Israel admits to nukes..
miller8966
Posts: 1,450
Let the world worry
By Yossi Melman
On April 2, 1963, Shimon Peres, then director general of the Defense Ministry, marched through the White House corridors. He was accompanied by Meyer Feldman, the adviser to President John F. Kennedy on Jewish affairs. Peres was in Washington for negotiations on the purchase of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, the first significant weapons deal between the two countries. Just by chance, Kennedy walked by and suggested that Feldman schedule him an appointment with Peres. Their meeting lasted 20 minutes. It was devoted almost entirely to Israel's nuclear plans. Kennedy was extremely concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. His defense secretary, Robert McNamara, had expressed the fear that by the 1970s, sixteen countries would have nuclear weapons. Since the start of his term of office in 1961, Kennedy and his aides had been pressing Israel for details about the activities of the Dimona nuclear reactor. American aerial intelligence had photographed the building of the reactor and as a result, then prime minister David Ben-Gurion was forced to admit in December 1960 that Israel was building a reactor near Dimona and not a "textile factory" as Israeli spokesmen had earlier claimed.
When the reactor's construction became known, the U.S. made an effort to prevent Israel from developing a facility for splitting plutonium, and other facilities that could lead to the creation of a nuclear bomb. Ben-Gurion was forced to accede to visits by officials from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. The first visit took place in 1961 and an additional one occurred in 1962.
According to documents in the Kennedy Library in Boston, Kennedy told Peres at the 1963 White House meeting that the U.S. was closely following the development of Israel's nuclear potential and asked what he had to say about it. The surprised Peres responded: "I can tell you clearly that we shall not be the ones to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. We will not be the first to do so." It was a momentary stroke of brilliance designed to ward off Kennedy's pressure and the deterioration of bilateral relations at a time when Israel was searching for a new ally after the special relations with France, the reactor's supplier, had ended.
Later, Ben-Gurion's successor, Levy Eshkol, would rebuke Peres for the words he had uttered. He felt he had gone too far. But in retrospect, he and all the prime ministers after him adopted the phrase and turned it into Israel's official policy.
Pricking the balloon
This now-famous policy of ambiguity is once again the eye of the storm surrounding the remarks made by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on Monday to a German TV station. Peres admitted (in a 1991 interview with Avner Cohen, author of "Israel and the Bomb") that he had conjured up the phrase at the spur of the moment. "I didn't want to lie to the president," he said, "but I also could not give him a direct answer to his question. To get out of the difficulty, I tried to tell him something and this turned into Israel's policy for [many] years." In other words, the public expression for Israel's nuclear policy, perhaps the most important layer in the country's security strategy, was also born of a kind of slip of the tongue. Now, as a result of Olmert's slip of the tongue, another pin has pricked the balloon of ambiguity. This was a week of "nuclear" slips of the tongue. It started with the U.S. secretary of defense-designate Robert Gates. Asked at the Congress hearing why Iran wanted to obtain nuclear arms, he explained that it was surrounded by countries that were already nuclearized, among them Israel. Olmert repeated the slip of the tongue. He criticized attempts to justify Iran's nuclear plans by saying that Israel already had nuclear power, mentioning Israel in one breath with France, Russia and the U.S. as countries that already have nuclear arms. The remark (his bureau hastened to announce that Olmert had not said Israel had nuclear weapons) caused a huge storm, but it seems that such a storm was not justified. True, Israel is the only country with nuclear weapons that has not confirmed it has them, or did not until this week. However, the whole world assumes it indeed has them. According to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the world recognizes the right of the U.S., the former Soviet Union (replaced by Russia), China, Britain and France to be nuclear powers. India and Pakistan are also nuclear powers for all intents and purposes, and while the world does not recognize their right to be, it accepts it as a fact. Recently North Korea apparently joined the club.
Over the years, Israel maintained its ambiguity, which left place for a certain lack of certainty and was designed to deter its enemies. But there have been many who proposed a different policy. One proposal was to talk about "a bomb in the basement" - that is, that Israel should state it has a nuclear option. Moshe Dayan spoke in favor of this. Others felt Israel should simply state that it had nuclear weapons.
