not an official document...just a trial balloon by one factions.
In title only...no power.
All the world will be your enemy, Prince with a thousand enemies, and whenever they catch you, they will kill you. But first they must catch you, digger, listener, runner, prince with the swift warning. Be cunning and full of tricks and your people shall never be destroyed.
I gave you the direction to look in...if you weren't so busy digging up all this hearsay and after-fact "Monday Morning" quarterbacking of the war, you could do it yourself.
In other words, you are incapable of providing any evidence.
I repeat NO official Japanese documents exist that say Japan was going to surrender prior to the bombs. There was a faction in the upper circles that was considering it, but they did not have the power to make it happen.
So the United States Strategic Bombing Survey isn't an official document?
Yes it is well documented that the Japanese were considering surrender before the bombs were dropped.
However, they made no major effort to convey that message to the US.
And there is no evidence that there was enough consensus amongst the leadership about a total surrender.
True. It looks as though they mistakenly directed their efforts towards Moscow.
Still, the U.S knew full well that Japan was on it's knees before the atom bombs were dropped.
They just weren't necessary...that's all.
In other words, you are incapable of providing any evidence.
So the United States Strategic Bombing Survey isn't an official document?
Quite capable....just not going to do it for something so widely known. I gave you directions in which to begin your search. Childish goading will not accomplish anything.
NO OFFICIAL PRE-HIROSHIMA JAPANESE DOCUMENT.
All the world will be your enemy, Prince with a thousand enemies, and whenever they catch you, they will kill you. But first they must catch you, digger, listener, runner, prince with the swift warning. Be cunning and full of tricks and your people shall never be destroyed.
I'm curious as to why Japan would even want to keep an emperor that got them in that mess to begin with? I mean, it's like "We're gonna surrender, but we'd like to keep our bad decision-making leader".
Maybe someone can explain to me what the real rationale behind keeping him in power was.
Emperor Hirohito didn't get them into it. In fact he had very little power. The military ran the country, and lead the expansion of Japan through Korea, coastal China and the pacific rim. The emperor had very little say or influence in this, but was revered by the people and gave his blessing to the ruling military mostly to keep his position secure. His lack of involvement is a big reason why he was allowed to remain as emperor for the next 50 some years.
Back on topic, and I don't know if this was mentioned, but there are some reports that the Japanese had been lobbying for peace for quite some time before the war ended. In fact, they agreed to almost all of the terms required by the allies, but for one or two minor things, such as keeping the emperor in place (VERY sacred thing for the people). The allies basically ignored the offers of surrender or dragged out their decision intentionally because they had planned on using the bombs for a long time. IMO, it was very much a 'warning shot' to the Russians. There was no need for a mainland invasion since they were on the verge of surrender, that argument is ridiculous IMO. The war could have been ended without the annihilation of hundreds of thousands of civilians at such a late stage of the war.
On a side note, the fire bombing of Dresden in Germany killed nearly as many civilians and was just as heinous and reprehensible. I don't give a shit that 'war is hell' or 'look what they are doing'. That is what is SUPPOSED to make us better and more righteous. You don't stoop to their level, you don't commit atrocities and you don't be hypocritical, otherwise what's the point of fighting? You're trying to end atrocious behavior with atrocious behavior against innocents? Sorry, I'll never support that.
The allies basically ignored the offers of surrender or dragged out their decision intentionally because they had planned on using the bombs for a long time.
I believe that Truman unnecessarily nuked two of Japan's largest cities, but I don't believe in supporting that with false logic.
There is no evidence that Japan officially extended an offer of compliance to the Potsman Declaration before sizzle sizzle fry fry happened.
The allies basically ignored the offers of surrender or dragged out their decision intentionally because they had planned on using the bombs for a long time.
Let's see....the bomb was tested in July in the U.S. and dropped in August on Japan. Yes, they were planning to use something that they weren't sure was going to work for a long time.
All the world will be your enemy, Prince with a thousand enemies, and whenever they catch you, they will kill you. But first they must catch you, digger, listener, runner, prince with the swift warning. Be cunning and full of tricks and your people shall never be destroyed.
Let's see....the bomb was tested in July in the U.S. and dropped in August on Japan. Yes, they were planning to use something that they weren't sure was going to work for a long time.
Let's see...there's been plenty of evidence provided on this thread which proves that Japan was making moves towards agreeing terms for surrender - along with the fact that the Japanese army was all but finished. You, on the other hand, have provided no evidence that the dropping of the atomic bombs was necessary.
I think that anyone viewing this thread can see that you lost this argument about 5 days ago.
Have you ever heard the phrase 'Pissing in the wind'?
Quite capable....just not going to do it for something so widely known. I gave you directions in which to begin your search. Childish goading will not accomplish anything.
You've not provided any evidence because there isn't any. You've simply embarrassed yourself by spouting shit.
Let's see...there's been plenty of evidence provided on this thread which proves that Japan was making moves towards agreeing terms for surrender - along with the fact that the Japanese army was all but finished. You, on the other hand, have provided no evidence that the dropping of the atomoc bombs was necessary.
I think that anyone viewing this thread can see that you lost this argument about 5 days ago.
Have you ever heard the phrase 'Pissing in the wind'?
I was involved in this debate at the beginning and nobody has PROVEN either way if Japan was going to Surrender or not. The reason is its all Theory and Rumors.
Everyone who knows the truth has passed on or is very very old. The original debate is whether we should feel bad about dropping the bomb or not. I don't think its wrong to feel bad about dropping the bomb just like its not bad to not feel bad about it. The fact is they attacked us first and dragged us into the war. Had they not done that we would have never dropped the bomb.
I don't get why the US has to get all of the blame especially AFTER Pearl Harbor.
