Dublin crew!!!

Maybe this is the wrong place for this but I've been invited to Iraq - Shall I go??

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http://www.patdollard.com/main.html

E-mails:

03/08/2006 - "I'm going back to Ramadi in September. Want to work for me and run a camera?"

04/08/2006 - "It ain't a party. Here's how it works. There's a 90% chance you will come back alive.
There is a 70% chance you will come back unwounded ( ie a 30% chance you will be wounded ). There is a 100% chance that some piece of hot flying metal ( mortar sharpnel, bullet, rocket, ied shrapnel or even ied concussion ) will fly within mere inches of your body. 100% Chance you will come mere inches from dying or being wounded. It's guaranteed. And when you come back, after enduring such hardships to help these peasants fight terrorist/gangster rule, after escaping close brushes with death every single day, you will be afraid of nothing, and you will have zero tolerance for the average civilian and their typical arrogance, earned, ultimately, by nothing. It's almost comical how you'll see these soft dufuses parade around like the badasses they will never be, practically demanding you kiss their ass without ever having earned it. The average, lazy ass, self-centered civilian's arrogance will be truly astounding to you. It'll be as if shackles have fallen from your eyes. And every rock and movie star will have lost every ounce of mystique and appeal to you. They will be what they are: plumbers or bus drivers or whoever who are simply plying a differnt type of trade. You will forever live in a different world, one you can not truly share with those closest to you, but only with those who have been through what you have been through. You will understand family as a verb, and appreciate it more as such instead of as a genetic-based noun. And in an indescribable way, you will know the truth of human nature, you will know the truth of everyone around you. Don't ask me how, but you will.


If you survive."

Patrick Dollard


I sent this gung ho American fella an e-mail asking him to justify his pro war stance and he replied to me a couple of times. (See below). He's now invited me to join him. So, shall I go??

"Dude, you're grasping at straws in every response you've made; or you've simply dodged the questions." Pat Dollard.


On Jul 20, 2006, at 7:46 AM, Byrne Steve (ST) wrote:


Just one more thing...you mention that my freedom, and possibly my life, is "..diectly related to Iraq not turning into a terrorist state.." Can you please explain what you mean by a 'terrorist state'? If you mean a country which see's itself as being outside of international law, and which acts unilaterally in undertaking acts of 'pre-emptive aggression against soverign nations then that is quite interesting. Are you aware that the U.S is the only country to have ever been charged with state terrorism?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua_vs._United_States_case

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Original Message

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From: Byrne Steve (ST)
Sent: 20 July 2006 12:24
To: 'Patrick Dollard'
Subject: FW: Iraq


Amended...

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Original Message

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From: Steven Byrne [mailto:sfbyrne300@hotmail.com]
Sent: 18 July 2006 19:21
To: Byrne Steve (ST)
Subject:

Patrick Dollard
Me

1. The pan-establishment of democracy, capitalism and modernism ( particularly modern education ) are the only real cure for the spread of Jihadism aka Terrorism.
And do you have a historical precedent on which you base this assumption? Or is it merely an assumption?

2. There is no legitimate analogue between the Cuban terrorism you cite, and global Jihadism.
I didn't say that there was. I was reffering to the double standards of the Bush Administration, who are knowingly harbouring known terrorists in the U.S.

3. Who specifically said that Iraq was responsible for 9-11?
You mentioned that Iraq and terrorism were linked. You also mentioned 9/11 within a discussion about the rights and wrongs of the invasion of Iraq.

4. The claim that the U.S. and British governments lied to their populations has been widely disproven and is debatable at best.
There has been no independent inquiry into this matter. The 2002 Butler report was a sham. Anyone with an iota of intelligence knows that the goverments of Britain and the U.S lied to the populations in order to try to justify the illegal invasion of Iraq. Why, for instance, would the British government present a dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction which was made up largely of a plagiarized students thesis 12 years out of date?
http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2003/3007neocon_hoax.html
" But it emerged that some of the document was copied from three different articles, including one written by a postgraduate student. Excerpts from a paper relating to the build-up to the 1991 Gulf War by Californian student Ibrahim al-Marashi were used in the intelligence document. The paper was published in the Middle East Review of International Affairs. Other sections in the dossier were apparently taken from defence journal Jane's Intelligence Review. "

The secret Downing Street memo

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.


The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.


(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)


MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide


What is the relevance of such past events to the succesful establishment of a democratic, capitalistic and modernized society in Iraq?
Because a democratic, capitalistic, and modernized society shouldn't be founded on lies, theft, and murder.

What is happening in Iraq is an alliance between our troops and the average Iraqi against two married-by-convenience gangs that seek to run the country. We offer Iraqis hope, the insurgents and Al Qaeda offer a rule by gangsters. What do you offer? Do you wish to help yourself, or just talk?

How did these two gangs - Al queda and the insurgents - happen to arise ? What was the catalyst for this event, or did it just simply happen out of a vacuum in history? There were no Al Queda in Iraq until after the U.S invasion. Now the place is a hotbed of terrorism and factional fighting to the point of it being a civil war. The U.S government were forewarned that an invasion would increase terrorism in the world but went ahead anyway. You created the mess, now deal with it.
You offer the Iraqi's hope? Interesting. Read this...
http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Feb2006/davies0206.html

5. As for "U.S....failed state..." stuff, we've gotten to the core of the issue between us. You hate the United States. Someone has made you believe that we are inherently bad, while others are inherently good. If you hate the U.S., fine, but I don't need to be bothered by the silly propaganda of an "I hate the United States, I am an enemy of the United States" mindset.
This comment is too ridiculous to be worthy of a response.

6. Your freedom, and perhaps your life, is directly related to Iraq not turning into a terrorist state that makes Afghanistan under the Taliban look like Disneyland.
That is a totally subjective opinion with no basis in reality.
On Jul 8, 2006, at 7:20 AM, Steven Byrne wrote:


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A bit of adventure and all that??