Study: Members of the military more educated than population as a whole
Purple Hawk
Posts: 1,300
Who Bears the Burden? Demographic Characteristics of U.S. Military Recruits Before and After 9/11
by Tim Kane, Ph.D.
Center for Data Analysis Report #05-08
November 7, 2005 | |
A few Members of Congress, motivated by American combat in the Middle East, have called for the reinstatement of a compulsory military draft. The case for coercing young citizens to join the military is supposedly based on social jus*tice—that all should serve—and seems to be but*tressed by reports of shortfalls in voluntary enlistment. In a New York Times op-ed on Decem*ber 31, 2002, Representative Charles Rangel (D– NY) claimed, "A disproportionate number of the poor and members of minority groups make up the enlisted ranks of the military, while most priv*ileged Americans are underrepresented or absent."[1] This claim is frequently repeated by crit*ics of the war in Iraq.[2] Aside from the logical fal*lacy that a draft is less offensive to justice than a voluntary policy, Rangel's assertions about the demographic makeup of the enlisted military are not grounded in fact.
Although all branches of the armed services have been able to meet recruiting goals in recent years, the Army's difficulty in meeting its goal of 80,000 new soldiers in 2005 has been widely reported, and some view it as a symbol of the need to reinstate the draft. However, this shortfall should be placed in the proper context. The Army is pro*jected to fall just 7,000 (about 9 percent) short of its 2005 recruitment goal, which is less than 1 per*cent of the overall military of over 1 million person*nel. Furthermore, there is the unexpected rise in re-enlistment rates. In other words, the total force strength is about what it should be.
Since the draft was discontinued in 1973, all branches of the U.S. military have relied entirely on volunteers to fill their ranks. There are constant challenges in maintaining a balanced supply of recruits for force strength and composition, but three decades of experience confirms that the vol*untary policy works well, despite widespread skep*ticism in the early 1970s. The same cannot be said of a conscripted force, as evidenced by the backlash among troops and the public during the Vietnam conflict. Despite the Pentagon's strong preference for an all-volunteer force, some politicians and many voters favor a draft.
A June 2005 Associate Press/Ipsos poll found that 27 percent of respondents supported "the reinstate*ment of the military draft in the United States." Rein*statement of the draft was far more popular immediately following the September 11, 2001, ter*rorist attacks, when 76 percent of Americans sup*ported a renewed draft if "it becomes clear that more soldiers are needed in the war against terrorism."[3]
Although Representative Rangel's bill to reinstate the draft failed by a decisive vote of 402–2 in the House of Representatives in 2004, the issue will likely be considered again, especially if there are more terrorist attacks on the U.S.
Some motivations for the draft are entirely patriotic in the sense that they aim to protect America from aggressors. Others see the draft as an instrument of equality, as well as an instrument of pacifism.
Representative Rangel's theory is that if all citi*zens faced equal prospects of dying in a conflict, support for that conflict would have to pass a higher standard. This theory assumes that the priv*ileged classes would be less willing to commit the nation to war if that conflict involved personal, familial, or class bloodshed. It also assumes that the existing volunteers are either ignorant or lack other options—that is, they are involuntary participants. One way to test this thesis is to explore the demo*graphic patterns of enlisted recruits before and after the initiation of the global war on terrorism on September 11, 2001.
This paper reports the results of summary research into the demographic composition of two groups of recruits: those who enlisted between October 1998 and September 1999 and those who enlisted between January 2003 and September 2003. These groups are referred to as the 1999 and 2003 recruit cohorts, respectively. Nationwide Census data for citizens ages 18–24 were used as a baseline for comparison. Comparisons of these three different groups highlight the differences not only between the general population and military volunteers, but also between recruits who volun*teered for the military before 9/11 and those who volunteered after 9/11.
Our analysis of the demographic composition of enlisted recruits vis-à-vis the general population considers the following characteristics:
Household income,
Level of education,
Race/ethnicity, and
Region/rural origin.
This paper also reviews other evidence that is at odds with the image, painted by some supporters of the draft, that the military exploits poor, ignorant, young Americans by using slick advertising that promises technical careers in the military to dupe them into trading their feeble opportunities in the private sector for a meager role as cannon fodder.
The caricature of conscription—a harsh reality of European militaries in the 18th and 19th centu*ries—lives on in the popular imagination, but it does not accurately represent the all-volunteer U.S. military. Indeed, the U.S. military's qualitative superiority is what makes it the most efficient and lethal combat force in history. In economic terms, high-skill human capital among troops makes the military more productive overall. There may be legitimate equity concerns that outweigh national security, but they will undoubtedly come at a cost or trade-off in productivity.
However, our research shows that the volunteer force is already equitable. That is, it is highly likely that reinstating the draft would erode military effectiveness, increase American fatalities, destroy personal freedom, and even produce a less socio*economically "privileged" military in the process.
In summary, we found that, on average, 1999 recruits were more highly educated than the equiv*alent general population, more rural and less urban in origin, and of similar income status. We did not find evidence of minority racial exploitation (by race or by race-weighted ZIP code areas). We did find evidence of a "Southern military tradition" in that some states, notably in the South and West, provide a much higher proportion of enlisted troops by population.
The household income of recruits generally matches the income distribution of the American population. There are slightly higher proportions of recruits from the middle class and slightly lower proportions from low-income brackets. However, the proportion of high-income recruits rose to a disproportionately high level after the war on ter*rorism began, as did the proportion of highly edu*cated enlistees. All of the demographic evidence that we analyzed contradicts the pro-draft case.
....this is just part of the study, see the rest
http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda05-08.cfm
as a note, this isn't even to address the kerry situation, just to show the truth
by Tim Kane, Ph.D.
