What are the conditions for victory in the middle east.
macgyver06
Posts: 2,500
what is trying ot be achieved?
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chronic war...thus, achieving any goals merely leads to another goal...
from my window to yours
American forces are attempting to change the political and economic structure of the Middle East in hopes of fostering constitutional governments that might curb terrorism for generations. Prosperity, security and liberty are the death knell to radical Islam.
If only the world were that simple.
Thanks Tony Snow.
And now, back to reality.
??? That's the basic premise, at least from my view... What's wrong with that???
what you said is fine - but, that is the ultimate...the questions regards what needs to be achieved to reach that end
from my window to yours
You don't think that the U.S is in the Middle East because of anything to do with oil, or with bolstering the arms trade?
What she said
vvvvv
Stop trying to live out revelations and lay down your arms.
Force feeding Western style goverance is no different than fundamentalists forcing their rule on the various countries in the reigon...same shit different pile.....
2 - ask for international aid
The problem is that : unlike past wars where there was a clearly defined enemy, the people who started the goddamn war like Bush or Rumsfeld or Cheney all say that this war will continue for 10-15 more years. Its an unending war. Second, we arent out to get all those who helped fund 9/11 and we arent out to get all those who funded saddam. We are out to get "terrorists". Terrorists have existed since the beginning of time, in all countries, including the u.s. Why do we think we can eradicate all terrorism? You can't fight a war to end terrorism, because its an unending battle? And how does one think terrorists start in the first place? Arent they by definition groups of people or an individual upset with society?
The problem is Bush and the war planners never said what the ultimate goal is. Was it getting rid of Osama? Getting rid of Saddam? Capturing all the Al Queada leaders?
We now have Saddam dead, we have captured most of the alquada leaders, we have set up a new government, we got them voting.
What else could we possibly do? What else do they (the war planners) think could be done?
Isnt it time to bring the troops home?
Exactly, when the U.S. was forcing Native AMericans to go to racist school structures in the early to mid 20th century, and they were forcing the Natives to adopt Christianity, they said they wanted the Natives to be like "apples". That is red on the outside and white on the inside.
Clearly this parallels nicely with what is going on in the middle east. The u.s. just wants a puppet government installed
there are large groups of christians on the ground in iraq trying to convert iraqis. how the fuck do they even get in there? how do you book a trip into iraq without gvt help?
That's all fine and dandy... but you forgot one key element in that equation... Culture.
How do you propose our military change the culture that is deeply rooted in religions of the Middle East? And how long will it take this cultural change to take hold? One Generation? Two? Twenty?
...
So, in your estimation... how long should I wait til I can do a Victory Dance?
Hail, Hail!!!
Ideally, our goal should be a Middle East wherein people are free from the tyranny of hatred, keeping the United States free from the fallout of that hatred. Unfortunately, the actions of the United States currently stand largely unrelated to that goal.
can you explain a little,... i love seeing your stance on issues.
~Ron Burgundy
at least the people who run america now
Yeah read more fiction like "1984", it'll totally help you understand this administration. Oh and I hear if you look deep enough, Nabokov's Lolita is so representative to this administration. Bush is like Humbert Humbert and we're like Lolita, get it? No? That's because it's fucking nonsense.
The stance is pretty simple. Fighting hate with hate, motivated by fear, isn't really going to accomplish anything. This is a fight that must be fought with a belief in the concept of rights, motivated by a singular moral precept: the belief that life and happiness are the highest ideals.
I'm very sympathetic to those who desire to erase fanatical Islam for the same reasons I'm very sympathetic to those who desire to erase any fanatical beliefs that drive men to kill one another. Fanatical murderers stand opposed to the moral ideals above.
I am not sympathetic to those who simply desire to hold sway over their fellow men, or hold power over their chosen territory if their only claim to that territory is the fear they can inspire in others. That is the business of Islamic fanatics, and I do not like to see this country that I love adopting that business.
Fanaticism is a mindset. War, even the rare justifiable defensive war, is the business of fighting over territory. You cannot destroy a mindset with a war unless you are simply willing to destroy the mind that holds it. And to do that, you must embrace the morality of the very same fanatical murderer you claimed to reject in the first place.
To fight a mindset without adopting its evil principles, you must simply prove it invalid. You must demostrate how it contradicts the basic ideals, moral or otherwise, shared by nearly all human beings. You must give people a better option to embrace to accomplish that which they seek.
In that vein, America is wise to seek a spread of democracy and the principles of freedom in the Middle East. However, they are not wise to do so via strong-man domination in violation of the basic principles of democracy and freedom.