The policy paid off
However, all of the governments, whether to the right or the left of the political spectrum, decided to abide by the policy of ambiguity. There was a two-fold advantage to this policy: It lessened U.S. pressure on Israel, and essentially led to America's implicit agreement to Israeli nuclearization. Furthermore, it acted as a deterrent to the Arab states.
The U.S. agreement was drawn up by then U.S. president Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, at a meeting with then prime minister Golda Meir in 1969. The visits by the American inspectors to the Dimona reactor were then halted. (These visits had not been very effective for two reasons: As Abba Eban admitted to this reporter at one time, Israel had built all kinds of dummy facilities at the reactor so the inspectors would miss the real thing; secondly, the inspectors were not really intent on discovering exactly what was there, because they already knew what the real purpose of the reactor was.) Thus, the Americans clarified that they would stop putting pressure on Israel, while Israel, for its part, committed to not carrying out tests, not making declarations and, in particular, not uttering threats that could suggest use of these weapons.
These principles, the by-product of the ambiguity policy, were not infringed upon even when Israeli leaders made slips of the tongue that went beyond the official line. Then president Ephraim Katzir said in December 1974 that Israel had "nuclear potential." When asked by a journalist whether his words were intended to cause fear, he replied: "Let the world worry." Katzir knew what he was talking about. As a researcher at the Weizmann Institute of Science, he was connected to nuclear matters, and in 1962, he was the official Israeli escort to the nuclear inspectors on their visit to the Dimona reactor.
Some 16 years later, in 1990, shortly after becoming science minister, Prof. Yuval Ne'eman who was a member of the Atomic Energy Commission and party to the nuclear secret, also made declarations, which suggested that any attack on Israel would provoke an extremely serious response. The remarks came against the backdrop of Saddam Hussein's threats in April 1990 that Iraq could "burn half of Israel." But nine months later Hussein attacked Israel with Scud missiles, which bore conventional warheads - not the chemical warheads he had in his arsenal. Many of the analysts believe Hussein did not used chemical or biological warheads simply because he thought Israel would respond with nuclear weapons. If so, the policy of ambiguity paid off in that case.
Some analysts also believe Israel's policy was the reason then Egyptian president Anwar Sadat decided to set limited goals for the war against Israel in 1973, one of which was to jumpstart the political process. This assumption is based on a later statement by Sadat that he had concluded the Arab states could not wipe out Israel, because of its nuclear arsenal. To any discussion of the ambiguity policy must be added the so-called "Begin Doctrine." Then prime minister Menachem Begin made it clear that Israel could not allow a nuclear-armed state to exist in the region that would threaten Israel's own existence. On the basis of this, he instructed the air force to strike at the Iraqi reactor in 1981. The extent to which Israeli leaders adhere to this doctrine will be tested in the coming years, as Iran threatens to develop nuclear arms.
Because of the sensitivity of the issue of whether Israel has the ability to attack Iran, and whether it would decide to do so if the international community does not succeed in preventing Iran from attaining nuclear weapons, the ambiguity policy has taken on greater importance. Any change will give Iran an excuse to nuclearize and will make it harder for Israel to explain its cause. Nuclear ambiguity is one of the most successful pillars of Israeli policy since the state's inception. Apparently the Olmert government does not have any intention of changing this, and rightfully so.
By Yossi Melman
On April 2, 1963, Shimon Peres, then director general of the Defense Ministry, marched through the White House corridors. He was accompanied by Meyer Feldman, the adviser to President John F. Kennedy on Jewish affairs. Peres was in Washington for negotiations on the purchase of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, the first significant weapons deal between the two countries. Just by chance, Kennedy walked by and suggested that Feldman schedule him an appointment with Peres. Their meeting lasted 20 minutes. It was devoted almost entirely to Israel's nuclear plans. Kennedy was extremely concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. His defense secretary, Robert McNamara, had expressed the fear that by the 1970s, sixteen countries would have nuclear weapons. Since the start of his term of office in 1961, Kennedy and his aides had been pressing Israel for details about the activities of the Dimona nuclear reactor. American aerial intelligence had photographed the building of the reactor and as a result, then prime minister David Ben-Gurion was forced to admit in December 1960 that Israel was building a reactor near Dimona and not a "textile factory" as Israeli spokesmen had earlier claimed.
When the reactor's construction became known, the U.S. made an effort to prevent Israel from developing a facility for splitting plutonium, and other facilities that could lead to the creation of a nuclear bomb. Ben-Gurion was forced to accede to visits by officials from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. The first visit took place in 1961 and an additional one occurred in 1962.