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Let's face it though...popping off two nukes in a row is good for at least 2-3 inches of virtual penis enlargement, in both length and girth.
Not to mention all the wonderful avenues of additional virtual penis development to discover immediately, and well after the fact.
Talk about the quintessential, all encompassing, MIC reacharound of the day!
Full Metal Jacket meets crispy critters...
Progress is not made by everyone joining some new fad,
and reveling in it's loyalty. It's made by forming coalitions
over specific principles, goals, and policies.
Let's see...there's been plenty of evidence provided on this thread which proves that Japan was making moves towards agreeing terms for surrender - along with the fact that the Japanese army was all but finished. You, on the other hand, have provided no evidence that the dropping of the atomoc bombs was necessary.
I think that anyone viewing this thread can see that you lost this argument about 5 days ago.
Have you ever heard the phrase 'Pissing in the wind'?
How about some information courtesy of a Mister Richard B. Frank, author of two notable works of military history including "Downfall: The End of the Japanese Empire." This is taken from his essay, "No Bomb: No End."
"In Japan's misshapen political structure, only eight individuals excercised any meaningful power of decision. An inner cabinet called the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War constituted ultimate governmental authority, but only if its members achieved unanimity. The contemporary shorthand for this body was the "Big Six": Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro, Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori, War Minister Anami Korechika, Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa, Chief of the Army General Umezu Yoshijiro and Chief of the Navy General Staff Toyoda Soemu....The remaining two men who wielded real authority were the emperor and his intimate adviser, Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido Koichi. Kido's power lay in his ability to sway the emperor, and the emperor's power depended upon the compliance of the government and the armed forces to his orders."
"To this day, no pre-Hiroshima document has been produced from Japan demonstrating that any one of these eight men ever contemplated a termination of the war on any terms that could, or should have been acceptable to the United States or her allies. What history does document about their thinking illustrates just how intransigent they remained as late as August 9. On the day the second atomic struck Nagasaki-and following three years of almost unrelenting defeats, the destruction of Japan's shipping lifelines, the incineration of sixty cities, and Soviet intervention-the Big Six for the first time seriously discussed, and agreed on, a set of terms for ending the war."
"The emperor himself confessed that he actually shared the core convictions of the Big Six at least until June 1945, and he never moved decisively away from the stance. This explains why these men failed to move to end and points to what their response would have been in the absence of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Plainly stated, they believed, and with good reason, that Japan still possessed an excellent chance to obtain an negotiated peace that would maintain the old order in Japan-in which they would be dominant."
"They (the Big Six) were confident that no amount of blockade and bombardment, even if it cost the lives of millions of their countryman, could compel them to yield."
"With a firm grasp of the strategic essentials, Japan embarked on a massive mobilization program. By midsummer (1945) there would be sixty divisions and thirty-four brigades mustering 2.9 million men in the homeland. A strict conservation program, plus the conversion of the aviation training establishment to kamikaze units, yeilded over 10,000 aircraft, half suicide planes, to confront the invasion."
So, 2.9 million men is a "finished" army???? The 10k aircraft would have equaled the number of U.S. aircraft planned for the initial invasion of the Japanese homeland. According to Mr. Frank, the Japanese military was at this point still 4 million men strong.
Other facts from Mr. Frank's essay:
"No Japanese government had capitulated in 2600 years; no Japanese detachment had surrendered in the entire course of the Pacific War. Accordingly, there was no guarantee either that a Japanese government would ever capitulate, or that Japan's armed forces would bow to such a command."
"Intelligence analysts had expressly warned policy makers on July 27, 1945 that so long as the Imperial Army remained convinced of its success in Ketsu Go (the homeland mobilization program mentioned earlier), there was NO prospect that Japan would yield to terms America could abide."
"There is, however, a still more fundamental point about why Japan's organized surrender stemmed from the atomic bombs, not Soviet intervention. Halting the war required both the decision of a legitimate Japanese authority that the war must end, and the compliance of Japan's armed forces with that decision. In explaining Japan's surrender shortly after the war, Prime Minister Suzuki testified that Japanese leaders remained devoted to continuing the war so long as they believed that the Imperial Army and Navy could ultimately conduct the "decisive battle" against the U.S. invasion. Suzuki confessed that Japan's leaders agreed to surrender only after the advent of nuclear weapons. They recognized that the United States would no longer need to invade Japan. If there was no invasion, Japan had no military and political strategy short of national suicide."
All the world will be your enemy, Prince with a thousand enemies, and whenever they catch you, they will kill you. But first they must catch you, digger, listener, runner, prince with the swift warning. Be cunning and full of tricks and your people shall never be destroyed.
You've not provided any evidence because there isn't any. You've simply embarrassed yourself by spouting shit.
Post-World War II Assistance to Japan
Total U.S. assistance to Japan for the years of the occupation, from 1946-1952
was roughly $2.2 billion ($15.2 billion in 2005 dollars), of which almost $1.7 billion
was grants and $504 million was loans. The Greenbook presents these figures as
provided under five headings. Over three-quarters (77 percent) of these funds were
provided through GARIOA grants. Most of the remainder (i.e., 23 percent) was $490
million in related funds that Japan repaid and is classified as a loan. There is no
information in the Greenbook or readily available published sources regarding how
much of this was provided for economic reconstruction, although the intent of the
occupation after 1948 was to promote economic recovery.
All the world will be your enemy, Prince with a thousand enemies, and whenever they catch you, they will kill you. But first they must catch you, digger, listener, runner, prince with the swift warning. Be cunning and full of tricks and your people shall never be destroyed.
Think about what you are defending. Atomic weapons on civilian centers.