Furthermore, our approach has been far too nation-centric. Rather, we must focus simply on areas of influence and potential, regardless of the nation they occupy.
In short, I do not believe in the conspiracy and "evil empire" views of those who oppose this war. Rather, I simply think this nation is fighting a territorial battle more appropriate for the Cold War era. This is not a battle for land. This is a battle for minds.
The secret Downing Street memo
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
Diplomat's suppressed document lays bare the lies behind Iraq war
By Colin Brown and Andy McSmith
Published: 15 December 2006
The Government's case for going to war in Iraq has been torn apart by the publication of previously suppressed evidence that Tony Blair lied over Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.
A devastating attack on Mr Blair's justification for military action by Carne Ross, Britain's key negotiator at the UN, has been kept under wraps until now because he was threatened with being charged with breaching the Official Secrets Act.
In the testimony revealed today Mr Ross, 40, who helped negotiate several UN security resolutions on Iraq, makes it clear that Mr Blair must have known Saddam Hussein possessed no weapons of mass destruction. He said that during his posting to the UN, "at no time did HMG [Her Majesty's Government] assess that Iraq's WMD (or any other capability) posed a threat to the UK or its interests."
Mr Ross revealed it was a commonly held view among British officials dealing with Iraq that any threat by Saddam Hussein had been "effectively contained".
He also reveals that British officials warned US diplomats that bringing down the Iraqi dictator would lead to the chaos the world has since witnessed. "I remember on several occasions the UK team stating this view in terms during our discussions with the US (who agreed)," he said.
"At the same time, we would frequently argue when the US raised the subject, that 'regime change' was inadvisable, primarily on the grounds that Iraq would collapse into chaos."
He claims "inertia" in the Foreign Office and the "inattention of key ministers" combined to stop the UK carrying out any co-ordinated and sustained attempt to address sanction-busting by Iraq, an approach which could have provided an alternative to war.
Mr Ross delivered the evidence to the Butler inquiry which investigated intelligence blunders in the run-up to the conflict.
The Foreign Office had attempted to prevent the evidence being made public, but it has now been published by the Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs after MPs sought assurances from the Foreign Office that it would not breach the Official Secrets Act.
It shows Mr Ross told the inquiry, chaired by Lord Butler, "there was no intelligence evidence of significant holdings of CW [chemical warfare], BW [biological warfare] or nuclear material" held by the Iraqi dictator before the invasion. "There was, moreover, no intelligence or assessment during my time in the job that Iraq had any intention to launch an attack against its neighbours or the UK or the US," he added.
Mr Ross's evidence directly challenges the assertions by the Prime Minster that the war was legally justified because Saddam possessed WMDs which could be "activated" within 45 minutes and posed a threat to British interests. These claims were also made in two dossiers, subsequently discredited, in spite of the advice by Mr Ross.
His hitherto secret evidence threatens to reopen the row over the legality of the conflict, under which Mr Blair has sought to draw a line as the internecine bloodshed in Iraq has worsened.
Mr Ross says he questioned colleagues at the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence working on Iraq and none said that any new evidence had emerged to change their assessment.
"What had changed was the Government's determination to present available evidence in a different light," he added.
Mr Ross said in late 2002 that he "discussed this at some length with David Kelly", the weapons expert who a year later committed suicide when he was named as the source of a BBC report saying Downing Street had "sexed up" the WMD claims in a dossier. The Butler inquiry cleared Mr Blair and Downing Street of "sexing up" the dossier, but the publication of the Carne Ross evidence will cast fresh doubts on its findings.
Mr Ross, 40, was a highly rated diplomat but he resigned because of his misgivings about the legality of the war. He still fears the threat of action under the Official Secrets Act.
"Mr Ross hasn't had any approach to tell him that he is still not liable to be prosecuted," said one ally. But he has told friends that he is "glad it is out in the open" and he told MPs it had been "on my conscience for years".
One member of the Foreign Affairs committee said: "There was blood on the carpet over this. I think it's pretty clear the Foreign Office used the Official Secrets Act to suppress this evidence, by hanging it like a Sword of Damacles over Mr Ross, but we have called their bluff."
Yesterday, Jack Straw, the Leader of the Commons who was Foreign Secretary during the war - Mr Ross's boss - announced the Commons will have a debate on the possible change of strategy heralded by the Iraqi Study Group report in the new year.
hmmm I love the book 1984....but the last time I checked, it was fiction.
If you think that you can only learn things from non-fiction books, then you're really missing out.