Middle East ......

Lerxst1992

Targeting civilians and civilian objects: Hamas and its military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, have been accused of deliberately killing and injuring civilians in Israel, including women, children, and the elderly. They have also launched indiscriminate rocket attacks on civilian population centers in Israel.

gimmesometruth27

Lerxst1992 said:

Targeting civilians and civilian objects: Hamas and its military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, have been accused of deliberately killing and injuring civilians in Israel, including women, children, and the elderly. They have also launched indiscriminate rocket attacks on civilian population centers in Israel.

but this does not excuse starving the palestinians.

Lerxst1992

mickeyrat said:

video

https://www.instagram.com/reel/DNUI925yr8v/?igsh=MTVlY24xamZtcWt0dg==

gimmesometruth27 said:

Lerxst1992 said:

Targeting civilians and civilian objects: Hamas and its military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, have been accused of deliberately killing and injuring civilians in Israel, including women, children, and the elderly. They have also launched indiscriminate rocket attacks on civilian population centers in Israel.

but this does not excuse starving the palestinians.

Agreed as the top doesn’t excuse Hamas for getting them into this mess, not blocking 99%, edit 90% , of UN food shipments. Why oh why is that last fact no ever in the liberal media?


..

According to data from the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), a significant portion of aid entering Gaza has been stolen or "intercepted" before reaching its final destination. One report, citing UNOPS data from May 19 onward, states that 85% of aid entering Gaza by truck has been stolen, either "peacefully by hungry people or forcefully by armed actors."

Reports from various sources indicate that the theft of humanitarian aid is a major problem in Gaza, with different groups being blamed for the theft

Halifax2TheMax

Former PM Olmert, Moshe and Omer didn’t get the memo. Hamas mouthpieces that they are. Pay attention to the quotation marks. From the New Yorker.

Halifax2TheMax

Etgar Keret gets it. From The New Yorker:

benjs

Lerxst1992 said:

mickeyrat said:

video

https://www.instagram.com/reel/DNUI925yr8v/?igsh=MTVlY24xamZtcWt0dg==

gimmesometruth27 said:

Lerxst1992 said:

Targeting civilians and civilian objects: Hamas and its military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, have been accused of deliberately killing and injuring civilians in Israel, including women, children, and the elderly. They have also launched indiscriminate rocket attacks on civilian population centers in Israel.

but this does not excuse starving the palestinians.

Agreed as the top doesn’t excuse Hamas for getting them into this mess, not blocking 99%, edit 90% , of UN food shipments. Why oh why is that last fact no ever in the liberal media?


..

According to data from the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), a significant portion of aid entering Gaza has been stolen or "intercepted" before reaching its final destination. One report, citing UNOPS data from May 19 onward, states that 85% of aid entering Gaza by truck has been stolen, either "peacefully by hungry people or forcefully by armed actors."

Reports from various sources indicate that the theft of humanitarian aid is a major problem in Gaza, with different groups being blamed for the theft

From AI: first question I asked was why aid isn’t getting to Gazans. Second question was how much of this is Hamas responsible for?

Short answer: some, but it’s hard to pin a large, verifiable share of the aid bottleneck on Hamas.

Here’s what solid reporting shows:

• Aid diversion/theft by Hamas: Israel and some commentators allege Hamas routinely steals or taxes aid. But a USAID review (July 2025) said it found no evidence of “massive” Hamas theft in the incidents it examined (State Dept. officials disputed parts of the analysis). 
  UNRWA likewise says it has received no specific, substantiated allegations of systemic diversion of the aid it distributes. 
  There are incidents of armed men looting convoys, and Israel has released clips it says show Hamas members stealing aid, but these are case-by-case claims and not independently established as a widespread pattern.  
• Security and policing inside Gaza: Early in 2024, Hamas-run police were escorting UN convoys. After Israeli strikes on those escorts, police largely withdrew, and law-and-order collapsed around distribution points, which UN and U.S. officials say made safe delivery far harder. That’s an indirect way Hamas’ role matters (because its police force is part of its governance), but the immediate trigger was the strikes and the loss of escorts.  
• Criminal gangs / chaos: A major share of losses has been attributed by aid groups and reporters to criminal looting—often in areas under Israeli control near crossings—rather than to Hamas specifically.  
• Who controls the gates: The entry of aid (what comes in, how much, and when) is controlled at crossings under Israeli authority; as of mid-August 2025 Israel says it controls ~75% of Gaza and is coordinating movements with the UN. That means Hamas does not decide how many trucks get in; its influence is mostly inside Gaza’s distribution environment.  

Bottom line

• Hamas does contribute to the problem—through its continued combat presence, the collapse/complicity of its policing in places, and some alleged diversion incidents.
• But the best available official/UN data do not support claims that Hamas is the primary or systemic reason aid isn’t reaching people. The biggest structural chokepoints are at the borders and along the corridors (access approvals, closures, inspections, and violence around convoys), with criminal looting compounding the breakdown inside Gaza.  

benjs

Next question was: Is the looting attributable to Hamas?