Japan was in a hopeless strategic position. Militarily they had already lost. And when Germany was defeated Russia was freed up to focus on Japan as well. That's two superpowers against a tiny island nation that was already militarily defeated, in a hopeles position. Yet still they were nuked.
.........
"The bomb dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 turned into powder and ash, in a few moments, the flesh and bones of 140,000 men, women, and children. Three days later, a second atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki killed perhaps 70,000 instantly. In the next five years, another 130,000 inhabitants of those two cities died of radiation poisoning.
A woman with her jaw missing and her tongue hanging out of her mouth was wandering around, in the heavy black rain, crying for help.
In The Making of the Atomic Bomb, probably the most thorough and most vivid narrative of that long, costly, and secret enterprise on the New Mexico desert known as "The Manhattan Project," Richard Rhodes, scrupulously controlled up to this point, describes the results with unmistakable feeling: "People exposed within half a mile of the Little Boy fireball were seared to bundles of smoking black char in a fraction of a second as their internal organs boiled away. The small black bundles now stuck to the streets and bridges and sidewalks of Hiroshima numbered in the thousands. At the same instant birds ignited in midair. Mosquitoes and flies, squirrels, family pets crackled and were gone.
A woman, then a girl in the 5th grade, remembered: "Everybody in the shelter was crying out loud. I do not know how many times I called begging that they would cut off my burned arms and legs."
The sociologist Kai Erikson, reviewing the report by the Japanese team of scientists, wrote:
"The attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not 'combat' in any of the ways that word is normally used. Nor were they primarily attempts to destroy military targets, for the two cities had been chosen not despite but because they had a high density of civilian housing. Whether the intended audience was Russian or Japanese or a combination of both, then the attacks were to be a show, a display, a demonstration. The question is: What kind of mood does a fundamentally decent people have to be in, what kind of moral arrangements must it make, before it is willing to annihilate as many as a quarter of a million human beings for the sake of making a point."
Comments
There are many supposed reasons as to why Truman chose to incinerate so many Japan civilians.
The most significant underlying reason is that the alternative would've been a full-scale invasion of Japan, against which the Japanese were prepared to fight to the end with not only their military, but also their civilian population including the women and children.
I have no doubt that if the US had gone ahead with the invasion, the final count of Japanese civilian deaths would've dwarfed the number of dead from Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
So, in that sense, yes the A-Bombs were actually a better alternative for both the US and Japan.
However, my opinion is that an invasion of Japan might not have actually been necessary. The fact of the matter is that the war had reached that stage because the invasion was all that there was left to do.
Japan's air force and navy were all but annhilated. The imperialistic arm of Japan had been severed. The once mighty Japanese army that had conquered most of asia was no longer a threat.
In essence, the US could've just waited it out with the use of a naval blockade and continued bombings of actual military targets.
Lastly, I've always wondered if Japanese commanders really understood the power of the atomic bomb prior to its usage against them. Perhaps if the US had simply sent them footage of bomb testings or even set one off in an unhabitated area of Japan for demonstrative purposes, the Japanese leadership would've then realized that there was no other alternative but to surrender.
Instead Truman dropped two of them on major cities in a sneak attack fashion without first making it known to the Japanese leadership exactly what they were up against.
But, one important thing to remember here is that in the end, the total unconditional surrender of Japan to the US military was the best thing that has ever happened to that country.
Without that unconditional surrender, Japan would never have fully recovered and become the economic powerhouse that it later became. It is very likely that we would not be driving hondas and toyotas, and there would be no nintendos or playstations.
The factories that the US built for Japan were state-of-the-art for their time. They were more advanced than the factories in the US.
This is why Japan was able to produce cameras and cars and various other products that were superior to those of the rest of the entire world.
On top of that, the US outlawed and ultimately eliminated the "old way" of how Japan did business. Japan's "old way" of doing business was rife with corruption, and actually worked against progress. It was a system that was left over from the days of feudal Japan. The US forced Japan to adopt a free-market style of business.
Again, none of that would've been possible if Japan had not given their unconditional surrender.
http://forums.pearljam.com/showthread.php?t=272825
Can you provide any evidence for this?
But the only condition on which the Japanese took issue was their wanting to keep the Emperor in power. And in the end they got what they wanted. So it wasn't really an unconditional surrender was it?
It's taught in Business school. I'm sure if you looked hard enough, you'd find it. And considering that you were way, way off the mark on your statement below, I would deem it prudent to give me the benefit of the doubt in this case.
The Potsdam declaration, which laid out the terms of unconditional surrender for Japan, was not agreed to by the Japanese on any level until both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were nuked.
Only then did they consider the declaration, but they STILL demanded that 4 of the terms not be complied with.
Eventually, it was widdled down to the issue of the emperor's control, but only after the nukes had been dropped.
After the declaration was signed, Japan still kept its emperor as you stated. However, actual control of the government was handed over to the Japanese parliament, known as the National Diet of Japan.