According to documents in the Kennedy Library in Boston, Kennedy told Peres at the 1963 White House meeting that the U.S. was closely following the development of Israel's nuclear potential and asked what he had to say about it. The surprised Peres responded: "I can tell you clearly that we shall not be the ones to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. We will not be the first to do so." It was a momentary stroke of brilliance designed to ward off Kennedy's pressure and the deterioration of bilateral relations at a time when Israel was searching for a new ally after the special relations with France, the reactor's supplier, had ended.
Later, Ben-Gurion's successor, Levy Eshkol, would rebuke Peres for the words he had uttered. He felt he had gone too far. But in retrospect, he and all the prime ministers after him adopted the phrase and turned it into Israel's official policy.
Pricking the balloon
This now-famous policy of ambiguity is once again the eye of the storm surrounding the remarks made by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on Monday to a German TV station. Peres admitted (in a 1991 interview with Avner Cohen, author of "Israel and the Bomb") that he had conjured up the phrase at the spur of the moment. "I didn't want to lie to the president," he said, "but I also could not give him a direct answer to his question. To get out of the difficulty, I tried to tell him something and this turned into Israel's policy for [many] years." In other words, the public expression for Israel's nuclear policy, perhaps the most important layer in the country's security strategy, was also born of a kind of slip of the tongue. Now, as a result of Olmert's slip of the tongue, another pin has pricked the balloon of ambiguity. This was a week of "nuclear" slips of the tongue. It started with the U.S. secretary of defense-designate Robert Gates. Asked at the Congress hearing why Iran wanted to obtain nuclear arms, he explained that it was surrounded by countries that were already nuclearized, among them Israel. Olmert repeated the slip of the tongue. He criticized attempts to justify Iran's nuclear plans by saying that Israel already had nuclear power, mentioning Israel in one breath with France, Russia and the U.S. as countries that already have nuclear arms. The remark (his bureau hastened to announce that Olmert had not said Israel had nuclear weapons) caused a huge storm, but it seems that such a storm was not justified. True, Israel is the only country with nuclear weapons that has not confirmed it has them, or did not until this week. However, the whole world assumes it indeed has them. According to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the world recognizes the right of the U.S., the former Soviet Union (replaced by Russia), China, Britain and France to be nuclear powers. India and Pakistan are also nuclear powers for all intents and purposes, and while the world does not recognize their right to be, it accepts it as a fact. Recently North Korea apparently joined the club.
Over the years, Israel maintained its ambiguity, which left place for a certain lack of certainty and was designed to deter its enemies. But there have been many who proposed a different policy. One proposal was to talk about "a bomb in the basement" - that is, that Israel should state it has a nuclear option. Moshe Dayan spoke in favor of this. Others felt Israel should simply state that it had nuclear weapons.
The policy paid off
However, all of the governments, whether to the right or the left of the political spectrum, decided to abide by the policy of ambiguity. There was a two-fold advantage to this policy: It lessened U.S. pressure on Israel, and essentially led to America's implicit agreement to Israeli nuclearization. Furthermore, it acted as a deterrent to the Arab states.
The U.S. agreement was drawn up by then U.S. president Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, at a meeting with then prime minister Golda Meir in 1969. The visits by the American inspectors to the Dimona reactor were then halted. (These visits had not been very effective for two reasons: As Abba Eban admitted to this reporter at one time, Israel had built all kinds of dummy facilities at the reactor so the inspectors would miss the real thing; secondly, the inspectors were not really intent on discovering exactly what was there, because they already knew what the real purpose of the reactor was.) Thus, the Americans clarified that they would stop putting pressure on Israel, while Israel, for its part, committed to not carrying out tests, not making declarations and, in particular, not uttering threats that could suggest use of these weapons.
These principles, the by-product of the ambiguity policy, were not infringed upon even when Israeli leaders made slips of the tongue that went beyond the official line. Then president Ephraim Katzir said in December 1974 that Israel had "nuclear potential." When asked by a journalist whether his words were intended to cause fear, he replied: "Let the world worry." Katzir knew what he was talking about. As a researcher at the Weizmann Institute of Science, he was connected to nuclear matters, and in 1962, he was the official Israeli escort to the nuclear inspectors on their visit to the Dimona reactor.