Here’s what’s known about the looting of aid trucks in Gaza and Hamas’ role:

Looting Patterns

• Large-scale incidents have been documented — for example, in November 2024 nearly all UN aid trucks entering via Kerem Shalom were looted before reaching warehouses【web†source】.
• Aid groups and journalists describe these incidents as the work of armed gangs and desperate civilians amid law-and-order collapse, not organized Hamas seizures【web†source】.

What Hamas’ Role Appears To Be

• Police escorts (run by Hamas authorities) once accompanied UN convoys. After Israeli strikes killed several of those escorts in early 2024, police largely withdrew. That created a security vacuum where convoys became easy targets for looters【web†source】.
• U.S. and UN officials have said that without those escorts, aid delivery is nearly impossible to secure. This means Hamas’ absence from convoy protection has indirectly worsened looting, even if Hamas isn’t the one seizing the goods.
• Israel has at times claimed Hamas members were involved in looting. Some video evidence has been circulated by the IDF, but these claims haven’t been independently verified. Aid agencies stress they have not seen evidence of systematic Hamas theft【web†source】.

Independent Reviews

• A USAID review (July 2025) found no proof of “massive” Hamas theft of aid, though Israeli officials dispute this【web†source】.
• UNRWA says it has not received credible, substantiated reports of Hamas routinely diverting its aid【web†source】.

✅ 

Summary

• Most looting is attributed to criminal groups and chaotic crowds, not Hamas as an organization.
• Hamas’ role is mainly indirect: its policing collapse (after Israeli targeting) allowed gangs and civilians to loot freely.
• Direct Hamas theft allegations exist but remain unverified and contested.

benjs

Here’s a quick, source-based “who controls what” map for Gaza aid, focused on where Hamas is (and isn’t) decisive.

Border entry & inspections (outside Gaza)

• What happens: Cargo is screened/cleared, then routed into Gaza (mainly via Kerem Shalom; Rafah has been mostly closed; Kissufim opens intermittently).
  Primary control: Israel (COGAT/IDF) sets the rules, hours, and approvals; aid often must be off-loaded at the crossing and re-loaded onto Gaza-side trucks, which creates long dwell times and crowds. 
  Hamas’ role: None at this stage (it doesn’t control gates/inspections).
  Notes: UN and aid groups say bureaucratic denials/turn-backs and limited operating hours are a major upstream choke point; Israel says it facilitates sufficient aid and that distribution inside Gaza is the problem.  

“Middle-mile” corridors inside Gaza (from the gate to UN/NGO warehouses)

• What happens: Gaza-side trucking collects consignments from the crossing and tries to move them to warehouses.
  Primary control: Movement is deconflicted with the IDF; on-the-ground security is fragmented. Criminal gangs increasingly attack convoys, especially around Kerem Shalom/Kissufim. 
  Hamas’ role: Before spring 2024, Hamas-run police often escorted UN convoys; after Israeli strikes killed escorting police, escorts largely withdrew, creating a security vacuum that enabled looting. (That’s an indirect Hamas link via its policing authority, but the proximate trigger was the strikes.)  

Last-mile distribution to civilians

• What happens: UN agencies (WFP, UNRWA, WHO, UNICEF) and NGOs hand out food/aid at distribution points.
  Primary control: UN agencies/NGOs, under deconfliction with the IDF; crowd control is fragile. Large incidents of looting have occurred (e.g., ~100 trucks looted on Nov. 16, 2024). 
  Hamas’ role: Allegations exist that Hamas diverts or steals aid, but key reviews say they found no evidence of massive/systematic diversion from UN channels (while Israel disputes this).  

So…is the looting “Hamas”?

• Evidence points mainly to criminal gangs and chaotic crowds, especially near the southern crossings; drivers have been beaten, kidnapped, and trucks hijacked.  
• UN temporarily halted shipments through a main crossing at times due to looting risk.  
• Hamas’ direct role in seizing aid at scale hasn’t been substantiated by UN/USAID reviews; its indirect role is the collapse of its policing/escort function after targeted strikes, which left a vacuum for gangs.  

Why the looting keeps happening (and who holds the levers)

1. Long waits & crowd build-ups at the gate → approvals, off-loading/re-loading requirements, and limited hours are upstream triggers.
   Lever: Israel/COGAT (more predictable hours/throughput; streamlined checks).  
2. Security vacuum on Gaza roads → convoys lack reliable escorts and deconfliction confidence.
   Lever: IDF (effective deconfliction & protection) and Hamas-run police (if/when escorts can operate without being targeted). Aid groups say current deconfliction isn’t working well enough.  
3. Warehouse-to-people surge dynamics → when fewer trucks arrive after long gaps, crowds overwhelm sites.
   Lever: All parties (steady, higher, safer flow reduces volatility); WFP has asked for faster clearances to cut crowd pressure.  

Quick takeaways

• Borders & rules: Israel controls the spigot; Hamas doesn’t.  
• Road security inside: Gangs are the main looters; Hamas’ policing withdrawal worsened it.  
• Systemic theft claims: UN/USAID say no evidence of mass Hamas diversion from UN aid; Israel disputes with its own intel claims.  

benjs

Next question: Based on prior history around the world, what ways are there to improve the ratio of aid that gets to the Gazan population?