Therefore, the Emperor of Japan ceased to have any significant control as a result of Japan's unconditional surrender.
http://forums.pearljam.com/showthread.php?t=272825
It's taught in American business schools that Japans technological excellence is a result of Americans benevolently building the Japanese superior factories to their own? Really? American officials must have felt that they owed the Japanese some kind of favour. Sounds a bit far-fetched to me. Perhaps you'd like to dig out one of your old Business school textbooks and put this issue to rest by providing us with some reliable sources?
http://www.antiwar.com/henderson/?articleid=11405
'There is ample evidence that the Japanese government was willing to surrender months before Aug. 6 if only it could keep its emperor. Much of this evidence is given in Alperovitz's book and much in Dennis D. Wainstock, The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996). Wainstock (pp. 22-23) tells of many attempts by the Japanese to clarify the terms and to make clear their willingness to surrender if they could only keep their emperor untouched. For example, on April 7, 1945, acting Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru asked Swedish Ambassador Widon Bagge in Tokyo "to ascertain what peace terms the United States and Britain had in mind." Shigemitsu emphasized that "the Emperor must not be touched." Bagge passed the message on to the U.S. government, but Secretary of State Edward Stettinius told the U.S. ambassador in Sweden to "show no interest or take any initiative in pursuit of this matter."[10]
So the Japanese government tried another route. On May 7, 1945, Masutard Inoue, counselor of the Japanese legation in Portugal, approached an agent of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Inoue asked the agent to contact the U.S. embassy and "find out exactly what they plan to do in the Far East." He expressed his fear that Japan would be smashed, and he emphasized, "there can be no unconditional surrender." The agent passed the message on, but nothing came of it.
Three times is a charm, goes the saying. But not for the hapless Japanese. On May 10, 1945, Gen. Onodera, Japan's military representative in Sweden, tried to get a member of Sweden's royal family to approach the Allies for a settlement. He emphasized also that Japan's government would not accept unconditional surrender and must be allowed to "save face." The U.S. government urged Sweden's government to let the matter drop.
But if you can't at first surrender, try, try again. On July 12, with almost four weeks to go before the horrible blast, Kojiro Kitamura, a representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank in Switzerland, told Per Jacobson, a Swedish adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, that he wanted to contact U.S. representatives and that the only condition Japan insisted on was that it keep its emperor. "He was acting with the consent of Shunichi Kase, the Japanese minister to Switzerland, and General Kiyotomi Okamoto, chief of Japanese European intelligence, and they were in direct contact with Tokyo."[11] On July 14, Jacobson met in Wiesbaden, Germany with OSS representative Allen Dulles (later head of the CIA) and relayed the message that Japan's main demand was "retention of the Emperor." Dulles passed the information to Stimson, but Stimson refused to act on it.
Interestingly, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy drafted a proposed surrender demand for the Committee of Three (Grew, Stimson, and Navy Secretary James Forrestal.) Their draft was part of Article 12 of the Potsdam Declaration, in which the Allies specified the conditions for Japan's surrender. Under their wording, Japan's government would have been allowed to keep its emperor as part of a "constitutional monarchy." Truman, though, who was influenced by his newly appointed Secretary of State James Byrnes on the ship over to the Potsdam Conference, changed the language of the surrender demand to drop the reference to keeping the emperor.
The bitter irony, of course, is that Truman ultimately allowed Japan to keep its emperor. Had this condition been dropped earlier, there would have been no need for the atom bomb. Rather than let Japan's government "save face," Truman destroyed almost 200,000 faces.
Why did this happen? Why did Truman persist in refusing to clarify what unconditional surrender meant? Alperovitz speculates, with evidence that some will find convincing and others won't, that the reason was to send a signal to Joseph Stalin that the U.S. government was willing to use some pretty vicious methods to dominate in the postwar world. My own view is that Truman and Byrnes wanted vengeance, plain and simple, and cared little about the loss of innocent lives. Let's face it: dropping an atom bomb on two non-militarily strategic cities was not different in principle from fire-bombing Tokyo or Dresden.
Interesting article...
http://www004.upp.so-net.ne.jp/teikoku-denmo/english/history/mujoken.html
"By the Emperor Showa's (昭和天皇) (the 124th Emperor; known as Emperor Hirohito) Gyokuon-hôsô [Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War] (玉音放送),[1] the Empire of Japan accepted the Allied Nations' Potsdam Declaration[2] demanding unconditional surrender" — this is what we have learnt. But there is a question whether Japan surely accepted "unconditional surrender." The description written on the school textbooks is actually a big misunderstanding.
It is a big mystery why the legend that "Japan accepted unconditional surrender" has been believed.
Potsdam Declaration
Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender:
Issued, at Potsdam, July 26, 1945
'We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.'
Potsdam Declaration
Birth of the Constitution of Japan, National Diet Library of Japan
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html
There is no description of demanding the "unconditional surrender of the country Japan" but "of all Japanese armed forces" (demilitarization). In fact, the Emperor Showa was not forced to abdicate and the government continued to function (the prime minister was selected by Japan's side as well) although Japan was under control of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) that stationed the Occupation Army (US Army). The status of Japan remained as "independent and sovereign." It was just demilitarized by the clause 13 or the Potsdam Declaration but has never accepted to abandon the country. Nevertheless, the Japanese people believed that they lost everything because there were many suffering demands by the SCAP's excessive administration such as Shintô Directive (神道指令),[*1] the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)[4] and the Constitution of Japan. The IMTFE is against the international law and the enactment of the Constitution of Japan infringes the Hague Conventions.[5]
Potsdam Declaration:
'We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.'
Clause 10 guarantees the status of the Japanese people, and states "freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights."
Potsdam Declaration:
'The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.'
Clause 12 states that the occupying forces will be withdrawn from Japan as soon as certain objectives have been accomplished. Let's review clause 13 once again:
'We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.'
Therefore, the Potsdam Declaration just presents the Allied Nations' conditions "to provide proper and adequate assurances" if Japan accepts "unconditional surrender of armed forces." That means it was "conditional surrender" rather than "unconditional surrender."
Thread title: Question about Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
What the fuck does the Belgian Congo have to do with Hiroshima and Nagasaki? If you want to make a thread about acts of great atrocity that happened in the Belgian Congo, go ahead. I will post in it and express my feelings once again. And as a Belgian I will stress how important it is that we, especially the Belgians, remember the atrocities that happened there.
But anyway, good argument :rolleyes:
naděje umírá poslední
However, there are some common sense points about my statement that I think even you could find plausible.