Center for Data Analysis Report #05-08
November 7, 2005 | |
A few Members of Congress, motivated by American combat in the Middle East, have called for the reinstatement of a compulsory military draft. The case for coercing young citizens to join the military is supposedly based on social jus*tice—that all should serve—and seems to be but*tressed by reports of shortfalls in voluntary enlistment. In a New York Times op-ed on Decem*ber 31, 2002, Representative Charles Rangel (D– NY) claimed, "A disproportionate number of the poor and members of minority groups make up the enlisted ranks of the military, while most priv*ileged Americans are underrepresented or absent."[1] This claim is frequently repeated by crit*ics of the war in Iraq.[2] Aside from the logical fal*lacy that a draft is less offensive to justice than a voluntary policy, Rangel's assertions about the demographic makeup of the enlisted military are not grounded in fact.
Although all branches of the armed services have been able to meet recruiting goals in recent years, the Army's difficulty in meeting its goal of 80,000 new soldiers in 2005 has been widely reported, and some view it as a symbol of the need to reinstate the draft. However, this shortfall should be placed in the proper context. The Army is pro*jected to fall just 7,000 (about 9 percent) short of its 2005 recruitment goal, which is less than 1 per*cent of the overall military of over 1 million person*nel. Furthermore, there is the unexpected rise in re-enlistment rates. In other words, the total force strength is about what it should be.
Since the draft was discontinued in 1973, all branches of the U.S. military have relied entirely on volunteers to fill their ranks. There are constant challenges in maintaining a balanced supply of recruits for force strength and composition, but three decades of experience confirms that the vol*untary policy works well, despite widespread skep*ticism in the early 1970s. The same cannot be said of a conscripted force, as evidenced by the backlash among troops and the public during the Vietnam conflict. Despite the Pentagon's strong preference for an all-volunteer force, some politicians and many voters favor a draft.
A June 2005 Associate Press/Ipsos poll found that 27 percent of respondents supported "the reinstate*ment of the military draft in the United States." Rein*statement of the draft was far more popular immediately following the September 11, 2001, ter*rorist attacks, when 76 percent of Americans sup*ported a renewed draft if "it becomes clear that more soldiers are needed in the war against terrorism."[3]
Although Representative Rangel's bill to reinstate the draft failed by a decisive vote of 402–2 in the House of Representatives in 2004, the issue will likely be considered again, especially if there are more terrorist attacks on the U.S.
Some motivations for the draft are entirely patriotic in the sense that they aim to protect America from aggressors. Others see the draft as an instrument of equality, as well as an instrument of pacifism.
Representative Rangel's theory is that if all citi*zens faced equal prospects of dying in a conflict, support for that conflict would have to pass a higher standard. This theory assumes that the priv*ileged classes would be less willing to commit the nation to war if that conflict involved personal, familial, or class bloodshed. It also assumes that the existing volunteers are either ignorant or lack other options—that is, they are involuntary participants. One way to test this thesis is to explore the demo*graphic patterns of enlisted recruits before and after the initiation of the global war on terrorism on September 11, 2001.
This paper reports the results of summary research into the demographic composition of two groups of recruits: those who enlisted between October 1998 and September 1999 and those who enlisted between January 2003 and September 2003. These groups are referred to as the 1999 and 2003 recruit cohorts, respectively. Nationwide Census data for citizens ages 18–24 were used as a baseline for comparison. Comparisons of these three different groups highlight the differences not only between the general population and military volunteers, but also between recruits who volun*teered for the military before 9/11 and those who volunteered after 9/11.
Our analysis of the demographic composition of enlisted recruits vis-à-vis the general population considers the following characteristics:
Household income,
Level of education,
Race/ethnicity, and
Region/rural origin.
This paper also reviews other evidence that is at odds with the image, painted by some supporters of the draft, that the military exploits poor, ignorant, young Americans by using slick advertising that promises technical careers in the military to dupe them into trading their feeble opportunities in the private sector for a meager role as cannon fodder.
The caricature of conscription—a harsh reality of European militaries in the 18th and 19th centu*ries—lives on in the popular imagination, but it does not accurately represent the all-volunteer U.S. military. Indeed, the U.S. military's qualitative superiority is what makes it the most efficient and lethal combat force in history. In economic terms, high-skill human capital among troops makes the military more productive overall. There may be legitimate equity concerns that outweigh national security, but they will undoubtedly come at a cost or trade-off in productivity.
However, our research shows that the volunteer force is already equitable. That is, it is highly likely that reinstating the draft would erode military effectiveness, increase American fatalities, destroy personal freedom, and even produce a less socio*economically "privileged" military in the process.
In summary, we found that, on average, 1999 recruits were more highly educated than the equiv*alent general population, more rural and less urban in origin, and of similar income status. We did not find evidence of minority racial exploitation (by race or by race-weighted ZIP code areas). We did find evidence of a "Southern military tradition" in that some states, notably in the South and West, provide a much higher proportion of enlisted troops by population.
The household income of recruits generally matches the income distribution of the American population. There are slightly higher proportions of recruits from the middle class and slightly lower proportions from low-income brackets. However, the proportion of high-income recruits rose to a disproportionately high level after the war on ter*rorism began, as did the proportion of highly edu*cated enlistees. All of the demographic evidence that we analyzed contradicts the pro-draft case.
....this is just part of the study, see the rest
http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda05-08.cfm
as a note, this isn't even to address the kerry situation, just to show the truth
And you ask me what I want this year
And I try to make this kind and clear
Just a chance that maybe we'll find better days
Cuz I don't need boxes wrapped in strings
And desire and love and empty things
Just a chance that maybe we'll find better days
And I try to make this kind and clear
Just a chance that maybe we'll find better days
Cuz I don't need boxes wrapped in strings
And desire and love and empty things
Just a chance that maybe we'll find better days
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