Here are the levers that most reliably increase the share of aid that actually reaches people, drawn from past crises:

1. Make access rules predictable and neutral. Create (or empower) a UN-run inspection/clearance mechanism with guaranteed timelines—like UNVIM for Yemen or the UN Syria cross-border model—which raised volumes by removing ad-hoc political vetoes.  
2. Use formal deconfliction/notification for every convoy. Humanitarian Notification Systems (HNS)—used in Ukraine, Syria, Yemen—reduce strikes, road closures, and last-minute reroutes by sharing routes/coordinates with all armed actors.  
3. Prioritize roads; keep airdrops as last-resort. Evidence from multiple responses shows airdrops move only a fraction of what trucks can and are harder to control at the “last metre.”  
4. Strengthen independent monitoring. Third-party monitoring (remote calls, spot checks, satellite/phone audits) plus post-distribution monitoring deters diversion; where oversight was cut (e.g., Ukraine), watchdogs warned diversion risks rise.  
5. Track people and parcels digitally (with safeguards). WFP’s SCOPE/biometrics and barcoded chain-of-custody logs improve targeting and auditability (politically sensitive; needs strong data-protection).  
6. Use cash/vouchers where markets work. Cash is often faster, dignified, and no more prone to diversion than in-kind aid when backed by digital payments and local market analysis.  
7. Let communities help decide “who gets what.” Community-based targeting/committees, co-led by trusted local groups, improves acceptance and reduces theft at distribution points.  
8. Negotiate convoy security & acceptance. Train teams to negotiate access with all sides and lean on acceptance-based security (ICRC Safer Access) rather than purely armed escorts when possible.  
9. Fix banking & sanctions frictions. Apply UN humanitarian carve-outs so banks, insurers and suppliers can legally move aid without fear of penalties—reducing choke points upstream.  
10. Pre-position and right-size loads. Pre-stock hubs near recipients, run frequent smaller convoys, and design safe site layouts to avoid crowd crush and looting spikes.  
11. Coordinate needs and timing across agencies. Joint UNHCR/WFP assessments and clear logistics policies reduce duplication, long waits, and chaotic surges that attract looters.  

If you apply these to Gaza right now (most impact, fast):

• Hardwire access: a neutral, rules-based clearance/inspection lane (land/sea) with 24/7 operating hours and a single HNS pipeline for convoy notifications.  
• Stabilize last-mile: more frequent/smaller road deliveries + community-run distributions backed by digital verification and strong TPM.  
• Ditch performative airdrops except as gap-fill and clear banking/sanctions barriers so suppliers can move volume.  

DE4173

benjs

DE4173 said:

Sure, whatever helps you sleep at night.

DE4173

mickeyrat

“I cannot cry. Before the war— any little thing, it would make me cry. But now I cannot make myself. I want to, but I can’t, even when my heart is breaking. I used to be a schoolteacher; I love children. But now I see them walking in the streets with no shoes. They come into our clinic and you can see how tired they are. Some of them are mutilated: they’ve lost a leg, or an arm. You see children crying because they cannot walk again. Yes, there is a lot of children like this now. But even the ones who aren’t injured are changing. Before the war it was not normal to find a child who wasn’t in school. There were organizations that would find the parents and force them to enroll. But now Gaza’s children haven’t been to school in two years. They’re changing. They’re beginning to think: ‘I will never go to school. I will just work to bring my family food or water.’ Even my own daughter; she’s twelve years old. She was a leader in school and she dreamed to be a doctor. She has a cousin in Canada, the same age. They have video calls, and my daughter can see the difference. She sees how far behind she’s fallen, and recently she told me: ‘I won’t be a doctor anymore.’ This broke my heart, but still, I could not cry. It’s like something is blocked in me. I don’t share my pain with anyone. I don’t share with my husband. I don’t share with my mother, or my father, or my sister. Because all these people come to me to feel safe. A few months ago when they bombed the house of my husband’s family—I went to collect the body parts. It was too difficult for my husband. He lost fifteen members of his family that day. His mother, his father, his brother, were beneath the rubble. So I went. I had to start looking: this is the head for who? This arm, this leg, is for who? Afterwards I sat alone, and I tried to cry. I felt that if only I could cry, I will feel better. I will feel less full. But even then, I could not. I have a colleague in the work, who tells me: ‘Kholoud, after the war, you are going to collapse. Because you do not cry.’”

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Kholoud’s story is part of a series of stories I am currently doing on the Palestinian Staff of Doctors Without Borders in Gaza. I will be sharing these stories over the next several days. 

From Médecins Sans Frontières / MSF: Kholoud Al-Sedawi has been with MSF (Doctors Without Borders) since 2019, progressing from Data Entry Operator to her current coordination support role. When most humanitarian workers withdrew from northern Gaza, Kholoud stayed and helped restart MSF's operations amid some of the genocide's most severe conditions. Her work focuses on restoring basic healthcare services where hospitals have been damaged or destroyed and organizing mobile clinics. While the situation remains dire, Kholoud's persistence has enabled MSF to maintain a presence in northern Gaza when most organizations could not.