The factories built after the end of the war were NEW factories. Therefore, it can be assumed that they were tooled with the LATEST technology. That is unless for some reason they were tooled with used goods, which is unlikely considering the scale of the undertaking.
In the US, the factories were OLD, as private companies did not have the government's support to build entirely NEW factories with NEW technology with the bill being picked up by Uncle Sam.
That being said, it is also taught in business school that Japan had an unequalled work ethic, a revolutionary strategy for innovative thinking and efficient systems, and that those factors also played a major role in Japan's eventual success in the industrial world. Those facts go without saying. Anybody who saw the movie Gung Ho in the 80's knows that the Japanese mean business when it comes to business.
Your article says the Japanese attempted negotiation by contacting the "Swedish Ambassador Widon Bagge in Tokyo". And that "Masutard Inoue, counselor of the Japanese legation in Portugal" contacted "an agent of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)"?!
Are you kidding me? Don't you think that if Japan was really serious about negotiating, they would've taken more logical steps than that? Their country was teetering on total destruction and they sought clarification from a Swedish Ambassador and an OSS agent? In other words, the Japanese were somewhat stupid?
If Japan had seriously considered negotiating prior to being nuked, don't you think they would've made that clear to the world by now? Why would they leave it up to a handful of journalists to uncover it decades later?
The Potsdam declaration did not call for the removal of the Emperor. Rather, it called for the following:
and the following:
In response, the Japanese leadership demanded that the declaration allow the following:
And after the war, the balance of power in Japanese government was shifted so that the above demand from the Japanese was not met.
Now you are arguing semantics. The fact of the matter is that Japan was forced to surrender to terms to which it did not agree prior to the surrender.
http://forums.pearljam.com/showthread.php?t=272825
Do you really think that the Japanese or even the Germans re-built their industrial infrastructure on their own following the war???
The emperor got demoted to figurehead following the war...they kept him in name only... Almost like the Queen of England.
How about providing some evidence as I requested above, for starters. Why is it so difficult for you to do so?
http://personal.ashland.edu/~jmoser1/japsurrender.htm
United States Strategic Bombing Survey, “Japan’s Struggle to End the War,” July 1, 1946: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/fulltext.php?fulltextid=29
SUZUKI [prime minister of Japan since April] informed the Survey that when he assumed office "it was the Emperor’s desire to make every effort to bring the war to a conclusion as quickly as possible, and that was my purpose". This created a position SUZUKI described as difficult. On the one hand he had instructions from the Emperor to arrange an end to the war; on the other hand any of those opposing this policy who learned of such peace moves would be apt to attack or even assassinate him. Thus with the general staffs, government in general and the people, he advocated increased war effort and determination to fight, whereas "through diplomacy and any other means available" he had to negotiate with other countries to stop the war.
Almost immediately, SUZUKI ordered his chief cabinet secretary, SAKOMIZU, to make a study of Japan’s fighting capabilities and whether they were sufficient to continue the war. SAKOMIZU concluded in May that Japan could not continue the war, basing his estimate on Japanese studies as to the inability to produce aircraft, losses and damage to shipping, the precarious food situation and the anti-war sentiments of the people. SUZUKI, who agreed with the estimate, presented it to the Emperor. Concurrently he asked ex-premier Koki HIROTA to sound out the Russian ambassador to Tokyo, MALIK, privately as to the Russian attitude toward interceding with America.
Early in May the Supreme War Direction Council began to discuss ways and means of ending the war. Concurrently other meetings of the Council were going on with the view of obtaining Russia’s services at an opportune time. Foreign Minister TOGO was leader of this. While HIROTA was talking with MALIK, Ambassador SATO had been instructed in Moscow to prepare the way for a Japanese emissary to discuss improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations and Russia’s intercession to end the war. Specific terms for ending the war apparently did not come up at this time, but the Council was prepared that whatever the result they "would be worse than pre-war conditions". The Potsdam declaration had not been issued, but it was felt that the Cairo declaration terms [the demand for unconditional surrender] would not actually be applied; it was looked upon as a declaration only, whose terms could be reduced by negotiating and by being in a position to exact "heavy sacrifices" if the war continued.
....Shortly after the end of the European war, 8 May, the war minister, General Korechika ANAMI, asked the cabinet for an Imperial conference to decide the "fundamental principle of the war", that is whether to continue it. This action, while not indicating that the army was ready to quit (on the contrary the war minister and army chief of staff urged continuance of hostilities), did confirm KIDO’s belief that the Army would permit open consideration of the question within the cabinet only after Germany’s collapse.... The Navy of course was divided, with [Navy minister] YONAI among the foremost advocates of peace and Admiral Soemu TOYODA, the navy chief of staff, siding with the Army....
....After ANAMI’s request for an Imperial conference SAKOMIZU prepared a statement for that occasion which opened by saying that the war should be "accomplished", and the Emperor’s reign and the homeland kept intact. This was followed by the details of SAKOMIZU’s estimate prepared shortly after SUZUKI assumed office. On 6 June the six regular members of the Council discussed what steps should be taken to prosecute the war.... The conclusion was that unless some radical measure could be adopted to arouse the people, the nation’s war power was bound to decline very rapidly. At this session, as TOYODA explained, "no one expressed the view that we should ask for peace--when a large number of people are present it is difficult for any one member to say that we should so entreat".