Some 16 years later, in 1990, shortly after becoming science minister, Prof. Yuval Ne'eman who was a member of the Atomic Energy Commission and party to the nuclear secret, also made declarations, which suggested that any attack on Israel would provoke an extremely serious response. The remarks came against the backdrop of Saddam Hussein's threats in April 1990 that Iraq could "burn half of Israel." But nine months later Hussein attacked Israel with Scud missiles, which bore conventional warheads - not the chemical warheads he had in his arsenal. Many of the analysts believe Hussein did not used chemical or biological warheads simply because he thought Israel would respond with nuclear weapons. If so, the policy of ambiguity paid off in that case.
Some analysts also believe Israel's policy was the reason then Egyptian president Anwar Sadat decided to set limited goals for the war against Israel in 1973, one of which was to jumpstart the political process. This assumption is based on a later statement by Sadat that he had concluded the Arab states could not wipe out Israel, because of its nuclear arsenal. To any discussion of the ambiguity policy must be added the so-called "Begin Doctrine." Then prime minister Menachem Begin made it clear that Israel could not allow a nuclear-armed state to exist in the region that would threaten Israel's own existence. On the basis of this, he instructed the air force to strike at the Iraqi reactor in 1981. The extent to which Israeli leaders adhere to this doctrine will be tested in the coming years, as Iran threatens to develop nuclear arms.
Because of the sensitivity of the issue of whether Israel has the ability to attack Iran, and whether it would decide to do so if the international community does not succeed in preventing Iran from attaining nuclear weapons, the ambiguity policy has taken on greater importance. Any change will give Iran an excuse to nuclearize and will make it harder for Israel to explain its cause. Nuclear ambiguity is one of the most successful pillars of Israeli policy since the state's inception. Apparently the Olmert government does not have any intention of changing this, and rightfully so.
America...the greatest Country in the world.
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Mordechai Vanunu spent 18 years in prison, including more than 11 years served in solitary confinement.
Vanunu was released from prison on April 21, 2004. He indicated a desire to completely dissociate himself from Israel, initially refusing to speak in Hebrew, and planning to move to Europe or the US[13] as soon as the Israeli government would permit him to do so. He denounced most of his family, but maintains a relationship with at least one of his brothers.
A number of restrictions were placed upon Vanunu by Israeli authorities, who stated their reason was fear of him spreading further state secrets and that he is still bound by his non-disclosure agreement. These stipulate that he:
has to register to live in an Israeli city of his choice.
has to give notice to the authorities if he wishes to travel to another city.
is not allowed to leave Israel. This restriction has since been extended to April 2006,[14] and yet again to April 2007 due to his violations of court rulings. While a court found in 2005 that he should be free to go to the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the 2006 restrictions explicitly forbade him to visit either, reversing the court's initial decision.
is not allowed to contact foreigners either by phone or in person or by e-mail.
is not allowed to enter or approach any embassy, visit any port of entry, or come within 500 metres of any international border crossing.
So much for democracy and human rights!
Um, the guy was convicted of treason. Because he was a traitor. He deserves to be punished. How else would you do it? I don't think this has anything to do with human rights or democracy.
if this guy was abducted from another country, tried and convicted in secret then i think he and others have every right to cry foul. in a fair and open democracy people have the right to a fair trial in public. this is the first time i have heard about this case but if it is all true then israel should have issued a warrent and asked the italian courts to extradite him. they should not have abducted him
http://www.myspace.com/thelastreel http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=19604327965
A traitor? To Israel perhaps, to the world, no. He was a hero for disclosing Israel's illegal and potentially apocalyptic nuclear arsenal. Only someone with a fascist mindset would think differently.
You don't think this has anything to do with human rights or democracy? I'd be interested to know how you regard human rights and democracy then. I imagine they must be pretty paltry and disposable concepts in your scheme of things.
Hey, how about you make a real argument, instead of just calling me a fascist; cause that's not arguing, its a circumstantial ad hominem fallacy. Israel's nuclear aresenal is just as apocalyptic as any other one. So just chill out. Also, the guy was an Israeli citizen who was a threat to their security. He was a traitor their country, and wasn't a hero for anyone else. If you read the article you'd see that the US already knew about Israel's nuclear program, and this guy was just giving away Israel classified information.