On 8 June the six regular members of the Council conferred with the Emperor. The statement was read by the Emperor who made no comment at this meeting. Each of the others expressed his own official opinion, but none as yet expressed his own official opinion, but none as yet expressed his real feelings. On 20 June the Emperor on his own initiative called the six council members to a conference and stated that it was necessary to have a plan to close the war at once, as well as a plan to defend the home islands. He asked what the council thought of that idea. The prime minister, the foreign minister and the Navy minister stated that they fully concurred with the Imperial view and that such steps were then being taken to that end. Then the Emperor in turn asked when the ministers expected they would be able to send a special ambassador to Moscow. The reply was that it was uncertain but they hoped he could be sent before the Potsdam conference. [A]fter this expression from the Emperor, SUZUKI decided he could stop the war; when he returned from the conference he told SAKOMIZU "Today the Emperor said what everyone has wanted to say but yet was afraid to say".
After that the government redoubled its talks with Russia and decided to send [former Japanese prime minister] Prince KONOYE to Moscow.... Russia asked for more details concerning the mission and SATO was directed to explain the mission as follows: (1) to make an improvement in relations between Russia and Japan (in view of Russia’s denunciation of the neutrality pact), and (2) to ask Russia to intercede with the United States in order to stop the war. The Soviets replied on 13 July that since Stalin and Molotov were just leaving for Potsdam no answer could be given until their return to Moscow. On 12 July meanwhile the Emperor had called in KONOYE and secretly instructed him to accept any terms he could get and to wire these terms direct to the Emperor. KONOYE also testified that when SATO was sounding out the Russians he reported the Russians would not consider a peace role unless the terms were unconditional surrender, and that this reply had a great influence on the Emperor.
In the days before the Potsdam Declaration, SUZUKI, TOGO AND YONAI became pessimistic about the Russian negotiations. They expected eventually that they would have some answer; but if it were unfavorable they concluded that their only recourse would be to broadcast directly to the United States.
On 26 July the Potsdam declaration was issued. In their deliberations on that statement, which began immediately, no member of the Inner Cabinet had any objections to ending the war. SUZUKI, TOGO and YONAI felt that the declaration must be accepted as the final terms of peace at once, whether they liked it or not. The War Minister and the two chiefs of staff on the other hand felt that the terms were "too dishonorable". Discussion centered around first the future position of the Emperor, second the disposition of war criminals, and third the future form of Japan’s "national polity".
On 6 August in the midst of these discussions an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Early reports to Tokyo described very great damage, but the military did not think it was an atomic bomb until President Truman’s announcement and a mission of Japanese scientists sent to Hiroshima confirmed it. On the morning of 7 August SUZUKI and TOGO conferred and then reported the news to the Emperor, stating that this was the time to accept the Potsdam Declaration. The military side however could not make up their minds to accept it.
These differences continued to be examined and hope of favorable word from Russia had been all but abandoned when very early in the morning of 9 August the news arrived that Russia had declared war. Although considerable pessimism had prevailed regarding the outcome of the negotiations, the government was not prepared for war with the Soviets, nor the military capable of any effective counter-plan. SUZUKI calculated that he had a choice of resigning, or taking immediate positive action which could be either declaring war on Russia or continuing until the whole nation was destroyed or accepting the Potsdam declaration. He conferred with the Emperor around 0700 and after a couple of hours decided to accept the Potsdam terms, with which decision the Emperor agreed. A meeting of the six regular members of the Supreme War Direction Council was called for 1000. After two gloomy hours it remained deadlocked as before on the two opposing opinions: (1) to accept the Potsdam declaration outright, with the understanding that it did not alter the Emperor’s legal position; 2( To accept the declaration with the following conditions: (a) that the Allied forces would not occupy the homeland; (b) that the Japanese military and naval forces abroad would be withdrawn, disarmed and demobilized by japan itself; (c) that all war crimes should be prosecuted by the Japanese government.
....After a session lasting until 2000 without achieving unity, the cabinet declared an intermission. In this impasse SUZUKI decided to request an Imperial conference for the Inner Cabinet at which the conflicting views could be presented and the Emperor’s own decision sought. At 2330 on the 9th the conference was held.... The Potsdam declaration was first read to the Emperor, then TOGO expressed his opinion, followed by all the others who stated their views. Around 0300 on the 10th SUZUKI announced, “We have discussed this question for a long time and everyone has expressed his own opinion sincerely without any conclusion being reached. The situation is urgent, so any delay in coming to a decision should not be tolerated. I am therefore proposing to ask the Emepror his own wish and to decide the conference’s conclusion on that basis. His wish should settle the issue, and the government should follow it.” The Emperor then stated his own view, “I agree with the first opinion as expressed by the foreign minister. I think I should tell you the reasons why I have decided so. Thinking about the world situation and the internal Japanese situation, to continue the war means nothing but the destruction of the whole nation. My ancestors and I have always wished to put forward the nation’s welfare and international world peace as our prime concern. To continue the war now means that cruelty and bloodshed will still continue in the world and that the Japanese nation will suffer severe damage. So, to stop the war on this occasion is the only way to ssave the nation from destruction and to restore peace in the world. Looking back at what our military headquarters have done, it is apparent that their performance has fallen far short of the plans expressed. I don’t think this discrepancy can be corrected in the future. But when I think about my obedient soldiers abroad and of those who died or were wounded in battle, about those who have lost their property or lives by bombing in the homeland, when I think of all those sacrifices, I cannot help but feel sad. I decided that this war should be stopped, however, in spite of this sentiment and for more important considerations.”
SUZUKI then said, “The Imperial decision has been expressed. This should be the conclusion of the conference.” Immediately thereafter the full cabinet resumed its meeting and ratified unanimously a decision to accept the Potsdam terms provided they did not alter the Emperor’s prerogatives. This was cabled to the United States through the Swiss around 0700 the 10th.
I took a shot at your country? This is a thread about Nagasaki and Hiroshima, I said I think the bombs were not necessary, certainly not two. I also said I feel sad for the victims and that we should remember them. How is that a shot at your country? I also said that "it's ok to admit them, no one can be perfect, every country makes mistakes. You can only learn from them." I even said I was glad the US won.
This isn't about one country taking moral high ground, I even admitted Belgium made its share of mistakes before you even mentioned the Belgian Congo. But again, this thread is about Nagasaki and Hiroshima, if you want to "take a shot" at my country for what happened there, go ahead, make a thread about it. Also, I won't consider it a shot at my country because you are right. The things that happened there were inexcusable. And I think it's very important that people remember and know what happened there.
If you have anything relevant to say, please do so, but don't resort to these ridiculous fallacious arguments.
naděje umírá poslední
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=8229
'Washington has believed ever since that the atomic bomb decisively forced Japan's surrender. But the Soviet factor carried greater weight in the eyes of the emperor and most military leaders. For surrender to the Soviet Union would surely have doomed the monarchy, whereas the Potsdam Declaration, which Truman had deliberately prevented Stalin from signing, held out the slim possibility of maintaining it.'
I repeat NO official Japanese documents exist that say Japan was going to surrender prior to the bombs. There was a faction in the upper circles that was considering it, but they did not have the power to make it happen.
In other words, you are incapable of providing any evidence.
So the United States Strategic Bombing Survey isn't an official document?
However, they made no major effort to convey that message to the US.
And there is no evidence that there was enough consensus amongst the leadership about a total surrender.
http://forums.pearljam.com/showthread.php?t=272825
True. It looks as though they mistakenly directed their efforts towards Moscow.
Still, the U.S knew full well that Japan was on it's knees before the atom bombs were dropped.
They just weren't necessary...that's all.
NO OFFICIAL PRE-HIROSHIMA JAPANESE DOCUMENT.
Emperor Hirohito didn't get them into it. In fact he had very little power. The military ran the country, and lead the expansion of Japan through Korea, coastal China and the pacific rim. The emperor had very little say or influence in this, but was revered by the people and gave his blessing to the ruling military mostly to keep his position secure. His lack of involvement is a big reason why he was allowed to remain as emperor for the next 50 some years.
Back on topic, and I don't know if this was mentioned, but there are some reports that the Japanese had been lobbying for peace for quite some time before the war ended. In fact, they agreed to almost all of the terms required by the allies, but for one or two minor things, such as keeping the emperor in place (VERY sacred thing for the people). The allies basically ignored the offers of surrender or dragged out their decision intentionally because they had planned on using the bombs for a long time. IMO, it was very much a 'warning shot' to the Russians. There was no need for a mainland invasion since they were on the verge of surrender, that argument is ridiculous IMO. The war could have been ended without the annihilation of hundreds of thousands of civilians at such a late stage of the war.
On a side note, the fire bombing of Dresden in Germany killed nearly as many civilians and was just as heinous and reprehensible. I don't give a shit that 'war is hell' or 'look what they are doing'. That is what is SUPPOSED to make us better and more righteous. You don't stoop to their level, you don't commit atrocities and you don't be hypocritical, otherwise what's the point of fighting? You're trying to end atrocious behavior with atrocious behavior against innocents? Sorry, I'll never support that.
http://www.mises.org/journals/lar/pdfs/2_2/2_2_6.pdf
nowadays hits you when you're young
I believe that Truman unnecessarily nuked two of Japan's largest cities, but I don't believe in supporting that with false logic.
There is no evidence that Japan officially extended an offer of compliance to the Potsman Declaration before sizzle sizzle fry fry happened.
http://forums.pearljam.com/showthread.php?t=272825
Let's see...there's been plenty of evidence provided on this thread which proves that Japan was making moves towards agreeing terms for surrender - along with the fact that the Japanese army was all but finished. You, on the other hand, have provided no evidence that the dropping of the atomic bombs was necessary.
I think that anyone viewing this thread can see that you lost this argument about 5 days ago.
Have you ever heard the phrase 'Pissing in the wind'?
You've not provided any evidence because there isn't any. You've simply embarrassed yourself by spouting shit.
I was involved in this debate at the beginning and nobody has PROVEN either way if Japan was going to Surrender or not. The reason is its all Theory and Rumors.
Everyone who knows the truth has passed on or is very very old. The original debate is whether we should feel bad about dropping the bomb or not. I don't think its wrong to feel bad about dropping the bomb just like its not bad to not feel bad about it. The fact is they attacked us first and dragged us into the war. Had they not done that we would have never dropped the bomb.
I don't get why the US has to get all of the blame especially AFTER Pearl Harbor.
6/7/2003 (***1/2)
7/9/2006 (****1/2)
7/13/2006 (**** )
4/10/2008 EV Solo (****1/2)
6/25/2008 MSG II (*****)
10/1/2009 LA II (****)
10/6/2009 LA III (***** Cornell!!!)
Not to mention all the wonderful avenues of additional virtual penis development to discover immediately, and well after the fact.
Talk about the quintessential, all encompassing, MIC reacharound of the day!
Full Metal Jacket meets crispy critters...
and reveling in it's loyalty. It's made by forming coalitions
over specific principles, goals, and policies.
http://i36.tinypic.com/66j31x.jpg
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( o.O)
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"In Japan's misshapen political structure, only eight individuals excercised any meaningful power of decision. An inner cabinet called the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War constituted ultimate governmental authority, but only if its members achieved unanimity. The contemporary shorthand for this body was the "Big Six": Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro, Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori, War Minister Anami Korechika, Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa, Chief of the Army General Umezu Yoshijiro and Chief of the Navy General Staff Toyoda Soemu....The remaining two men who wielded real authority were the emperor and his intimate adviser, Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido Koichi. Kido's power lay in his ability to sway the emperor, and the emperor's power depended upon the compliance of the government and the armed forces to his orders."