Again, if you want to make an argument do it. If you want to say he should have been tried publicly, than do that. But, make an argument, not ad hominem against me. Unless of course, you have nothing to argue and just feel like saying something about me instead.
O.k. The following will suffice as my argument:
'The European Parliament has condemned Israel's treatment of Vanunu, and referred to his detention by Mossad agents as a gross violation of Italian sovereignty and international law. Amnesty International described his treatment as constituting "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment [...] such as is prohibited by international law."
Vanunu received the Right Livelihood Award in 1987, and was given an honorary doctorate by the University of Tromsø in 2001. He was nominated by Joseph Rotblat for the Nobel Peace Prize every year from 1988 to 2004. In 2005 he received the Peace Prize of the Norwegian People (Folkets fredspris). Previous recipients of this prize includes Vytautas Landsbergis (1991), Alva Myrdal (1982), Mairead Corrigan and Betty Williams.
In December 2004, as a statement of solidarity, he was elected by the students of the University of Glasgow to serve for three years as Rector[21]. On Friday April 22, 2005 he was formally installed in the post[22], but cannot carry out any of its functions as he is still confined to Israel. Since then the Glasgow Herald has launched a campaign for his release. Vanunu has been officially adopted by Nick and Mary Eoloff from Minnesota (US), a couple belonging to a christian peace movement.'
The whole point is that the guy shared state secrets. Any attempt at extradition or for that matter a public trial would mean airing in public his offense which would mean further exposing the secrets he shared. which is obviously stupid given that he was being punished for sharing the secrets in the first place.
Exactly.
I don't see how Yosi is in any way a fascist, and your calling him that is offensive and unproductive. You also seem to have a weak grasp of the meaning of treason. and Israel's nukes are meant for self-defense. they built them at a time when all of their neighbors wanted to wipe the country off the map (sounds familiar) and waged a war with them at least once every decade. It isn't like Israel is ever gonna wake up one day and decide to nuke someone for fun.
There are other ways to acheive peace and nuclear disarmement aside from divulging classified information, which is an act of treason.
If they had a legitimate reason for producing them then why did they put so much effort into keeping them secret?
because the less people know about them the less they can steal. (maybe) honestly I don't know but I would assume they have a good reason.
Possibly to stop an arms race between themselves and countries like Iran.
I would assume that they were defying the non-proliferation treaty and thereby adding to their ever increasing catalogue of breaches of U.N resolutions.
when was the treaty signed, cause Israel built its nuclear program in the fifties with French support.
The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. A total of 187 parties have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty's significance.
To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use.
The provisions of the Treaty, particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a review of the operation of the Treaty every five years, a provision which was reaffirmed by the States parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.
http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/
Article 1
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.'
http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html
Where was Israel receiving it's nuclear capability? Answer = the U.S?
Read the part I've highlighted.
Maybe the reason for secrecy was so that the U.S would not be charged with violating the treaty by supplying nuclear materials to Israel?
no that's wrong because Israel built its nuclear reactor with FRENCH help in the 1950s well before the treaty was in affect. Israel produces its own nuclear material.
Perhaps they simply didn't wish to upset their neighbours in the region and to also be seen as international pariahs by stockpiling weapons whilst others had vowed to decrease theirs?
Either way, I suspect that their intentions were not particularly noble.
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Vice President "Bingo Bob" Russell was aware of this 3 or 4 years ago.
Oh yea i bet other countries like iran and egypt ( at the time) were real trust worthy.
I fully support Israels nuclear proliferation.
They were more than a little provoked.
http://groups.msn.com/PearlJamNirvana/messages.msnw
Yeah lets have party!
We should all get nukes!
Fuck Canada get some fucking nukes already...I want to have the ability to wipe out masses of innocent people at a press of the finger...
Your country already helped do that with it's support of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan...remember?
High Traffic ART EZI FTJ JSR KPA PCD SYN ULX VLB YHF
Low Traffic CIO MIW
Non Traffic ABC BAY FDU GBZ HNC NDP OEM ROV TMS ZWL
Well we didn't help in Iraq...I see to recall our PM asking to see something called evidence and none was present so we passed on that idea.... and we are one of the leading forces in Afganistan....for some reason I do not understand.....