"To this day, no pre-Hiroshima document has been produced from Japan demonstrating that any one of these eight men ever contemplated a termination of the war on any terms that could, or should have been acceptable to the United States or her allies. What history does document about their thinking illustrates just how intransigent they remained as late as August 9. On the day the second atomic struck Nagasaki-and following three years of almost unrelenting defeats, the destruction of Japan's shipping lifelines, the incineration of sixty cities, and Soviet intervention-the Big Six for the first time seriously discussed, and agreed on, a set of terms for ending the war."
"The emperor himself confessed that he actually shared the core convictions of the Big Six at least until June 1945, and he never moved decisively away from the stance. This explains why these men failed to move to end and points to what their response would have been in the absence of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Plainly stated, they believed, and with good reason, that Japan still possessed an excellent chance to obtain an negotiated peace that would maintain the old order in Japan-in which they would be dominant."
"They (the Big Six) were confident that no amount of blockade and bombardment, even if it cost the lives of millions of their countryman, could compel them to yield."
"With a firm grasp of the strategic essentials, Japan embarked on a massive mobilization program. By midsummer (1945) there would be sixty divisions and thirty-four brigades mustering 2.9 million men in the homeland. A strict conservation program, plus the conversion of the aviation training establishment to kamikaze units, yeilded over 10,000 aircraft, half suicide planes, to confront the invasion."
So, 2.9 million men is a "finished" army???? The 10k aircraft would have equaled the number of U.S. aircraft planned for the initial invasion of the Japanese homeland. According to Mr. Frank, the Japanese military was at this point still 4 million men strong.
Other facts from Mr. Frank's essay:
"No Japanese government had capitulated in 2600 years; no Japanese detachment had surrendered in the entire course of the Pacific War. Accordingly, there was no guarantee either that a Japanese government would ever capitulate, or that Japan's armed forces would bow to such a command."
"Intelligence analysts had expressly warned policy makers on July 27, 1945 that so long as the Imperial Army remained convinced of its success in Ketsu Go (the homeland mobilization program mentioned earlier), there was NO prospect that Japan would yield to terms America could abide."
"There is, however, a still more fundamental point about why Japan's organized surrender stemmed from the atomic bombs, not Soviet intervention. Halting the war required both the decision of a legitimate Japanese authority that the war must end, and the compliance of Japan's armed forces with that decision. In explaining Japan's surrender shortly after the war, Prime Minister Suzuki testified that Japanese leaders remained devoted to continuing the war so long as they believed that the Imperial Army and Navy could ultimately conduct the "decisive battle" against the U.S. invasion. Suzuki confessed that Japan's leaders agreed to surrender only after the advent of nuclear weapons. They recognized that the United States would no longer need to invade Japan. If there was no invasion, Japan had no military and political strategy short of national suicide."
Total U.S. assistance to Japan for the years of the occupation, from 1946-1952
was roughly $2.2 billion ($15.2 billion in 2005 dollars), of which almost $1.7 billion
was grants and $504 million was loans. The Greenbook presents these figures as
provided under five headings. Over three-quarters (77 percent) of these funds were
provided through GARIOA grants. Most of the remainder (i.e., 23 percent) was $490
million in related funds that Japan repaid and is classified as a loan. There is no
information in the Greenbook or readily available published sources regarding how
much of this was provided for economic reconstruction, although the intent of the
occupation after 1948 was to promote economic recovery.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33331.pdf
Japan was in a hopeless strategic position. Militarily they had already lost. And when Germany was defeated Russia was freed up to focus on Japan as well. That's two superpowers against a tiny island nation that was already militarily defeated, in a hopeles position. Yet still they were nuked.
.........
"The bomb dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 turned into powder and ash, in a few moments, the flesh and bones of 140,000 men, women, and children. Three days later, a second atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki killed perhaps 70,000 instantly. In the next five years, another 130,000 inhabitants of those two cities died of radiation poisoning.
A woman with her jaw missing and her tongue hanging out of her mouth was wandering around, in the heavy black rain, crying for help.
In The Making of the Atomic Bomb, probably the most thorough and most vivid narrative of that long, costly, and secret enterprise on the New Mexico desert known as "The Manhattan Project," Richard Rhodes, scrupulously controlled up to this point, describes the results with unmistakable feeling: "People exposed within half a mile of the Little Boy fireball were seared to bundles of smoking black char in a fraction of a second as their internal organs boiled away. The small black bundles now stuck to the streets and bridges and sidewalks of Hiroshima numbered in the thousands. At the same instant birds ignited in midair. Mosquitoes and flies, squirrels, family pets crackled and were gone.
A woman, then a girl in the 5th grade, remembered: "Everybody in the shelter was crying out loud. I do not know how many times I called begging that they would cut off my burned arms and legs."
The sociologist Kai Erikson, reviewing the report by the Japanese team of scientists, wrote:
"The attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not 'combat' in any of the ways that word is normally used. Nor were they primarily attempts to destroy military targets, for the two cities had been chosen not despite but because they had a high density of civilian housing. Whether the intended audience was Russian or Japanese or a combination of both, then the attacks were to be a show, a display, a demonstration. The question is: What kind of mood does a fundamentally decent people have to be in, what kind of moral arrangements must it make, before it is willing to annihilate as many as a quarter of a million human beings for the sake of making a point."
Howard Zinn. http://polymer.bu.edu/~amaral/Personal/zinn.html
Seriously. Seeing the things human beings can bring themselves to rationalize makes me weary.
Man is least himself when he talks in his own person. Give him a mask, and he will tell you the truth.
-Oscar Wilde